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This research sets out to analyse why security practices in Southeast Asian states 
vary. It critically explores by unpacking the origins and development of state 
structures to demonstrate why the region’s military spending is consistent with 
the historical trends. This thesis identifies that the contemporary security 
challenges are inherited by its specific histories that shaped the state’s threat 
perceptions in path dependent ways. Employing a comparative case analysis of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, the empirical findings 
demonstrate that the struggle for legitimacy during the initial formation of nation-
state influences how the state institutional settings of governing elites influence 
the security policy outcomes. 
This research identifies how security is a contested concept between social groups 
that inhabit the state. This research argues that security practices, and behaviours 
are socially inherited and shaped by social conflicts during the formation of the 
nation-state. To interrogate this puzzle, the thesis uses the Historical 
Institutionalist approach as an analytical framework through process tracing to 
examine a comparative analysis of the diverging state institutional structures 
which influence governing elites in security policy decision-making in Southeast 
Asian states. By unpacking the institutional variations across states in Southeast 
Asia and by drawing attention to the critical historical overview of the state 
structure, it helps explain how different socio-political groups are embedded in 
the political organisation and state institutions. 
One of the key findings of this research is that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, 
security is a historical by-product of contestation between actors in Southeast 
Asia which arises principally, if not exclusively, from its own social and 
institutional legacies and the changes of the political environment of individual 
states. The institutional legacies also influence how national political elites 
address its security concerns in order to uphold and reinforce its political 
legitimacy. The primacy of historical legacies on institutional arrangements need 
to be acknowledged in explaining security behaviour as it affects how it facilitates 
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This research analyses why, despite the changes in the balance of power, 
(specifically the rise of China and its South China Sea assertiveness) security 
policy responses and practices in Southeast Asia vary, and that military spending 
in Southeast Asian countries has remained relatively modest, and indeed, 
consistent with its longer term trends. It seeks explanations by examining the 
relationship between historical legacies and the transformation of statehood and 
how these seem to have influenced the security policies of the states in question. 
In pursuit of this goal, this research undertakes a comparative analysis of four 
Southeast Asian states, namely, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippine and 
Indonesia, in relation to how they approach the formulation and implementation 
of national security policies. It demonstrates that the determinants of national 
security policies are far more complex than what is conventionally presented. The 
historical studies of the Southeast Asian states would also provide a powerful 
analysis on the continuing relevance of security to political life and in the 
contemporary context (Hobden, 1998). It shows how the presence of institutional 
differences in Southeast Asian states during the critical junctures influence how 
security policies are formulated to produce divergent outcomes. With an in-depth 
analysis of the region’s historical experiences, this research suggests Southeast 
Asian security behaviour is inherited by its specific histories that shaped the 
state’s threat perceptions in path dependent ways. 
In recent decades, Southeast Asia has moved from the periphery to the centre 
of international relations and security studies. The post-Cold War has been 
marked by a regional power shift in East Asia between the two superpowers U.S. 
and China. Over the last 25 years, the region also witnessed a substantial increase 
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in military spending in Southeast Asia. Given these significant changes, security 
analysts are concerned with how the changes in balance of powers will affect 
regional security (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014). Realists argue that the strategic 
uncertainties inevitably forced states to build their military to achieve security in 
the anarchic international system (Mearsheimer, 2006). Contrary to the 
traditional expectations regarding the great power politics and their 
preponderance in regional security, this study argues that pre-existing indigenous 
internal threats in these states are also critical in influencing how the ruling elites 
formulate security policies in Southeast Asia. 
 Despite the voluminous commentary on this phenomenon, this thesis seeks 
to contribute to knowledge by looking into domestic politics, social controls, 
institutions and interest that drive the highly varied national security priorities as 
a particular security behaviour in selected individual Association of Southeast 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. For many states in the region, security is no 
longer conceived as defence against other states to be the prime drivers of security 
practices. It requires us to broaden the security spectrum that other endogenous 
issues such as class, clashes between ethnics, cultures and religions would also 
present similar security problems to the states (Acharya and Tan, 2004). This 
thesis aims to supplement the literature by conducting a critical investigation of 
the dynamics of security policies from the domestic views on how states have 
responded to the changing nature of its security environment. Scholars and 
policymakers have often overlooked the domestic drivers such as elite politics, 
ideologies, and state institutional arrangements which provides a more fortuitous 
explanation why different states adopt different security strategies. 
The central focus of this research is to explore and identify the differences 
in national security practices in Southeast Asian states and the policy making 
processes at the state institutional level. As we shall see, ideas about security 
remains unique in Southeast Asia which have important consequences for 
security practice in the region. As Krasner (1999) writes, ruling elites wants to 
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stay in power and promote the security, values and prosperity of their constituents 
in order to achieve sovereignty over the state. Building on this argument, Jones 
(2012a) further elaborates that sovereignty is constantly contested between the 
social forces and that the ordering of state power is determined by the dominant 
political forces. It is within this puzzle that this research traces the historical 
process of the development of national security. This research draws influence 
from the Constructivist and the Critical Theory approach in security studies and 
employs a Historical Institutionalist approach to understand how a particular 
configuration of state-society relationship that emerged in Southeast Asian states 
influences its security practices. The analysis of historical conditions of the state 
provides a better articulation on why certain security policies continue to be of 
relevance for policymakers, which helps us understand the diverging trajectories 
of security behaviours.  
 
1.2 Rationale of the Study 
 
This research aims to explore the politics of security in Southeast Asia by 
focusing on interest and contestations within the domestic politics of the 
respective states. The general objective of this research is to contribute a better 
understanding of how local actors respond to security challenges. Conducting a 
comparative historical analysis of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines, this thesis argues that the state structures of governing elites 
influence its security outcomes. This research emphasises that the capacity for 
Southeast Asian states to meet its security challenges depends on the level of elite 
cohesion in the domestic. Less attention has been placed on the ‘second image’ 
i.e. the states and the domestic factors in influencing the policy decision-making 
(Moravscik, 1997). By unpacking the state, this research aims to emphasize that 
contemporary security policies in each state have been historically and socially 
constructed: that they are the products of historical legacies, a product of 
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competing social forces interests and conflicts that have accumulated over 
considerable periods of time. This is achieved by analysing ways about the 
origins, evolution and consequences of politics of security in Southeast Asia.  
Research on security practices tend to be dominated by the realist 
perceptions, that states are assumed to be unitary actors who makes security 
decisions based on their position to maximise their power in the international 
system (Schweller, 1994). The mainstream of security studies, especially that of 
neorealism and neoliberalism has been susceptible to ahistoricism, that ‘that 
history only exists in so much as it reflects present conditions, and as such denies 
novelty and change (Hobson, 2002; Mabee, 2003). Acharya (2011) argues that 
the regional studies are often considered as ‘atheoretical’. Despite that such a 
claim is contested, it nevertheless highlights that the region is under-theorised 
(Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003).  
As Muthiah Alagappa (2003, p. 11) argues, “Viewed through the ahistorical 
realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia 
is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest 
otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, 
there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region’s disputes and 
conflicts have stabilised.” To that extent, the realist perspective only provides a 
partial explanation as the study of security is too narrowly focused on the military 
security of states, negating that smaller states policies in international politics also 
matter on how states respond to insecurity (Kuik, 2008; Lobell, Ripsman and 
Taliaferro, 2009). The existing literature suggest security as traditionally defined 
through the anarchic systemic structure that are fixed, and that it is limited to the 
defence of territorial integrity by military means which are linked with weapons 
purchase and sovereignty (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2006). However, this does 
not necessarily correlate with all the dimensions of the security of people and an 
overemphasis upon statist security (Thakur and Newman, 2003, p. 2).  
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This research argues that the role of history and the politics on security 
policies needs to be described in depth. To understand the different trajectories in 
security policies, practices, and behaviours in the region, it is important to show 
how security is  part of a complex historical process of dealing with violence and 
order in modern political and social life (Krause and Williams, 2018). The 
fundamental purpose of a state is to provide security and welfare to its people and 
in return, the states achieve sovereignty as the organising principle (Krasner, 
1999). Hence, analysing the origins of social constitution of state power is vital 
to our understanding of Southeast Asian security practices. It also shows how 
state institutions can either enhances or constrains in which political actors 
choose to formulate their policies depending on the specific institutional 
arrangements (Thelen, 1999).  
In short, the central argument that this thesis sets out to advance is that it is 
domestic politics and social change that drives the highly varied increase of 
military spending as a particular security behaviour in selected individual 
ASEAN states. Accordingly, several key research questions are posed to help this 
study analyse and understand the determinants of Southeast Asian security.  
The key research questions are: 
1. Why, despite the changes in balance of power, do security practices and 
security policy respond varies in Southeast Asia? 
2. What explains the differences in national security policies in each state 
in Southeast Asia? 
3. To what extent do domestic institutions influence political actors on 
security policy behaviours? 
4. To what extent do historical antecedents influence state actors’ 
perceptions on policy decision-making? 
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Various possible explanations can be derived from numerous strands of 
theoretical and empirical literature on Southeast Asian studies and international 
politics. As the process of security practices is highly complex in each case study 
which is driven by political, socioeconomic, norms, culture and strategic factors, 
focusing on a single paradigmatic approach cannot fully explain the empirical 
puzzles that this research pose on the study of security in Southeast Asia. To 
address these questions, this research will use the Historical institutionalist (HI) 
approach to contribute to the study on security. HI pays attention to the different 
historical experiences in these states that impacts on its domestic political 
institutions and its perceptions on security threats.  As shall be explained in 
greater detail in the next chapter, the aim is to analyse states behaviour by 
unpacking the state to understand how the conception of security originates in a 
given polity. As the state structures were intensely contested between social 
forces during the formation of states, this helps us to understand why security 
practices are conditioned by their history, prevailing interests, conflicts and 
ideologies that helped shape states’ threat perceptions. This analytical framework 
is inter-disciplinary which allows the connection between the study of 
international politics and domestic politics (Hall, 2010; Fioretos 2011; Thelen, 
1999). It is noteworthy that little research has been dedicated to the use of HI as 
an analytical approach to address the differences in security practices in Southeast 
Asian states.  
Grounded in a constructivist perspective, HI draws on the complexity of the 
nature of policy decision-making, which argues that the historical legacies of 
timing and sequences shaped security policy outcomes (Pierson, 2000; Lantis, 
2002). In particular, it explores the concepts of temporal context sequencing, the 
practice of institutional layering and the role of ideas which can either constrain 
or enhance state actors to explain the differences in policy outcomes (Hall, 2010; 
Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005). Using a path dependency model allows us to 
identify why certain dominant ideas are formulated and implemented over others. 
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This would also provide us the analytical tools for policy changes during specific 
critical junctures in various case studies to understand the power dynamics that 
cause states to react differently.  
As a starting point, HI subscribes that security is socially constructed 
(Haglund, 2014). Security is defined by ‘the products of historical structures and 
processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal 
groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them’ (Lipschutz, 1995, 
p. 8). Security practices emerge from the contestation between social forces to 
gain the distribution of power and push the policy agenda that best suits their own 
interest. Political issues become securitised when political actors identify them as 
a security threat (Buzan, et al., 1998). Sharing similar insights with the 
constructivist approach, the meaning of security is not considered as given that is 
fixed across time. It conceived that security is a fluid construction by which its 
meaning changes in different temporal contexts (Mcdonald, 2008). It challenges 
the dominant paradigm of realism that often view security as a result of material 
capabilities, international anarchy and the distribution of power portrayed by 
rational actors (Waltz, 1979). As shown in our subsequent chapters, Southeast 
Asia’s late capitalist development has produced highly distinctive forms of state 
and regime, different modes of political controls, institutions and interests that 
would explain the divergences in the conceptions of security practices. If we 
accept that states are not simply similar units but are necessarily shaped by the 
historical conditions in which they develop, the distinctive nature of state power 
must find its logic on how the state shaped its policy outcomes (Jones, 2010).  
For the purpose of this research, using HI as a theoretical framework allows 
us to explore and analyse the mechanism reinforces or undermines the 
development path for regime states in Southeast Asia. This helps us explain why 
states respond differently to threats. Investigation of this kind may focus on 
greater details on the presence or absence of different reinforcement mechanism 
such as perceptions, domestic politics, the role of elites, and corruption to help 
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understand the military dynamics in Southeast Asia (Taliaferro, 2000; Rathbun, 
2008; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Kaarbo. 2015).  
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
Structurally, this thesis comprises of seven chapters. While Chapter 1 
provides the introduction, this chapter will also discuss the methodology as a 
research tool for the subsequent empirical chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
existing literature on how different theoretical approaches on security practices 
in greater details. It first problematises the concept of security from different IR 
perspectives and operationalizes this concept for measurement of security in 
Southeast Asia. The referent object for this study is then developed from the HI 
as an analytical tool in order to demonstrate its applicability differences in 
Southeast Asia.  
Chapters 3 to 6 are empirical chapters to investigate the security practices of 
four Southeast Asian states: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The empirical chapters are organised chronologically so as to highlight the 
ongoing interactive and cumulative dialogues on how security policies in 
Southeast Asia have evolved over time. Doing so, helps us to identify the 
persistent themes on the differences in states behaviours in different states; it 
reveals how certain ideas are more dominant than others which helps explain the 
path dependence on how political actors choose to formulate and implement its 
security policies.  
In Chapter 3, this thesis examines the social origins of security conflict in 
these particular cases. It aims to explore the early roots of social conflict in 
Southeast Asia during the period of colonialism and World War II to help us 
provide a historical picture on the different trajectories on state formation. While 
the history of Southeast Asia will be familiar to many scholars, the chapter serves 
a number of important purposes. First, to explain the origin and evolution of 
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Southeast Asian security practices, we have to engage how its specific histories 
reveal the nation-states struggle to achieve its independence with varying degrees 
of political contestation between social forces. The variations in the degree of 
integration or intervention by the colonial powers during this period influence the 
levels of political contestations in the domestic politics during the make-up of the 
nation-state is very apparent. Second, this chapter will also reveal that the 
historical origins which shaped threat perceptions and state-society coalitions in 
a powerful path dependent effects they have to the formulation of security 
policies in Southeast Asia.  
Chapter 4 aims to analyse the emergence of newly independent nation-states 
in Southeast Asia and explore the different levels of political institutions 
constructed during the decolonisation. It analyses that the differences in social 
cleavages present in the region gave rise to the specific dominant actors that shape 
the state. It helps us determine the differences in regime types that emerged and 
the levels of state capacity. The differences in competition for social forces in the 
state would also differ in political institutional arrangements. Chapter 5 analyses 
the role of regime transition in the post-Cold War. It compares how the different 
types of regimes responded in the Cold War period and the levels of domestic 
institutional changes but in various types. This will also highlight the differences 
in institutional resilience present in each state which determines how states shape 
their security policies. It examines how the changes can determine the trajectory 
of how states pursue their security perceptions, which may act as a catalyst 
towards the path dependence of security policies in Southeast Asia.  
  Chapter 6 discusses the variances of security policies adopted by different 
regimes in Southeast Asia. It considers the possible impact of regional security 
problems, in terms of material impact on the states and their responses to manage 
these threats as a consequence. It provides a comparative analysis on how each 
country different regimes perceive different security priorities that are 
endogenous to their historical formation. Chapter 7 concludes the chapter by 
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summarizing the findings on this study and presents its contribution to the 
existing literature. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
This section discusses the methodology framework employed in the research 
and data collected. To identify the different levels of power relations in state 
institutions and analyse their differences in generating its security policies, this 
study focuses on the qualitative method to explore the socio-political processes 
on national security. This research employs a historical-comparative case study 
method as a tool to assess the variations of security policies in the region. The 
comparative case study method is the most appropriate methodology for this 
research to help explain the research design in order identify the causal claims 
and generate new knowledge on the phenomenon (Burnham et al. 2008). The aim 
of the methodology is to analyse the core questions: Why, despite the changes in 
balance of power do military spending and acquisitions remained stable in 
Southeast Asia consistent with historical trends? Why do national security 
policies in each state in Southeast Asia different? To what extent do domestic 
institutions influence political actors on security policy behaviours? To what 
extent do historical antecedents influence state actors’ perceptions on policy 
decision-making? 
In order to provide a critical analysis on the variations of national security 
in Southeast Asia, it is therefore beneficial for this research to use a comparative 
method to disconfirm the conventional logic. In classifying the variations in 
policy outcomes, it is necessary to adopt a cross-comparative research on how 
institutions in the states can have causal sequences in which their historical events 
affect how security policies vary in Southeast Asia. To do so, it is therefore 
appropriate for this research to explore the state from a historical perspective as 
a methodological value toward theorising how the temporal processes matter in 
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the state’s national security (Thelen, Steinmo and Lange, 1992; Fioretos, 2011). 
Policymaking processes are inherently influenced by the political institutional 
arrangements, out of which the capacity of the state varies. For HI, it focuses on 
the origins, evolutions and consequences of political institutions from the 
domestic to international level (Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate, 2016).  
To examine the policy differences, it is important to analyse how domestic 
power relations between institutions and the rules of the game at a given time 
influence the policy outcomes (Mahoney, 2000). Using the right methodological 
approach is essential to the theme of the research in order to address the historical 
development of the political institutions in the given case studies. In order to 
analyse and examine the existing political institutional arrangements, this thesis 
employs  the comparative sequential method (Falleti, 2010; Falleti and Mahoney, 
2015). The comparative sequential method “constitutes a theoretically guided 
application of the method of process-tracing that uncovers and specifies the 
causal mechanisms that link the main events of the processes under study and 
compares the resulting sequences across cases to explain the sources of variance 
in the outcomes of interest (Falleti, 2010).” The comparative cross-case study 
method allows for comparing institutional practices between states in the region 
and the variations of the institutional arrangements on how it influences the policy 
outcomes (Pennington, 2009).  
The methodology is important for this study as the political realities for each 
state differ, causing the policy responses to vary (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). By 
comparing the sequences, it provides the methodological tool to identify key 
events that are sequential in the initial period of the state that created the path 
dependence that dictates a state’s behaviour. Further, by incorporating process-
tracing provides an inductive analysis on the macro-social comparative historical 
method and individual level decisions to study how policies are formulated for 
policy outcomes (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 263). More concretely, process-
tracing attempts to uncover how power relations in the state and political actors 
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behave in various institutional arrangements before and after the critical juncture. 
HI seeks to differentiate how the different stages or events influence the state 
which either hinder or enhance the policies often with enduring consequences 
(Amenta and Ramsey, 2010). A historical-comparative analysis method enables 
this study to analyse the background conditions on how state formulates its policy 
decisions (Ragin 2000; Della Porta and Keating 2008). Because political actors 
are influenced by different causal mechanisms, it provides a distinctive feature to 
understand how political actors behave when confronted with institutional 
imperatives. Depending on its timing and sequences, history matters in the study 
of institutions as earlier events provide the sequential processes that influence 
how ruling elites formulate policies (Steinmo, 2008). Once the relevant 
antecedents have been identified, this research consider the preference of political 
actors to the types of national security policies being proposed. 
By using a controlled comparison of a small-N research, it allows for rich 
referencing on policy narratives and process tracing through space and time 
(Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). The methodological consideration is both necessary 
and vital to the study of Southeast Asian politics as it provides a closer look at 
processes and the variations in institutions in diverse cases to explain the 
particular phenomena by using theories and causal mechanism (Bennett, 2004). 
In order to advance the study on the development of domestic institutions, using 
process-tracing in a small-N research can identify key events and through some 
specific causal factors, how these events are connected to processes and 
sequences (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015). Furthermore, the study of small-N 
research, as opposed to the large-N research is a more context-bound method 
which provides detailed analysis allowing for more variable explanations rather 
than a single generic variable that influences a state’s national security concepts 
(Hopkins, 2010).  
This thesis has chosen Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines 
for comparative study due to their particular historical experiences and the ways 
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these have impacted their particular political processes. They were not subject, 
for instance, to the same form of colonialism (but to Dutch, Britisth, Spanish and 
U.S. colonialisms depending on the particular country); their civilian authorities 
have different capacities in exerting authority in the state; and they have different 
cultural formations with a variety of ethnic communities and religions (Beeson 
and Bellamy, 2008). That said, there are several commonalities, which together 
with their differences, make these countries particularly suitable for comparison 
to understand the complexity of political processes (Croissant and Lorenz, 2018). 
By selecting a small number of case studies, it provides greater research details 
on the process of national security decision-making in the region.  
The remarkable historical depth that Southeast Asia provides makes it 
unique to analytically fill the literature gap, by critically investigating the various 
political regime types and power relations between domestic institutions. 
Selecting the small-N case study in this perspective avoids selection biases as 
each of these case studies has different institutional arrangements, allowing this 
research to gain in-depth knowledge on the state’s national security concept 
(Della Porta and Keating, 2008).  
First, Indonesia and the Philippines are archipelagic states, which somewhat 
share similar security concerns due to its geographical proximity. Singapore, on 
the other hand, is a city-state which makes its perceptions on security different 
from the three other case studies. Meanwhile, Malaysia is a federated state with 
some of its territories located in Borneo, separated by the South China Sea. 
Second, Malaysia and Singapore share similar parliamentary political systems 
while, Indonesia and the Philippines, on the other hand are presidential systems 
allowing for control for the main argument. Third, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines are claimants of the South China Sea which share similar maritime 
concerns over their territorial water sovereignties. Though the only 
commonalities between these cases are that they are claimants over the disputed 
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water, their historical background, colonial experiences and domestic struggles 
are vastly different.  
This research considers Singapore because it has good relations with all 
major regional states such as Australia, China, Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. 
Additionally, it has the highest military spending in comparison to the other 
Southeast Asian countries; effective military organisation as well as strong 
diplomatic relations with ASEAN counterparts; and the has the strongest 
economy of the four. The Philippines is also important as they are one of the key 
countries that are in conflict with China, especially in recent times with the 
arbitration tribunal over the South China Sea dispute and a major ally of the U.S. 
Selecting the Philippines enables better understanding in this research. 
Methodologically, historical comparative case studies allow the development of 
more sophisticated variants of concepts (Bennett and Elman, 2007). Hence, by 
choosing these case studies, it allows us to explore the reasons for variant factors 
of security concerns on the diverging national security concept.  
 
1.5 Data Analysis 
 
1.51 Primary and Secondary Data Resources  
 
 
To explore the divergent security policies in Southeast Asia, this research 
proposes a combination of primary data and secondary research data as research 
tools to understand a state’s national security concept. A detailed compilation of 
statistical data was provided by two authoritative bodies: the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Military Balance 
published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). These two 
bodies provide primary data for initial analyses on military spending in military 
procurements, arms sales as well as military inventories to determine the military 
dynamics in Southeast Asia. For analytical purposes the primary data provided 
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by these two authoritative bodies is sufficiently accurate. It is important to analyse 
the military expenditure as it provides a relative assessment of government 
priorities between military and non-military sectors showing the economic 
burden of a state to fund the cost of its military (Omitoogun and Skons, 2006). It 
also illustrates a general trend of military acquisitions and awareness of states’ 
military trajectories and capabilities in the region. It is noteworthy as the Military 
Balance mostly records the military acquisitions for states but does not provide 
the economic data such as the military expenditure as a GDP percentage. To 
overcome the limitation of data, this research instead supplemented it with the 
SIPRI figures as part of the raw data. However, primary statistical data is only 
limited to its raw data without any qualitative analysis in assessing states’ military 
capabilities. This is because when it comes to assessing the capabilities it is about 
how a state is able to exploit its resources (Biddle, 2004). 
As such, official public documents, memoirs, policy statements, government 
reports, official speeches, congressional reports, defence white papers, the state’s 
constitution, and archives, as well as data from the World Bank were analysed as 
one of the most essential data resources for this research. To gain data from the 
public documents, this research mainly focused on policy-making organisations 
in different states but also on the statements from various government institutions 
(for instance Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance to name a few) public 
statements and public reports. Because this study employs a qualitative approach, 
it is therefore necessary to gather the relevant data as documents provide the 
relevant narratives for the state’s policy choices (Vromen, 2010). The primary 
data collected provides the historical context of states’ policy process which 
offers a holistic picture of the political and social behaviour (Steinmo, 2008). To 
gain more information, this research focuses on information on the historical 
backgrounds of states in Southeast Asia, particularly on the members of ASEAN 
comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore to trace the 
process of its policy decision-making. These sources are obtained from the web 
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pages of the states’ prime minister’s office, the ASEAN webpage, the Shang-ri la 
dialogue, the national governments and newspaper articles. The data analysis 
employed in this research helps to lay down the thought processes and outcomes 
of policymaking in each case as well as to infer the normative contexts of 
policymaking from their statements.  
 
Information Data Resources 
Information Sources 
National Security and Security 
Policies in Southeast Asia  
Journal articles, policy documents, official 
speeches, books, government reports 
Politics and Political Security of 
Southeast Asia 
Journals, newspapers, relevant blogs, internet 
news portals and books 
Defence White Papers and Security 
related policies in Southeast Asia 
Policy documents, official speeches, books, journal 
articles, magazines, news portals  
Process of Policy Making in Southeast 
Asia 
Policy documents, journal articles 
Policy Debates and Statements in 
Southeast Asia 




To supplement the primary data due to accessibility, secondary data is also 
used extensively, derived from institutions’ working papers, journal articles, 
published books from both local and international sources, defence magazines as 
well as news articles in English and Malay. To be able to access these documents, 
the research relied on extensive use of internet search engines, as well as think 
tank institutions’ websites and organisations, and visiting the relevant libraries 
that hold extensive collections of Southeast Asian studies and military studies. In 
order to handle these data sources, these documents will be rigorously analysed 
with John Scott’s control criteria of Authenticity, Credibility, Representativeness 
and Meaning (Scott, 1990). Specifically, by using John Scott’s four criteria the 
documentary research is authentic where the origin of the source is reliable and 
dependable; is credible where the documents are free from error and distortion, 
providing an accurate account of the chosen standpoint; is representative where 
the documents gathered are typical of their kind; and is clear in meaning where 
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the documents provide clear, comprehensible and significant data (Mogalakwe 
2009). Employing these criteria will provide a strict adherence to quality control 
in order to meet the required standards.  
The second method of sourcing is the existing literature focusing on the 
relationship of states in the region as well as the dynamics of military changes 
which are valuable sources of information for the research. Existing analytical 
writing provides several possible explanations on the reasons behind the military 
acquisitions in Southeast Asia and the possible changes in national policies. 
Furthermore, they provide a methodological cue for this research to challenge the 
understanding the political processes for the national security concept in 
Southeast Asia. Analysing the existing literature also provides much information 
about the selected countries. As a secondary source, defence magazines and news 
outlets are additional methods that provide rich information about the changes in 
foreign policymaking. Thus, in order to narrate the context of the public 
statements, this research employed academic scholarship of investigative 
journalism and journalistic investigations to understand what contributes to the 
dynamics of military relationships in Southeast Asia. The use of media outlets 
and blogs is also substantially employed as the media are on occasion inherently 
biased to its patrons. Some news outlets are owned by the government or the 
oppositions which provides a useful tool to cross-reference the information 
available. The third method of sourcing is working papers and institutional think-
tank writings. The main purpose of using these sources is to provide a clear 
background of the dynamics of Southeast Asia that contribute to the context of 
changes in foreign policymaking. Expert analysis is a valuable source for 
understanding the regional dynamics with inside local knowledge provided. More 
importantly, the data gathered was used as part of the key sources to understand 
the policy processes in these case studies. This research used the collected data 
to identify the policy patterns in the given state which provides meaning to 




This research also employed interviews to supplement the data gathered 
from the documentary research to understand the empirical puzzle. This research 
conducted interviews with influential local academic scholars and analysts with 
the knowledge on the national security policies as well as some officials in 
various countries involved in the policy process (Hochschild, 2009). Generally, 
the interviewees consist of local academic experts, mid-level ranking bureaucrats 
that are either involved in the military acquisitions in their respective countries, 
retired government officials and high-level ranking officials who are influential 
and directly involved in policymaking. Interviews are a method that provides 
favourable opportunities to gain rich information to explain the phenomena 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995).  
Interviews were undertaken for six months in Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei 
and the UK. Due to the limited financial resources, I was unable to conduct 
interviews in the Philippines and Indonesia. However, to attain the best available 
substitutes, interviews were conducted both in Singapore and Brunei. With the 
help of local intermediaries and personal relations with some ex-Brunei high 
ranking officials, I was able to gain audiences with some of the mid-level and 
high-ranking individuals during their visits to Brunei for both official and 
personal trips. During my visit to Singapore, I was able to gain access to the local 
think-tank experts and was fortunate to be introduced to the region’s experts with 
vast knowledge on the case studies. To supplement, I also was fortunately able to 
secure online interviews with local Indonesian and the Filipino scholars to gain 
insights on their perspectives on the subject of national security practices. 
Meanwhile, in the UK, I was able to attend workshops and seminars to obtain 
some connections with the embassies of respective countries to gain local 
insights. They helped me organise for interviews with the relevant individuals 
who have insights on the respective country’s security practices.  
 30 
Overall, there were 28 interviews gathered out of which some of them are 
interviewed under the Chatham House rules, due to the sensitive nature of the 
research. As such, some of the interviews were not recorded as requested by the 
interviewees. Moreover, due to financial limitations, this research could only 
cover two of the countries (Singapore and Malaysia). However, because 
Singapore hosts one of the most influential think tanks in the region (ISEAS and 
RSIS), most country experts reside in Singapore. It is notwithstanding that I had 
difficulties accessing the interviewees involved in policymaking in other 
Southeast Asian countries (other than Brunei), especially with high-ranking 
officials. Therefore, this research used local intermediaries such as interviewing 
local academics and local think tank analysts in the specific countries chosen who 
will be useful for the purpose of this research. Often, local think tank respondents 
worked closely with the government policy makers who have direct access to 
government institutions as well as being consultants to policy formulations. Their 
opinions on the security policies also carry weight due to their expertise on the 
subject matter. 
The interviews were conducted via emails and face-to-face interviews to 
gain access to these individuals. It provided insights into the interviewee’s 
thoughts on the policymaking process. These interviewees were carefully 
selected based on their backgrounds, positions and knowledge of national 
security (Berg, 2004). This study used a semi-structured interview, as it is the 
most appropriate method for gaining information especially when it comes to 
sensitive research topic. The semi-structured interview provides in-depth detail 
on the insider’s perspective (Leech, 2002). This interview method allowed this 
research to be flexible with open-ended questions, limiting the likelihood of the 
interviewees feeling restricted while at the same time without straying off topic 
(Mikecz, 2012). Additionally, it enables me to gain a rapport with the 
interviewees to make them feel at ease during the interview and in turn, gain their 
trust and confidence so that the information provided would be more constructive 
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(Leech, 2002). From the qualitative data, this research aims to gain a deeper 




















































An investigation of Southeast Asian security practice assumes greater 
urgency with regards to the growing dynamics in the regional affairs. This chapter 
sets to construct an analytical framework as a precursor to the subsequent 
empirical chapters. It aims to problematise the current dominant explanation on 
security practices and its policies. This chapter rejects the realist position that the 
states are ‘black box’, that it fails to examine the complex structure of states and 
the dynamic relations between the state and society. This chapter aims to show 
that the study of security practices is more fruitful from the domestic lens, which 
provides a different picture to understand how political contestations and its 
different historical conditions influence the process of policy decision-making. It 
employs a historical-comparative approach championed by the Historical 
Institutionalist (HI) framework to understand the state institutional arrangements 
in the formulation of state’s national security concept. This would provide the 
analytical tool in explaining the divergence of security policies in the region.  
The study of security practices in Southeast Asia constitutes an excellent 
case for institutional comparative study. It aims to contribute by providing a 
richer historical analysis and its specific institutional arrangements and highlights 
how different state structures contribute to the variations of security policies. It 
provides a qualitative analysis through process tracing which includes the critical 
analytical components such as critical antecedents, critical junctures, path 
dependence, and the reproduction of institutions to understand divergence of 
national security policies (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010; Slater and Simmons, 2010; Capoccia, 2015).  
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It is important to note that political contestation over power in the domestic 
level plays an important role in the discourse of formulating security policies. 
This chapter aims to show that HI offers a finer tuned and historically rooted 
conception than generally founded in the constructivist approach. With the 
principle concept of institutions such as regime legitimacy, state structures, 
domestic power relations, nationalism and suchlike, HI sets out detailed criteria 
with which to provide comparative details to differentiate how Southeast Asian 
states are structured differently. This would also explain the divergent pathways 
centres on the critical juncture that the different levels of social conflict have 
profound consequences for allocations of resources and policy outcomes. 
By doing so, it provides a systematic framework on how security issues are 
viewed from the domestic level in which different society perceived security 
differently which explains the differences in security policy outcomes. In the 
following sections, this thesis will explain HI as an analytical tool and to grasp 
how the understanding of power relations and historical legacies shape the 
conceptualisation of national security policies. It provides a research design that 
is able to determine the causal effect of institutions on state policy. In other words, 
the study on institutions provides the links on how security issues are viewed 
from the state-society level view security differs across countries. 
The primary research questions of the thesis are fundamental in the study of 
security in Southeast Asia: why, despite the changes in security context have 
military spending and acquisitions remained stable in Southeast Asia, consistent 
with historical trends? What explains the differences in national security policies 
in each state in Southeast Asia? To what extent do historical antecedents 
influence state actors’ perceptions on policy decision-making? How do the state 
institutional settings influence the formulation of national security concept and 
implementation of security policy? In order to fully grasp the study on national 
security, we need to illustrate what are the important theoretical and conceptual 
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elements that explain the continuity and change in national security in Southeast 
Asia.  
This chapter proceeds in two main sections. The first section critically 
reviews and examines prominent IR theories; realist, constructivist and the 
critical theory approaches to national security and its security policy behaviours. 
It first analyses how the rise of China, the changing balance of power, and the 
South China Sea dispute are explained from the realist approach which inherently 
affects the Southeast Asian states security policies as a response to the regional 
power structure. The second part aims to examine the role of regional institution 
viewed from the constructivist approach vis-à-vis ASEAN as a regional 
framework for countries to be unitary actors working within the scope of its 
norms. The third part discusses the Neo-Gramsci critical theory that is 
fundamentally domestic oriented and puts on political contestation in security 
policies.  
 In the second section, this chapter aims to provide an alternative explanation 
for the variations on security policy behaviours by looking into the bottom-up 
approach to understand broadly the determinants in the state’s security 
behaviours. It employs a historical-comparative approach by incorporating the 
Constructivist and the Critical theory with HI framework to understand how the 
state institutional arrangements in the formulation of the state’s national security 
concept.  It aims to clarify the linkages by conceptualising how historical legacies 
and domestic state’s institutional arrangements influence national security 
behaviours. State’s national security concept should be understood from the 
institutional analysis by ‘bringing the states back in’ to explain the variation in 
state foreign policies on national security (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Chambers, 
2014). Thus, the national security concept emerges from the bargaining process 
in politics between political elites to secure their power in the domestic politics 
as well as maintaining state sovereignty in the international domain (Knight, 
1992; Narine, 2004).  
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The remainder of this chapter will then proceed to introduce the domestic 
variants form of analysis on states political institutions that would greatly benefit 
the study of security behaviours in Southeast Asia. Using key concepts from the 
historical institutionalist approach, that is the critical antecedent and the study on 
the origin of institutions, it offers a more nuanced explanation. Using HI as an 
analytical framework allows this thesis to explain three characteristics that are 
necessary as a prelude to understanding the differences in behaviour of states in 
Southeast Asia. They are: 1. political contestation, 2. state institutional order; and 
3. the historical legacies. The emergence of a state is a result of intense political 
contestation between the social force in the given polity. It provides an analysis 
on the relations of state-society which encompasses the role of power, norms and 
domestic social struggle in defining its foreign political interest and national 
security priorities in the region. If we choose to accept that individual states have 
different historical trajectories, this helps us explain how different state capacities 
effect how a state choose to pursue its security. 
 
  2.2 Literature Review 
 
Different Theoretical Approaches on Explaining Security Practices in Southeast 
Asia 
 
For a long time, Southeast Asian security was understood from the realist 
lens. For nearly seven decades, the U.S. presence in the region has brought some 
form of regional order and security which especially benefitted the capitalist 
states (Beeson, 2004). Under the umbrella of the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance, it 
provided an opportunity for the client states to prosper during the Cold War, while 
they were willing to tolerate illiberal political and economic practices (Beeson, 
2003). However, after the Cold War, the strategic environment for the Southeast 
Asia has reached a juncture: an increasingly emerging U.S.-China rivalry, driven 
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by the rise of China and the gradual change in the balance of power, and the 
territorial issues stemming from the colonial legacy (Liff and Ikenberry, 2014; Fu 
et al., 2015).  
There is a great consensus that it is the rise of China that has fundamentally 
changed the structural power in the regional and global international system. 
Numerous literatures have discussed that the military build-up in Southeast Asia 
is a response to the rise of China, the changing balance of power, and the U.S.-
China strategic competition (Buszynski, 2010; Majid, 2012; Ahmad and Mohd 
Sani, 2017; Murphy, 2017). They offer different theoretically informed accounts 
on the reactions of Southeast Asia’s security policies. Despite this, the realist 
approach is still considered by some as the most influential theory in security 
studies.  
Realist scholarship argues that the rise of China is the most important 
challenge to the balance of power and has led to intense security competition with 
the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific and possibly an all-out war (Mearsheimer 2006). 
Some also argue that the rise of China has changed the status quo and that could 
potentially become a hegemon replacing the U.S. (Leifer, 2005; Mearsheimer, 
2010). This is followed by China’s increasing military capabilities, becoming the 
second largest military spender in the world, solidifying its position as a rising 
power that can potentially challenge the current hegemon. As China’s economic 
capabilities continue to expand, its growing spending on military modernisation 
is seen as an intent to deter the U.S. involvement in the region (Summary of the 
2018 US National Defense Strategy, 2018). As a hegemonic power, the U.S. 
continues to play an important role in the region. It is widely accepted that 
historically in the post-World War II, the U.S. is seen as the guarantor of regional 
security in the Asia-Pacific and is deeply entrenched in military, economic, 
political and culture in Southeast Asia with its military presence for maintaining 
global and regional order (Chong, 2017).  However, due to China’s economic 
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pull, some argue that the U.S. must accommodate China’s growth in order to 
avoid military clashes (Kang, 2017).  
The U.S. as a regional and global hegemon is now increasingly locked in a 
strategic competition with China for influences, that extends to geostrategic, 
economic, military, geopolitical and other main domains (Shambaugh, 2018). To 
some, Southeast Asia is at the epicentre of the great power struggles competing 
for autonomy and order, at the expense of other smaller states (Patalano, 2013). 
As regional states are growing uncertain of U.S. commitments as a security 
guarantor, some scholars argued that smaller states appear to be hedging with the 
U.S. and China while at the same time engaging in military build-ups (Liff and 
Ikenberry, 2014; Glaser, 2015).Yet, the discourse of anxiety about the rise of 
China has exacerbated with the ASEAN states involved in the clash between the 
two superpowers: China vis-à-vis the U.S.  
 For small and middle power states in Southeast Asia, great power politics 
play a great significant role in the making of their security policies. For some, 
states either perceive this as a threat or as an opportunity to develop relations with 
these great powers (Murphy, 2017). Not to mention, at the epicentre of this great 
power rivalry, the South China Sea dispute plays a significant role on how they 
behave. One of the most influential scholars from the realist camp, Robert Kaplan 
(2014), pointed that the South China Sea is quickly turning into a strategic 
flashpoint for the great power politics for influence in international order. For 
Kaplan, China’s rapid military development has fuelled tension in the South 
China Sea, causing an action-reaction on military build-ups. Kaplan also argues 
that as China’s borders are more secure than in the past and provides Chinese 
rulers to increase its presence in the South China Sea. In recent years, satellite 
images also showed that China is militarising the South China Sea islets with 
military hardware and communications as well as helipads (O’Connor and Hardy, 
2015a; 2015b). This forces other littoral claimants to further develop their own 
naval capacities (Kaplan, 2011).  
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Scholars argued that the destabilising of uncertainty has warranted the U.S. 
and its allies, particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines to 
rebalance in order to maintain the regional order through the containment of 
China (Cruz De Castro 2015; Lee 2015; Swaine 2015; Zhang 2016). Drawing 
upon this logic, scholars and observers argued that great power competition 
between China and the U.S. may lead to conflict based on the historical logic of 
the Thucydides trap over the changes in distributional power and international 
order (Mearsheimer, 2006: Allison, 2015). As the relative power continues to 
shift to China, the probability of war is likely as the geostrategic challenges as its 
continued ascendance will have an impact on the U.S.-led international order 
(Allison, 2017). For Western scholars, the absence of international institutions 
and regimes capable of constraining the aggressors poses a greater likelihood of 
security dilemma amongst these great powers that can have a spill-over effect 
towards the region (Mearshimer, 2006). 
Realist perspective assumes that all states security interests are depicted as 
material which invariably assume that national interest is analogous, though only 
differ in its relative material capabilities under the condition of anarchic 
international system (Waltz, 1979). Due to the nature of the international system 
that is of self-help, states are driven to strengthen their defence capabilities 
through military modernisation to meet the strategic challenges. For Western 
scholars, state actors are highly autonomous and unitary which its behaviours are 
greatly influenced by the international structure (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
Mearsheimer (2006) contends that the rise of China may be a destabilising force 
to the regional order. It is especially true for realist scholars that while security 
policies may be open to input from political elites, the systemic level may restrain 
domestic social forces in security issues in order to survive and maintain 
sovereignty.  
Prominent scholars located in the region such as Emmers (2012), Tan 
(2014), and Khoo (2014) found that the continuing existence of great power 
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politics, the territorial disputes and the aggressive military modernisation 
reinforce the relevance of rationalist perspective. Khoo (2004) suggests that only 
great power politics can provide regional stability while the role of regional 
institutions such as ASEAN is fairly limited in managing conflict. Questions have 
also been raised about the U.S.’s strategic commitments in the region especially 
with the Trump administration when he decided to withdraw the U.S. from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Instead of reassuring their commitments to the 
region, Trump repositioned the U.S.’s commitment to the region by replacing it 
with the American first policies making allies bear a large share of defence 
commitments to its strategic allies which are at odds with the regional elites 
perceptions (Townshend, 2017). Regional institutions such as ASEAN and the 
ARF were created to reinforce the relevance of the self-help system and to a larger 
extent, the study of Southeast Asian security because they perceive that it is 
largely asymmetrical and unstable especially in great power politics (Khoo, 
Smith and Shambaugh, 2005). Such a realist account, however, has been 
criticised by other scholars on its inadequacy in explaining the contribution of 
regional order by the small and medium states in ASEAN (Goh, 2007).  
For ASEAN states, balancing and bandwagoning are not the only most 
appropriate strategic considerations on how smaller states respond to great power 
politics and the changes in the balance of power (Kang, 2003). In the post-Cold 
War, smaller and medium states in the region have been pursuing a hedging 
strategy vis-à-vis China and the U.S. which is a mixed method approach to 
accommodate and address the security challenges that the region is facing (Kuik, 
2008; Goh 2005; Jackson, 2014). For ASEAN states, they prefer to adopt 
pragmatic accommodation and economic interaction with China while 
maintaining U.S. presence benefitting its security presence in the region and 
preserving its political autonomy in the great power competition between China 
and the U.S. which represent its distinctive security strategy (Lim and Cooper, 
2015). Perhaps, this logic also carries some weight as the region is dominated by 
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weak, underdeveloped states with uneven levels of economic development (Ba, 
2009).  
Although the realist logic is still widely perceived as useful to help frame 
the policy behaviours in the region, the security policy behaviours in the region 
are more multi-layered and complex than realist might suggest. Realist has a 
tendency to ‘black box’ the state - that is, to put aside the domestic politics as 
unimportant in defining the state’s security behaviours. While the similar states 
like unit formulation carries some truth, it does not reflect that other primary 
institutions such as the regime types, non-intervention and sovereignty are subject 
of contestation that need to be problematised in thinking about the logic of 
security in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2012a). To assume that states behave in 
similar ways because of structural constraints ignores the actual conditions that 
state do not always conform to the systemic pressures (Acharya, 2005; Wendt, 
1999). The emphasis on the balance of power logic limits the realist approach to 
look beyond the materialist condition that other non-material factors can also play 
a proprietary role in explaining why the region has remained stable.  
Rather, the actual historical make-up of Southeast Asian states are diverse, 
with big variations in ethnicity, culture and identities which influence how states 
determine their security priorities and its practices  (Acharya, 2014). For instance, 
the Philippines is confronted with internal securities stemming from its historical 
make-up of a nation-state, originating from its colonial policies with countless 
counter-insurgencies and endemic poverty which limit the government projection 
capacity in building its military for conventional warfare (Cruz De Castro, 2014). 
On the other hand, Singapore’s history with its neighbouring countries vis-à-vis 
Malaysia and Indonesia has consistently driven its policymakers to maintain high 
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traditional security threats. For instance, Tan (2004) argues that the force 
modernisation in Southeast Asia is driven by prestige, corruption, economic 
growth and domestic factors. A good example is Malaysia. In recent years, 
Malaysia has revealed a modernisation plan to equip its military with newer 
emerging challenges, which its security doctrine was previously directed at 
internal threats.  The 2013 Sabah incursion and the 2014 clash with China in the 
South China Sea displayed a deep sense that its military faced several challenges 
in securing its sovereignty (Vuving, 2017). However, the plan to modernise its 
military were either cancelled or delayed following the weak commodity prices, 
which saw a decline in its defence expenditure. More so, the Malaysian 
government has also been under scrutiny over the 1MDB scandal, intensifying 
ethnic tensions in the state which sparked mass protest. These political 
developments forced the government to shift its priorities to the domestic by 
increasing the distribution of patronages in order to maintain political stability 
(Case, 2017). Such measurements clearly demonstrate that the government was 
more concerned about its economic development and political legitimacy over 
strategic ones. Not surprisingly, realist theory falls short to provide sufficient 
analytical explanation without giving appropriate considerations of the domestic 
views that security policies are politically contested between the social forces in 
the state. Its heavy bias towards the logic of balance of power offers partial 
explanation about the how the region has enduring peace or why the existence of 
institutional cooperation among East Asian states despite the heterogeneity of 
types of states in the region (Stubbs, 2014). 
By contrast, another influential approach in the study of Southeast Asia is 
the constructivist camp, which seeks to transcend from the realist approach. They 
challenged the realist assumption material capabilities logic in explaining a 
holistic picture on security as they ignored the inter-state cultural differences, 
norms, values and cognition in explaining the variations of national security 
policies (Acharya, 2014; Stubbs, 2014). Instead, they argue that security is 
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socially constructed out of the meanings that social actors interact with other 
states on the structures of the international system (Wendt, 1999). They posit that 
security perceptions are not epiphenomena of unitary states acting under anarchy 
and material power but are independent of these structures influenced by both 
normative and domestic structures (Johnston, 1999).  
In the post-Cold War, constructivists argue that the traditional realist of great 
power balancing and bandwagoning are not the only form of responses to power 
and relative capabilities (Kang, 2003; Ross, 2006; Chan, 2012).  They emphasise 
that the socialisation process that constitute as norms and culture rather than 
ideology provides a more comprehensive understanding on security behaviours 
(Hobson, 2000). They argue that regional states have managed to transcend from 
the realpolitik by forging a regional identity through the ideational structures via 
a process of socialisation to create a nascent security community (Acharya, 
2014). 
Constructivists explained that the formation of Association of Southeast 
Asian Nation (ASEAN) is perhaps the most significant regional institution that 
has exerted a dominant ideational influence over its members (Stubbs, 2014; 
Mahbuhani and Sng, 2017). They explained that the regional security order is 
enunciated by the norms of interstate conduct that have socialised its ASEAN 
members and even external powers, transforming their interests and identities 
(Hopf, 1998; Ba, 2009). Constructivists argue that the relative peace in Southeast 
Asia is achieved because the regional states have had an influence on the 
institutionalisation of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention, 
which is often called the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Haacke, 2003). Some also perceived 
that the rise of China has not prompted fear amongst the smaller regional states, 
as its identities from its history has shown that it is a peaceful country (Kang, 
2007; Shambaugh, 2005). Kang (2007) argues that the rise of China provides both 
strategic and economic opportunities rather than threats for the region.  
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 In recent times, as a regional multilateral institution, ASEAN has acted as 
a buffer for the U.S.-China rivalry in managing the dynamics of power the two 
major powers through a wider security architecture that is centred on ASEAN 
(Stubbs, 2014; Tan, 2018). The practice of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) by ASEAN members has helped maintain peace between 
members as well as other major states by providing normative regional platforms 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), ASEAN+3 for participants to work on 
understanding security issues (Ba, 2009). ASEAN’s prominence is largely 
successful through negotiations based on its capabilities as an entrepreneurial 
leadership and a regional conductor in managing regional order while 
maintaining its neutrality and unity (Stubbs, 2014; Yates, 2017).  
Despite ASEAN achievements as an institution in maintaining peace and 
security in the region, however, its role as a security community and success in 
managing conflicts have been challenged in recent times (Khoo, 2014, 2015). 
Increasingly, questions have been raised in recent years on ASEAN unity, with 
other members of ASEAN divided with their opinions on certain aspects of the 
institutions policies on China (Khoo, 2016). For the first time in its forty-five 
years of history, ASEAN failed to agree on its joint communique in 2012 to agree 
on a diplomatic stance on the South China Sea dispute. Constructivists argue that 
the norm of non-interference in member states’ affairs explain the lack of 
substantive regional cooperation (Acharya, 2014).  
Further, mistrust between members still persists which affects its 
effectiveness in managing conflicts (Emmers, 2017). Historical animosities 
between members of ASEAN states remain with ASEAN contemporary borders 
stems from the decolonisation period in the aftermath of World War II. The limits 
of the colonial administration carved during pre-war became the new 
international borders for the independent countries. The overlapping territorial 
claims amongst the newly independent countries continue to be the perennial 
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issue in the region (Jenne, 2017). Spats over territorial disputes have provided 
strong incentives for states to increase its defence expenditure in order to protect 
its national security. States such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore 
have procured sophisticated military equipment that has high offensive 
capabilities such as submarines to assert their sovereignty claims over rival 
claimants (Bateman 2011; Einhorn 2015).  
Both the neorealist and constructivist suffer similar logical pitfalls which 
focuses on structural forces of the international system- power and norms, 
ignoring the context of agencies and the state structure (Beeson, 2017a). 
Constructivist (Wendt, 1999) and neorealist (Waltz, 1979) treats states as 
coherent and unitary, which largely neglect states’ internal reconfigurations 
(Hameiri and Jones, 2016). Although the realist logic focuses on the principal 
source of security threat is external, the historical realities in the nation-state show 
otherwise (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008). On the other hand, constructivist logic is 
also criticised for its inability to explain how the ASEAN way values have been 
violated by members of states in order to maintain state sovereignty (Narine, 
2006). If all states were of similar type with the same shared perceptions, there 
would be no divergence in security policies. In reality, Southeast Asian states 
have different historical legacies, domestic institutions and different objectives 
on how they deal with security threats. While acknowledging that the 
socialisation of normative regional order of ASEAN has contributed to our 
understanding on security studies, constructivists have only fleetingly explained 
state preferences are endogenous as domestic politics shape how state behaves 
(Jones, 2011).  
A case can therefore be made that by analysing the historical antecedents as 
opposed to great power projection, it provides a better explanation on why some 
countries in the region have divergent security policies despite the changes in the 
balance of power between great powers in the international system (Croissant and 
Kuehn, 2009). Southeast Asian states have used the norms of ASEAN way as a 
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strategy for policymakers as a political tool dressed in nationalist sentiments for 
its domestic politics (Emmers, 2017). This is where the constructivist logic 
appears to be lacking as the normative argument should eliminate any mistrust 
between members of states. According to Jones (2010), the norms of non-
interference have been violated by members of states on countless occasions to 
further domestic interests in Southeast Asian states. Adherence to norms and 
sovereignty have been selective rather than uniform. The inability to address 
these security issues multilaterally implies that the nature of the problems comes 
from different vested interest between states that limits itself to cooperate on the 
multilateral level (Beeson, 2017b). The disjuncture between the adherence to the 
ASEAN norms and the variations in how state leaders actually respond to its 
security challenges can be explained via the nature of political contestations 
between social forces in the state.  
On the other hand, critical theory provides an alternative explanation by 
unpacking the state. They seek to analyse the security architecture in Southeast 
Asia from the domestic approach. Critical theorists have done so by providing 
comparative institutional studies about the state-society relations on security 
which have been championed by the political economy theories such as the 
‘Murdoch School’ of Social Conflict Theory (Rodan, 2006; Hameiri, 2007). 
Sharing the same ontology as the constructivist theory, critical theory argues that 
security is socially constructed (Jones, 2010). The social conflict theory perceives 
the political institutions as organised and shaped by the powerful political 
agencies in which they are exercised. It argues that the political institutions and 
outcomes derived from social conflict where power relations over the control on 
state resources are conditioned by the struggle between class in the given state 
(Hamieri, 2011). To be more specific, social conflict analyses from the domestic 
which focuses on the struggle between political interest between classes or 
coalition societal groups existing in a power dynamic relationship over access to 
state resources and state power (Rodan et.al, 2006; pp.6-7). In this view, states 
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do not have the autonomy as state is an institutional space for political actors to 
wield its political influences to implement its political interest (Decanio, 2000).  
For the social conflict approach, institutions exist because political agencies 
shaped them, and they are subjected to manipulation to serve their political 
interest. Put differently, they view the state as a source of power rather than as a 
set of agents and institutions that bind political agents to behave in a certain 
manner (Jones, 2010). For instance, according to the critical theory, Abdullah 
(2018) argues that Singapore’s high military spending is not entirely determined 
by its geographical position, sandwiched between two Malay states, but it is also 
determined by the hegemonic ideology of the PAP that has been institutionalised 
in the state to maintain its regime legitimacy. Perhaps, in the case of Indonesia, 
despite its transition to a democracy albeit now being formally under the Ministry 
of Defence, the military is still highly politicised with the formulation and 
operational control in the fields of security remains largely in the prerogatives of 
the TNI (Heiduk, 2015). Thus, it can be said that the concept of security is often 
interpreted and emphasized from the domestic roots as it focuses on the power 
struggles between groups in a nation-state that defines the overall national 
security (Bloomfield, 2012).  
Based on the social conflict logic, ASEAN was formed through cooperation 
of dominant forces in the capitalist states to maintain domestic social order from 
the growing class-based challenges to their domination (Jones, 2010). Although 
it managed to reduced intra-conflict, however, as Jones puts it, “to permit 
ruling elites to consolidate their own grip over society and achieve the economic 
growth necessary to undercut the appeal of communism, within an international 
context of waning Western guarantees to defend anti-communist regimes from 
opposition forces within their own societies” (Jones, 2012a, p. 39). During the 
period where the Western powers were waning, ASEAN was first introduced in 
1967 by the original members of ASEAN Five- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines and Thailand - to promote its national sovereignty while sharing 
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similar domestic problems in dealing with Communism and to maintain its 
domestic dominance (Solingen; 2004; 2005). The states converging interest to 
collaborate and engage in the institutional network was a preference for the states 
to maintain sovereignty and state autonomy (Solingen, 2010). For ASEAN states, 
state autonomy is an important composition that constitutes how it should react 
towards the big powers (Kuik, 2008). This is because the historical realities of 
these ASEAN states are different which the constructivists have overstated 
ASEAN’s principle function as an institution. The existence of ASEAN is a 
symbolic stature for ruling elites as a platform and as a reassurance vehicle for 
states to pursue their own national interest (Khoo, 2004; Davies, 2018).  
Our discussion so far has revealed that there is a causal relation on how 
domestic conflict influences how states formulate security policies. Dominant 
political actors deriving from class influences and ideas play an important role in 
shaping the national interest due to its influences over state capacity and agendas 
which explains the divergence in security policies in the region (Jones, 2011). It 
is accepted that the social conflict approach has been fruitful in providing 
explanations on the state’s security practices. This thesis agrees with Hameiri and 
Jones statement (2014, p.5) that “to understand political institutions and outcomes 
as being shaped by social conflict”. This research builds on from the existing 
findings of critical theory, which seek to explore other different dominant forces 
that hold on to state power aside from class. Although the study on class has 
provided influential explanations on why states’ security practices diverge, there 
has been little considerations on how other social forces such as race, ethnicity, 
religion, clan, tribes and region may be equally resonant other than class (Slater, 
2010a; Clarke, 2017). It also lacks the analysis how certain institutional structures 
can produce long-term effects which can occasionally constrain or benefit certain 
social groups from participating in the security policy (Pion-Berlin, 2011).  
This research therefore sees a gap in the literature that the study of security 
should be analysed beyond class boundaries by looking into the historical context 
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to understand how the relations between states and society influence the different 
trajectories in security practices. In the contemporary Southeast Asian security, 
threats come increasingly from within the states themselves defecting from the 
existing state systems. Historical legacies and the state institutions can also act 
autonomously due to institutional constraints created by timing and sequencing 
mechanisms. Such arrangements were developed through path dependent 
processes that are necessary for state-institutional development and stability in 
affecting political behaviours (Steinmo, 2008). To understand why security 
policy varies in Southeast Asia, the contemporary security practices is best 
understood as a continuum of a long process that began during the colonial 
period. As Lipschutz (1995, p.8) argues, security is “the products of historical 
structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts 
between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege 
them”. 
By exploring certain domestic institutional arrangements such as norms, 
rules, ideologies, and identities, this helps us in explaining the differences in 
security policies and the state behaviours in the region (Lantis, 2002, 2014). This 
research shares the constructivist position that security is socially constructed. 
Once these norms are created, it takes a path dependent process which makes it 
difficult to change even though it is not the optimal policy decision. Although the 
creation of ASEAN provides a regional security culture that shape states context 
on the cost and benefit of particular actions, however, it does not determine a 
state’s national interest and the security policy (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 
47).  
They argue that the state as a superstructure that serves the dominant social 
groups interest while reducing the function of the state to act autonomously 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Because the creation of state develops some 
provisions of institutional stability political actors, military actors and civilian 
elites also have some form of influence in state preferences in security policies. 
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In spite of this, the societal role and the dominant social groups can also be 
influenced by the societal structure depending on the degree of institutional 
arrangements created  in the given states (Slater and Fenner, 2011).  
As Beeson (2017a, p.6) puts it, “it is not necessary to be a Marxist or to 
adopt a ‘critical’ perspective to appreciate the dialectical nature of this process, 
or the possibility that there may be other forces other than class relations at work 
in determining social outcomes.” It is important that the engagement between IR 
theories provide contributions to knowledge in explaining the national security 
concept. Some important insights emerge from the exchanges between the 
international relations theory- realism, constructivism and critical theories which 
can be fruitfully brought together. The study on power, prevailing norms and the 
material structure of capitalist system has brought together to explain the 
divergence of security policies and the stability of these policies once 
implemented in the states.  
As will be elaborated further detail in the next section, this research aims to 
introduce Historical Institutionalism as an analytical framework to explore how 
the origin and development of specific state structures helped either constrain or 
enhances certain specific institutions such as norms, rules, ideologies and 
organisations once it materialises. Providing a systematic analysis on the study 
of security in Southeast Asia requires us to adopt the key tenets of these theories 
as a method to investigate why states behave differently through opening up the 
black box of the state in connecting the security policies to domestic interests 
(Kapstein, 1995; Bell, 2011). This thesis aims to add into the academic debate by 
analysing from the endogenous perspectives which focus on state-society 
relations and their impact towards the concept of security and security policies. 
Although the literature discusses the importance of great power politics, the 
regional institutions and the conflict of power have contributed to the debate on 
security practices in Southeast Asia, this thesis aims to add to the discussion by 
using the historical institutionalist approach by providing a comparative analysis 
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from the different domestic perspective on  why security policies vary and how 
they evolve over time. Historical Institutionalism provides an alternative 
explanation, which explores the logic of path dependence influenced by its 
history on domestic struggles in each individual state which can shape or 
constrain its policy preferences (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005).  
 
 2.3 Historical Institutionalism as an Analytical approach on National 
Security  
 
To move beyond the realist tradition in explaining the state’s security 
behaviours, the contemporary security challenges that Southeast Asia faced by 
today are presented to be more complex and multi-layered (Collins, 2003). If we 
are to assess the impact of historical contingencies on the nation-state, we must 
first identify the principal mechanisms on how security practices are 
implemented. To analyse and understand the different trajectories of security 
policies and its practices, it is commonly claimed, especially in Southeast Asia, 
that the security policies derive from the coalition of political elites within the 
states (Collins, 2003; Ganesan, 2005; Slater, 2010a). The concept of national 
security is defined based on the perspectives of political actors in a given state to 
identify its strategic principles and priorities guiding the principles of the sates in 
formulating its national security goals to maintain state sovereignty (Collins, 
2003, p. 3). As Ayoob (1995) points out, different experiences of state formation 
determine the differences in the primary security orientations.  
 Thus, to examine the variances of state behaviours, we need to take 
historical divergences into consideration which provide a compelling explanation 
on the different trajectories in security policies in the region (Beeson, 2014). As 
Bloomfield (2012) argues, the differences in subcultures within a strategic culture 
may help us explain why certain security policies are institutionalised over others. 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) is best understood as an ontologically open 
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analytical approach with a set of concepts that are foreground to temporality 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2015). The central assumption of HI is that political actors 
are subjected to the context of rules structured by the winning coalition of 
political groups, which gradually strengthened the rules to be institutionalised 
over time (Sanders, 2006). The institutional model usually derive from political 
concessions established from the existing political group to include or exclude of 
its members to create a stable state (Bertrand, 2004). Political contestations 
between the social forces often influence how state shapes security perceptions.  
Institutional analysis matters because it allows us to examine the 
relationship between political actors as agents of history, as they can shape policy 
choices, behaviour, interests and identities of agents (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; 
Lowndes, 2010). Institutions can be in the form of formal (rules, regulations, 
organisational structures, state) and informal (ideas, norms, identities) that 
influences policy choices and govern political actors within a specific outcome 
(Steinmo, 2008). Whether formal or informal, institutions are important for 
domestic politics because institutions can not only enhance or constrain political 
actors in the decision-making, they are also the outcome of deliberate political 
strategies which influence how the state behaves (Steinmo, 2008).  
The chief contribution of analysing state institutions is that the state is a 
historically contingent social and political system that is captured by certain 
social groups’ interest claiming control over given territories (Skocpol, 1997). 
Krasner (1999) argues that state sovereignty is ‘organised hypocrisy’ that is 
maintained by the powerful actors within the polity maintained for their own 
interests. Jessop (2008) argues that the state may privilege some actors, identities, 
and strategies over others. As the state distribute power and resources, the 
political representatives of these social groups often compete to capture the state 
institutions in order to enhance their agenda. Depending on the specific 
institutional arrangements, power relations can influence whose ideas would be 
incorporated in the security policy, which helps explain the principle of specific 
 53 
political actors in coordinating the state policies. Once the institutions are 
established, key political actors formed political structures such as parties, 
bureaucratic organisations as well as business organisations to structure interests 
that can shape or constrain political choices. Such a political outcome is also a 
product of political contestations between social forces, which explains the 
trajectory, scope and sustainability of these institutions (Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth, 1992; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005; Steinmo, 2008). 
Because HI is focused on the impact of institutions on actor motivations in 
policies, it is able to subsume other approaches to explain the policy preferences 
(Thelen, 1999). In consequence, security policy is a product of historically 
contingent structures and processes of struggles for power within states between 
the social groups and their political interest that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995, 
p.8). The influence of HI as an analytical framework exemplifies that history 
matters in the study of IR and comparative politics because the ideological 
framework and the institutional practices in the given polity are radically different 
due to its antecedent condition that structured politics across time (Hall, 2016).  
 HI also focuses on the analysis of institutions whereby policy choices are 
also linked by existing and past arrangements (Thoenig, 2011). By analysing the 
state’s history, elements such as timing, sequencing, critical junctures, path 
dependency, change and continuity helps as a building block in understanding the 
narrative of policy choices (Pierson, 2004). Thus, by tracing history and the 
allocation of power as a starting point, it provides the analytical tool to understand 
the origin of institutional arrangements on how historical episodes in which 
institutions are created or reshaped (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010).  
Once the rules of the games are institutionalised, it creates a long period of 
stability. The established legacy of historical conditions on security has a 
powerful effect in dictating actors’ behaviours termed as path dependence, 
because once these rules, norms and ideas are institutionalised, political actors 
create policies and reinforce the systemic logic that reflects the institutional 
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settings (Thelen, 1999). Pierson (2004, p. 37) demonstrated that because power 
asymmetries are uneven, it creates a powerful positive feedback that the agenda 
control and ideological manipulation can transform into an unlevel playing field, 
making open conflict to be unnecessary. Pierson (2000) argues that the 
institutional arrangements are typically hard to change as political actors are 
bound by past institutional choices making them hard to manoeuvre policies. The 
allocation of power and authority resides on the key political actors as a source 
of political feedback (Pierson, 2004, p. 36). 
Sewell (1996, p.262) posits that the ‘what has happened at an earlier point 
in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence events occurring at a later 
time’. In this sense, institutions are created by human actions and interactions that 
are linked to certain historical legacies which may shape the rules, norms, the 
capacity of state, and the institutional arrangements that are designed to privilege 
particular interests (Suffian, 2019). Over time, social and political power are used 
to consolidate political advantage at the expense of other political forces (Pierson, 
2004, p. 37). North (1990) posits this as ‘institutional locked-in’ which limits the 
institutional changes as certain political groups benefit over others from the 
institutional settings that constrain institutional changes. Such positive 
reinforcement to specific political groups enables these institutions to persist for 
a long period of time. This is because even though the institutional changes can 
lead to new policies or system of governance to be formally introduced, changes 
may be incremental as it may not necessarily undermine informal institutions that 
was previously created in limiting powerful actors in the previous institutions 
(Suffian, 2019).  
 
2.4 Explaining Institutional Changes in Historical Institutionalism 
 
However, HI is under criticism whereby the ‘stickiness’ approach is 
parsimonious, which cannot explain the institutional changes effectively with 
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critics claiming that agents are highly constrained by the institutional 
environments (Schmidt, 2008; Libel, 2016). Critics claim that HI is invariant 
whereby political actors are seen as rational without taking into account of how 
dominant ideas can change the institutional structure in the study of politics 
(Hameiri, 2007; Schmidt, 2008; Hameiri and Jones, 2014; Libel, 2018).  
Thus, for critics, the study of institutions, at the very least from HI 
perspectives is limited in explaining in the changes in institutions from an 
exogenous shock that views this framework as monolithic (Jessop, 1990). Despite 
this, HI also offers a second strand which argues that rather than ideas, critical 
antecedents provide a more convincing approach in explaining how change 
occurs in the study of institutions and their outcomes (Mahoney, 2001; Slater and 
Simmons, 2010). Though these criticisms are not new in HI, analysing the 
political agency has been focal for HI to understand policy outcomes. For HI, the 
state preferences in policies are not just limited to exogenous shocks, but also 
endogenous processes which pay attention to critical junctures as well as critical 
historical antecedents in the contest for power (Pierson, 2004; Slater, 2010a). 
Earlier works on HI provide a strong background on the analysis of agents that  
institutions and the understanding of institutional arrangements on political actors 
(Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Depending on 
the specific period and sequences, institutions may be punctuated with a brief 
period of instability termed as ‘critical junctures’ where changes are possible 
(Capoccia and Kelleman, 2007). During a critical juncture, there is a moment of 
open contestation in which one political group has substantial advantage over 
others (Pierson, 2015). During this period, the winners will get to exercise the 
political authority over the losers to create a mechanism for reproduction to 
guarantee their access to power (Thelen, 1999).  
Thelen (2002) argues that not all political institutional changes can cause 
destabilization that will lead to institutional breakdown. The change of the rules 
of the game can be incremental as new rules or governance can be formally 
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introduced but may not necessarily undermine the informal institutions and 
powerful actors in the old institutions (Suffian, 2019). For Streeck and Thelen 
(2005), they theorized that such institutional changes can occur in -1. 
‘displacement’- when an institution is displaced over another; 2. ‘layering’- when 
an institution adopts new elements on top of the existing institutions; 3. ‘drift’- 
when the condition in which the institution exists for changes, but the institution 
do not adapt to these changes; 4. ‘conversion’- when an existing institution adopt 
new purposes attached to the existing structure. Depending on the level of 
political contestation, the institutional change can be evolutionary whereby the 
powerful political actors can distribute access to state power to be more inclusive 
to the non-beneficiaries (Thelen, 1999).  
This helps explain the disjuncture between ASEAN states on their 
divergence on the security policies and responses to the regional challenges. Any 
attempt to understand Southeast Asian politics on political actors decision-
making process should be grounded from the analysis of institutions. Significant 
political outcome is best understood as a result of both rule following and interest 
maximising (Steinmo, 2008). By analysing how policy is embedded from the 
national standpoint provides a better guideline on how to understand state 
behaviours. For instance, China’s increasing assertiveness in recent years 
especially during Aquino III administration, has forced the Philippine 
government to promote policy layering to include the South China Sea dispute as 
part of its national security concern (Department of National Defence Republic 
of the Philippines, 2012). Despite its attempt to expand its security policy, the 
enduring influence of the elite clans in policy decision-making demonstrate that 
the Philippines politics becomes a huge obstacle for the government to divert state 
resources to acquire credible defence system (Cruz De Castro, 2005; 2014). Such 
path dependence subsequently encouraged the Philippine government to support 
alternative form of changes such as policy layering and policy drifts. Perhaps, the 
continuous internal threats in Mindanao, renewed Communist insurgency, and 
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the comprehensive defence agreement signed with the U.S. provide little 
incentive for the Philippine politicians to build the institutional framework to 
formulate security policies to modernize its military for external defence. The 
recurring political conflict on religious and class-based fractions poses how the 
Philippines ruling elites determine its policy outcomes based on its political 
capacities that can either mobilise or refrain the actors to state resources to 
formulate and implement its security policies (Cruz De Castro, 2014).  
This remark points to the reason why exploring security policy from the HI 
approach can be beneficial to the security studies. It does not give primacy to 
agents, institutions, structures or ideas, but rather each analysis is dialectically 
held in a mutually constitutive manner (Marsh, 2009). Rather than the primary 
institutions such as the international system as international constraints, this 
variant of HI approach on institution provides a deeper and subtler context where 
the rules of the games typically need to be negotiated between the political actors 
(Bell, 2011). Instead, agency and structure shape one another over time, which 
invariably shapes political processes (Fioretos, 2011). By adopting the HI 
approach, it provides a comparative historical perspective that is a bottom-up 
state-society driven process concerned with causal analysis through the 
examination of process over time and the use of systematic and contextualised 
comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 10).  
In relation to this thesis, using HI to the study of security practices in 
Southeast Asia provides context on how security policies are generated by the 
collective actions of influential elites in the state. This also underpins the strength 
of the state and regime institutions especially when there is an absence of political 
conflict between the political elites (Slater, 2010a). The HI approach focuses on 
the study of institutions of governments within the state that influence and shape 
security policy as a by-product of the emergence of particular institutional 
arrangement deriving from political contestation between social forces. 
Consequently, security policy is best understood as a product of historically 
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contingent structures and processes of struggle for power within states between 
the social groups and their political interest that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995, 
p.8). Political outcomes are not necessarily limited by its influences of behaviours 
from exogenous shock, rather endogenous changes such as dominant social 
groups or divergence in political elites coalitions also play an important role in 
affecting the security policy outcomes which has been produced by historically 
divergent outcomes (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005; Slater, 2010a; Capoccia, 
2015).  
Further, to understand how power is organised, using HI as an analytical tool 
identifies the key linkages between actors and state institutions which confront 
actors with constitutive rules that can either constrain or enable them, which 
becomes diffused and consolidated that shaped their behaviour (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992; Adler, 1997; Bell, 2011). This is because institutions are not just 
constitutive of ideas created by agents but are also sets of rules and norms that 
needed to be negotiated by agents over time (Archer, 2003). Rather, certain agents 
are able to take advantage of, and to some extent shape, the social context in the 
given structure, but with finite material limits that constrain as well as enable 
(Beeson, 2017a, p.6).  
As mentioned, security policy is based on the analysis of domestic collective 
elites that have the authority to make policy decision-making which becomes the 
dominant ideology. Due to threat perceptions are politically produced by the 
winning coalition, this allows the dominant elites to formulate and facilitate the 
state’s discourse on strategic principles to respond to security threats that would 
be implemented into the state’s security policies (Mcdonald, 2008). It is a shared 
beliefs, attitudes, and norms that are institutionalised in a given polity with key 
political actors in the state (Krebs, 2018). Once created, the national security 
concept will be institutionalised over time creating a path dependence that is 
difficult to change. The resulting institutional arrangements translate into political 
legacies that shape actors behaviours over time and the degree of institutional 
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capacities with which the state emerges (Pierson, 2015). However, the path 
dependence can be ruptured during a critical juncture that causes the institutional 




This chapter problematised the existing literature, dominated by the realist 
approach that typically depicts how security threats are based on material 
capabilities and the resultant insecurity arises from the uneven power capabilities. 
It critiques that the realist account on the security studies fails to take into account 
that the complex structure of states and the dynamic relations between the state 
and society that are crucial in explaining the different trajectories in security 
practices. On the other hand, constructivist offers a normative approach whereby 
the ideational references determine how states formulate security policies. They 
emphasise that the socialisation process that constitutes as norms and culture 
rather than ideology provides a more comprehensive understanding on security 
behaviours. Yet, it also shares a similar logical pitfall as it focuses on the norms 
rather than the states which explain the different trajectories in security policies 
in Southeast Asia. By contrast, critical theory decouples the structural centric 
implicit in traditional security studies which in turn allows for discussion of an 
expanded analysis of security by unpacking the state. In doing so, critical theory 
provides a measurable concept that the politics of security is a contested subject 
between the social forces.  
This chapter sets to construct an analytical framework as a precursor to the 
subsequent empirical chapters. It proposes a HI framework for understanding 
how the formulation of security policies and their interactions with relevant 
domestic institutions over time. It argues that a state’s national security concept 
is conditioned itself with the particularities of certain institutional arrangements 
that are unique to the states, shaped by historical legacies. The formulation of 
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national security concept is dependent on how the power relations between social 
groups perception to protect their own interest and the bargaining process to 
mobilise state resources to implement the policy outcomes.  
Drawing on HI analytical logic of institutional change, path dependence, 
and the timing and sequences, it provides us the analytical tool on how state 
formulate its’ security policy. This allows for the distinction to understand how 
the adoption of security policies and their interactions as the process for state’s 
security behaviour over time. Further, with this conception, this thesis can 
establish a link on how political actors perceive their interest with the variant 
factors such as security-threats; economic development; nation-building; and 
military modernisation, and the domestic political institutions in Southeast Asia. 
The state’s conception on national security is structured by the existing political 
institution, and because of this institutional structure, the state’s perception on 
security is guided by the expectation derived from the governing institution. By 
unpacking the state in this way, depending on the institutional designs, it provides 
us with a methodological tool on how certain security factors are more influential 
in a given state than others at a given period of time.  
The next chapter illustrates the argument further through the analytical 
tools of HI to examine the interest and influence of the state elites’ interests. It 
also seeks to provide empiric analysis on how domestic institutional structures in 
the state perceive the factors influencing the security policies which led to the 










While the rise of states security concerns in Southeast Asia has been 
discussed by scholars (Lantis, 2014; Koga, 2018), less attention has been paid to 
the trajectories of these security policies that originated from its historical past. 
National security is a sharply contested concept that should be traced from its 
colonial legacies as the emergence of sovereign state and how ruling actors 
perceived security are informed by its history (Alagappa, 1998, p. 65). The main 
purpose of this chapter is to unpack how historical conditions determine foreign 
and security policy paths. More importantly, reading on the history of Southeast 
Asia through the prism of HI leads us to understand how state structures are 
influenced by the different types of political contestations, socio-economic 
conditions, as well as identifying the different social groups that emerged in the 
period of decolonisation. 
Drawing from the institutional analysis, it is also helpful in explaining how 
the influence of ideas, norms, rules and regulations become a useful template in 
security matters. The fact that the region was mostly a subject of colonialism is 
an indication of how Western powers have a profound impact on the domestic 
political institution in Southeast Asia. This chapter assesses the nature and 
significance of colonialism on how different types of political contestations 
constitute the dominant narratives of national security in Southeast Asian states. 
It also attempts to assess how social conflicts and power struggles are linked to 
the social construction of its national security as well as how its security practices 
are closely linked to its colonial legacies.  
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Political institutions and security policies are confluence of colonial 
legacies on how it helped shape domestic political institutions and the birth of 
sovereign states. Countries differ in their security concepts due to their different 
institutional make-ups, the rules of how security is perceived, and the incentives 
that motivate the people. The experience of colonialism has profound effects on 
the political, economic, and social impacts on security. This chapter proceeds by 
discussing how political contestations in the polity helped create the state’s 
institutional order in Southeast Asia. It discusses how political contestations in 
the given polity during the early period provide context on how security policies 
are formulated. It then continues by examining and briefly tracing the process of 
colonial heritage before World War II. Specifically, it aims to examine how the 
different historical conditions that states experienced have a huge consequence 
on the institutional structures. The enduring differences in each state influences 
the outcomes on how states mobilise its resources to protect its infrastructural 
power from other competing interests.  
Before World War II, Malaysia and Singapore were colonised by the 
British Empire. Indonesia, on the other hand, was colonised by the Dutch. The 
Philippines, meanwhile, were colonised by the Spaniards, and subsequently the 
U.S. after Spain signed the Treaty of Paris in 1898, giving concessions to its 
colonial territories to the U.S. By focusing on the colonial impact before the 
decolonisation process, this chapter aims to provide fresh insights on how power 
struggles caused institutional changes leading to the emergence of the nation-state 
contribute to their perception on security and its practices are a path dependent 
process during the decolonisation period in the case studies. Next, this chapter 
argues that the Japanese invasion in Southeast Asia served as a transformative 
period for states which set motion to the critical juncture wherein countries 
achieved independence. It is important to note that the level of political 
contestation depends on the historical trajectories that set motion within the 
polities. Although there are subtle variations in how local elites responded in post 
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war, however, the contentious politics that occur have a lasting effect on the 
institutions for political order.  
As will be shown in this chapter, despite their common yet different historical 
experiences before independence, the concept of security of Southeast Asian 
post-colonial states saw different types of social conflicts in the region. The 
colonial period resulted in fundamental changes in the political and socio-
economic structures through varying degrees which provided a framework for the 
intensification of the political contestations in the post-colonial era. In the case of 
Malaysia and Singapore, the inherited British colonial policies forged sharp 
ethnic cleavages that was usually expressed along the class line, thereby shaping 
what would become a pluralist society. In the case of Indonesia, the Dutch policy 
created a sharp cleavage over class, ethnicity, and religion, which allowed the 
local elites to politically mobilise the peasantry to challenge the colonial power.   
 
On the other hand, the colonial experiences suffered by the Philippines 
resulted in the deep cleavages over religion and class, which also helped shape 
its security concerns in the post-colonial era. To complicate matters further, the 
claim for statehood during its decolonisation saw different levels of elite 
cohesion. In both Malaysia and Singapore, the legacy of British ruling to recruit 
local elites as part of its administration saw limited elite competition for secession 
during its independence. Meanwhile, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, the 
limited integration of the local elites in the colonial administrations by the Dutch 
and Spanish and subsequently the U.S. increased the likelihood for armed 
rebellion against the national project to claim for separate statehood within these 






3.2 Political Contestation and the State Institutional Order: The origin of 
Security Concept in Southeast Asia 
 
So far, this thesis has argued that part of the initial appeal of using HI as an 
analytical framework is that, it offers a historical analysis on the national security 
practices and the formulation of security policies. This section aims to discuss 
why divergence occurs in Southeast Asia by unpacking the black box of the 
states. This helps us explain how the origins of social conflict helped shape its 
security policies.  
To understand the state’s nature and how it shaped its national security 
policies, it requires us to examine the role of agencies in the political structures 
on how different coalitions of elites perceive threats, evaluate and push for 
policies based on their own interests (Pierson, 2016). The study of agential power 
in the institution from HI perspective is largely a historical process that is deeply 
rooted and highly consequential to the power structures (Lipschutz, 1995). The 
political transition took form when political contestation widened the cleavages 
between social forces in the state. In the colonial era, the condition of political 
struggles between the colonial powers and local social groups plays an important 
part in structuring the political dynamics in producing long-term path divergence 
in the state (Kuhonta, 2011; Slater, 2010a; Vu, 2010). Social forces formed 
coalitions to challenge the function and design of existing institutions in order to 
gain access to power and resources (Jones, 2011).  
The long struggles with the colonial rule and the short-term triggers of 
gaining its independence is an example of critical juncture. During the critical 
juncture, the winning coalitions of political elites typically seek to institutionalise 
their advantageous positions in the state by changing the rules of the games both 
formally and informally to strengthen its position in the political arena (Pierson, 
2016). During this period, gaining access on the state’s resources depends on the 
negotiation between political actors in the domestic setup that are instrumental in 
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how state resources are allocated, and whose security policies are being 
implemented (Alden and Aran, 2016; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; Robison, 
2012). Because the level of political contestation between political groups differs 
in each state, specific institutional arrangements can have durable effects to 
particular social actors by altering resources and incentives to the winning 
coalition (Pierson, 2016). The level of political influences that these elites hold 
in the state vary. Social groups also have various interest, ideologies, socio-
economic power and access to the state’s power (Steinmo, 2008; Jones, 2011). 
State institutional capacities and its distributional political power amongst the 
ruling elites varies. This is due to the level of political power contestation in states 
generates different political coalitions between the social groups. In other words, 
to protect its interests, the coalitions of elites construct or reconstruct the 
institutional arrangements to strengthen the state institutions (Slater, 2010a).  
Hence, the adoption of security concept and security policies require us to 
connect these choices to the level of coalitions of political elites to its specific 
domestic interests that takes into account how social, political and economic 
interests can constrain or enable their power through the implementation of 
policies (Case, 2002). During critical junctures, winning coalition groups shape 
the choices and changes that emerges from the power struggle. Winning social 
groups  inherently produces divergent policy outcomes (Jones, 2011). The most 
important institutional distinction to emerge between the Southeast Asian states 
during the critical juncture lies primarily between the civilian ruling party and 
those in which the military is the dominant actor in capturing the state power 
(Slater, 2010a).  
The fundamental issue of contesting political power lies in the examination 
of civil-military relations as to how we measure the level of civilian control and 
military influences in the state. It is truism that the regional norms fulfil an 
important part in shaping a state’s civil-military relations. The western concept 
of civil-military relations emphasised that the civilian groups have the authority 
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to control and dictate the security decision-making through the subordination of 
the military as a professional institution. According to Huntington (1995), it is 
the accepted norm that the role of the military is to professionally serve their duty 
when called upon by the civilian government. The primary role of the military is 
to defend the state against external threats while the civilian controls the strategic 
and political implications regarding the implementations of security policies. 
However, Huntington’s model of civil-military relations is brought into question 
in the case of Southeast Asia as it appears to be more complex (Kuehn and 
Lorenz, 2011). In post-colonial states such as those in Southeast Asia, militaries 
often play other roles that are beyond the definition of western models of civil-
military relations (Katsumata, 2011). The extensive roles of the militaries in the 
region involved in nation and state-building, economic developments and regime 
transition increased the military’s capabilities in influencing the institutional 
arrangements in the states changes the dynamics of power relations between 
civilian elites and the military on how security is perceived (Beeson and Bellamy, 
2008; Pion-Berlin and Martinez, 2017).  
According to Croissant et. al (2011), at the broadest level, the factions of 
elites comprise of two different groups- 1. Civilian elites, and 2. The military as 
shown in figure 3.1. In this regard, the term ‘civilian elites’ encompass from top 
political executives in all organisations including the bureaucrats from the top to 
mid-level officials of the states. The military is referred to as an organisation 
established by the constitutional law, enjoys a monopoly over certain weapons 
and other equipment that is responsible to uphold the security of the state with 
constrained application use of force (Edmonds, 1988; p. 26). In the face of 
security threats both internally and externally, social groups respond to these 
vulnerabilities by creating strong states with high capacity to mobilise resources 
to face these challenges (Larsson, 2013). Thus, this emphasises that political 
contestation in the state produces civil-military relations that covariates because 
the military roles in a given political space varies (Croissant, 2011).  
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Figure 3. 1 
Source: (Croissant et. al, 2011) and author 
 
How do social groups organise their interests? To understand how social 
groups organises specific institutional order to extract power we must examine 
how specific domestic interests and specific political forces can enable or 
constrain security policies. Political agencies use domestic institutions such as 
the state, parties, organisations, formal rules and regulations to centralise 
decision-making power to the state (Pion-Berlin, 1997). The differences in social 
groups in the state entail how different institutional arrangements are being 
organised to advance the interest of political coalitions as its security policies. 
Because national interest derives from the winning social groups perspectives, 
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the implementation of national security policies can be examined through the 
level of influences of the social groups in the state (Lantis, 2002, 2014). During 
the critical juncture, the path of institutional development depends on the winning 
coalition groups that will shape its national interest that is channelled through the 
security organisation to formulate security policies to protect its domestic interest 
(Hill, 2013).  
The structural conditions expressed in the domestic politics and the degree 
of political contestation between groups vary in the society, which invariably 
shape the civil-military relations. By looking into how power is organised, it 
potentially exposes different mechanisms of reproduction for power that are 
likely to be disrupted or enhanced depending on  how the institutional order is set 
up in the state (Thelen and Conran, 2016). The role of the state in each country 
differs depending on their capacities and the degree of political autonomy that are 
uniformly unique to its own (Larsson, 2013). The variations of state capacity 
affect how states behave depending on the existing capacity within the institution. 
The degree of the elites' capacity to mobilise and shape defence policies vary due 
to the divergence from historical antecedents that exert a different political 
institutional arrangements during the critical juncture (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012).  
The differences in the institutional order create various types of political 
regime capacities. Because of the historical antecedents, mobilising state 
resources depends on the power relations between the civilian and the military 
which differs in each state (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011). States that have a strong 
capacity to mobilise state resources have powerful unitary ruling elites which are 
usually the executive figure (Prime Minister or President), along with a small 
cadre of senior politicians and elite bureaucrats. They tend to have less restriction 
over policymaking, thus have a strong capacity to mobilise resources as opposed 
to states with a weaker capacity (Leftwich, 1995). To pursue their goals, elites 
typically used a strategy of combination of mobilisation through ideologies, legal, 
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and material resources to craft institutions that serve their interest (Crone, 1988; 
Kuhonta, 2011). The capacity of the state is uniquely designed to each state where 
it is shaped and manifested by the domestic institutions that allow or hinder them 
to mobilise the resources for national defence (Crone, 1988). In particular, 
examining the capacity of the states provides the mechanism to understand the 
power relations between state institutions (Skocpol, 1997). Once created, the 
institution can reproduce and persist over time by the mechanism of increasing 
return (Thelen, 1999).  
To mobilise state resources for defence, the ruling elites may use a variety 
of methods that are politically driven such as threats, nation-building, economic 
developments, ethnicities and ideologies so as to privilege particular interest or 
influence decision-making, formally or informally (Leftwich, 1995). At the same 
time, society can also play a role in the decision making whether or not it has the 
capacity to constrain decisions in foreign policies (Breuning, 2011). Countries 
such as Singapore and Malaysia have high political capacity, with military 
spending used as part of a political tool for nation building to mobilise the state 
resources to legitimise the PAP and BN in political autonomy to the general 
public, meaning that national strategic deterrence is required for both external 
threats and gaining internal political legitimacy (Lam, 2015; Vasu and Loo, 
2016). On the other hand, countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia have 
different political institutional arrangements (Banlaoi, 2009; Laksmana, 2019) as 
both countries have experienced regime changes, thus affecting the capacity of 
the state to mobilise the resources such as for military procurement or other areas 
in the security policies.  
In other words, due to the differences in political institutional arrangements, 
the capacity to extract and mobilise the resources also varies in states depending 
on which political groups in the state possesses firm or fragmented and fragile 
social cohesion (Fukuyama, 2004). The coalition between the ruling elites, the 
bureaucrats, the parties and the military are essential in supporting the policies 
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because it dictates the efficacy of the states in providing the public goods (Slater, 
2010a). Depending on the level of cohesion between these political institutions, 
the implementation and formulation of policies vary as the support of the state 
determines its capacity. Consequently, the strength of the states’ determines 
whether the regimes would build a powerful apparatus to mobilise the resources 
(Slater and Fenner, 2011).  
In sum, different political contestations initiate different pathways which 
produce different types of regimes and the content of security policies in each 
state. The level of civil-military relations varies in a state with some military 
institutions appears to be more influential in the national security concept while 
others may have stronger civilian elites that dictate the national security concept. 
The political contestation between the ruling elites plays an indicator on how the 
state shapes its policies and its practices which may diverge from other states. 
 
 3.3 The role of historical legacies as pathways to National Security Concept  
 
It is generally agreed amongst scholars that there is a degree of political 
diversity within the Southeast Asian region where political institutional 
arrangements vary in each state (Alagappa, 1998; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008; 
Slater, 2010a). Other than the geographic location and colonised states, they have 
less in common between them. But how can we observe why different social 
groups possess more political power especially in national security policies? For 
HI, the core assumption is that historical legacies play an important role on how 
they helped shape the institutional arrangements in a given polity, which rules 
and practices are consequential in states’ actions (Thelen, 1999). Alagappa (1998) 
argued that states security perceptions are often shaped by the historical context 
of the state building. While the material factors such as power politics matter in 
security, historical legacies play a critical factor in shaping states’ threat 
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perceptions on matters such as geographical proximity, social cleavages, 
ideology and ethnicity (Wendt, 1992; 1995; Waever, 1995, Jackson, 2017).  
Early choices during the critical juncture become institutionalised in the 
form of organisations, power-sharing agreements and prerogatives (Pion-Berlin, 
2011). As mentioned in the previous section, the role of political contestation as 
a critical antecedent provides a pre-requisite to the state institutional order which 
creates a path dependent effect to the winning political coalition groups (Slater 
and Simmons, 2010). It determines the state national interest and formulate 
security policies designed to protect its interest. In Southeast Asia, the lasting 
footprint of the colonisation preceding the nation-state making creates a sharp 
divergence of the political development and its institutional order (Beeson and 
Bellamy, 2008; Slater, 2010a). The historical conjuncture derived from the 
aftermath of World War II and the inauguration of a post-colonial state derived 
from the social cleavages in Southeast Asia which serve as a critical juncture 
during the decolonisation period created a long-term path divergent that is 
politically consequential in states perception on security policies ( Slater, 2010a; 
Ganesan, 2013).  
Although the political institution over time created a path dependence that 
trajected institutional stability, however, it also revealed the source of 
institutional change (Capoccia, 2015; Thelen and Conran, 2016). Political 
institutions are not homogenous, as different states constitute different 
institutional setups that are bound based on its own formal and informal rules that 
are constructed nationally (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Because the institutional 
design involves the exercise of power and the dominance of the winning coalition 
groups over others, the evolution of power between groups may lead to non-
compliance to other non-power social groups which can lead to shifts in social 
coalitions, causing to renegotiate in institutional changes in the state over time 
(Mahoney, 2000). While institutional design may change over time due to 
political contestation, certain structural factors persist which can limit political 
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agencies to act certain ways (Croissant et al., 2011). The concentration of power 
may not be static as some social groups during the power struggle can gain power 
over time (Slater, 2010a, p. 20). For instance, the institutional structure led by the 
oligarchic politics and the level of military influences in politics in the Philippines 
changed over time especially during the Marcos regime from 1965-1986 
(Kushida, 2003). However, due to the changes in power relations and interest, 
Marcos regime was ousted in the 1986 regime coup organised by strong political 
oppositions, mass public movements with a section of the military backup that 
marked a critical juncture which paved way to the re-emergence of democratic 
regime driven by the oligarchs (Quimpo, 2005). The analysis of critical 
antecedents plays an important role in supporting a critical juncture explanation. 
This is because certain antecedent condition can help to explain the critical 
juncture that plays a role in directing an outcome (Mahoney et. al, 2016). 
Depending on the burden of its historical struggles, different social groups 
that are in power produce various types of regime states and security policy 
preferences which entail different political implications and impacts (Jones, 
2011; Pierson, 2016). Primarily, it is through the crafting of new political 
institutions that the political order in the state can gain their autonomy over time 
creating a path dependent trajectory towards its concept of interest (Slater, 2010a, 
p. 18). The behaviour of state, attitude, and strategic choice take place in the 
context of political, economic and social at a specific time have important 
consequences to the state national security policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2008). It 
is because political institutions such as the state determines how and to what end 
a society is governed (Munck, 1996). States that gain independence through 
peaceful negotiations with their colonial masters may have different institutional 
arrangements than states that gain independence through political conflict. The 
institutional order depends on the level of involvement of the military in the 
struggle for state autonomy as the differences in political dynamics shape the role 
 73 
of the military during the decolonisation period (Alagappa, 2001; Croissant, 
2011).  
Contentious politics through social cleavages in the state may be caused by 
an endemic threat to the societal elites prior to the critical juncture that produces 
long term path divergent outcomes to the institutional arrangement (Capoccia, 
2015). For instance, the aftermath of Japanese occupation of Malaysia left an 
intensifying ethnoreligious problem that divided the society between the 
dominant Malay majority with the ethnic minorities such as the Chinese and 
Indian communities that left a path dependent effect in post-independence from 
the British colony with implications on how security policies are formulated are 
based on racial issues (Nathan, 1990; Stockwell, 2006). The point is that each 
state has its own historical makeup deriving from the antecedent condition that 
influences the institutional setup during the critical juncture in the process of 
decolonisation, making its path for policy decision-making continuous over time.  
Political dispute becomes far more contentious during the historical 
antecedents between the coalition of groups in the polity which may at times 
undergo major events that reorder political structure and forms (Ganesan, 2013). 
By analysing the historical experiences, it  provides the context on the different 
paths of security policies as a causal factor in explaining the political contestation 
that led to change or stability in the institutional order (Pierson, 2016). Not only 
that, the narrative of threats perceived by the winning coalition creates a dominant 
ideology which provides a set of beliefs that shape a society’s understanding of 
security (Moon, 1998; McDonald, 2008). Hence, this is why understanding the 
context through history matters as it provides a different path in each state that 
influences the divergence on the context of security (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008).  
Historical conditions create specific institutional arrangements which 
enhance or limit actor choices. Military behaviour is subjected to institutional 
order embedded in the state. However, militaries in the region are often involved 
in non-military roles such as nation-building, regime protection and economic 
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development out of which these roles are usually under the purview of civilians 
(Croissant, 2018). By analysing the historical legacies, it allows us to distinguish 
how organisational and individual behaviours are shaped. Historical sequences 
that set motions in a state have deterministic properties on how institutions design 
power that can influence how individuals behave (Mahoney, 2000). For instance, 
in some states the military has more influence in the security decision-making 
realm over the civilian institutions. This is because in some states the involvement 
of the military historically in the policy process invariably set a path dependent 
that makes the military more educated in the implementations of the security 
policies (Gibson and Snider, 1999).  
On the other hand, a strong civilian elites cohesion with the military as a 
support and assistance in the political leadership in exercising and organising its 
political power can result in a strong state with the civilian coordinating the 
security policies, with the military’s role in advancing and operationalising these 
security concept to policies (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009). In other words, the 
diversity in political powers amongst social groups in the making of nation-states 
produces different political institutional arrangements which causes the 
divergence of state power and access to state resources in formulating national 
security policies (Croissant, Eschenauer and Kamerling, 2017). This is due to the 
political process which involved the elites prior to the critical juncture is what 
Slater (2010a) defined as critical antecedents which affects the institutional order 
changing the rules of the game. Put differently, the historical antecedents on 
political contestations between social forces in the state can have a detrimental 
role in the institutional structure which can dictate how the state pursue its 
national security policies.  
Postcolonial states are more often involved in the modernisation of a state, 
which itself is considered nation-building to gain internal legitimacy (Berger, 
2003). The process of decolonisation of the nation-state in the post-world war era 
meant that the historical context of states in Southeast Asia has developed its own 
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perception of a security concept (Berger, 2003). States such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines were part of the colonial territories of 
the Dutch, the British Empire, Spanish and the U.S. Instead of limiting the scope 
of security to threats and survival, these states perceived that military security as 
part of nation building in legitimising itself as a sovereign state (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 2001). The ruling elites perceived that security is a part of the national 
strategic objectives to achieve modernity and legitimise the statehood. Historical 
settings contextualise the narratives on how the civil-military relations play a role 
in each case study and how it explains the military expenditure in Southeast Asia 
(Bates et. al, 1998). Thus, the concept of securitisation differs in states where 
their perception of security is constructed by the history, ideologies and culture 
that are manifested and influenced towards its understanding on national security 
(Waever, 1995).  
States that emerged from decolonisation perceive that the military is an 
essential form of legitimising its sovereignty in a given territorial space that has 
been carved out (Alagappa, 1998: p. 613). However, the divergence in the state 
path trajectory depends on which group emerges influential during the 
decolonisation process. States that suffers from military struggles such as 
Indonesia during the decolonisation process have more political influences than 
states that managed to gain independence through peace via civilian elites 
(Croissant et al., 2011). Historical sequences help our understanding on the role 
of institutions in policy decision-making where aberrant states’ behaviours seem 
to be likely in particular settings. The differences in the institutional practice arise 
from the historical antecedents, which created the sets of institutional 
arrangements during the critical juncture in the power relations between key state 
actors which plays an important role in the policy decision-making ( Beeson and 


























Source: (Croissant et al., 2011)  and Author 
 
These historical antecedents shaped how political institutional 
arrangements dominate over states’ policy decision-making and assert the 
preferences of security policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The critical 
importance of the pre-existence of social forces in the state explains why there 
are divergence in security policies. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the 
pre-existence of social cleavages before the making of the nation-state explains 
the uneven level of power politics between the ruling parties and other institutions 
(Heiduk, 2017). The importance of understanding the state structure is crucial, as 
the institutional arrangements provide a locus of the negotiation between the state 
and the society (Risse-Kappen, 1991).  In the case of security, often the state’s 
institutional arrangement dictates how factors such as threats, military 












outcomes in different states. It is undeniable that decision makers are influenced 
both from the external and internal factors and the degree of influences that each 
factor imposed towards the decision makers vary depending on political settings 
of states (Hudson, 2005). The domestic structure deals with how states respond 
to the demands of the domestic society as well as to understand the degree of 
centralization of power in a state's political system (Katzenstein, 1978; 
Gourevitch, 1986).  
These factors are unique to the states as historical experiences and 
domestic setups are distinctive to its own state-making, which invariably dictates 
the security policy outcome. In other words, state national security concept is 
defined by their own institutional arrangements that are mediated by its historical 
context. States such as Malaysia and Singapore share similar political 
institutional setups; a one-party state political system that is dominant with 
cohesive coalition process between the institutions which makes these countries 
be considered as states with strong civilian political institutions (Risse-Kappen, 
1991; Lee, 2008; Slater, 2010a).  
However, their interpretation of security varies due to the historical 
divergences which will be explained in the empirical chapters in greater detail. 
On the other hand, in the case of the Philippines, the political institutions are 
fragmented and fragile which causes the state to be considered as weak state 
(Kuhonta, Slater and Vu, 2008; Slater, 2010a). Meanwhile, Indonesia displays an 
intermediate state, party, and military institutional in capacity and cohesion 
(Slater, 2010b).  
The strength of the state is coordinated and institutionalised under the 
formal institutions such as rules or informally norms and values which provide 
political actors to either dominate the political institutions or refrain from the 
national policy decision-making (Mahoney, 2000; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005). 
It is precisely because of this process that we perceive states security policy 
outcomes differs. This is because the institutional arrangements were negotiated 
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after the critical juncture that preceded by the critical antecedents conditions 
(Slater and Simmons, 2010). The importance of the states’ structure resides as a 
particular framework for domestic actors to formulate its security policies (Risse-
Kappen, 1991). Because security is intensely contested between the social forces, 
this will invariably influence how states choose to distribute its power and 
resources in a specific institutional setting to further their own political agenda 
(Hollingsworth, 2000).  
The political institutions play an important role in security policy outcomes 
especially when it comes to understanding the level of influences that the state 
has over the nation. The dynamics of the domestic setup help us to understand 
how the relationship between the political institutions determine the policy 
processes. It is important that the nation-state is still the most dominant platform 
for the pursuit of the political agenda and the government remains the central 
decision makers in both international and domestic politics (Carlsneas, 2016). 
Political institutions such as the state organisations, agencies, rules, norms and 
ideas are shaped by historical experiences creating a path dependent that is 
reinforced over time (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Fioretos, 2011; Capoccia, 2015). 
Historical conjuncture contextualises the narratives of how institutional 
arrangements exert a long-lasting influence on states’ security behaviours as the 
institutional setup may restrict or enhances the military expenditure in Southeast 
Asia (Bates et. al, 1998). The outcome of the events during the critical juncture 
are shaped by the historical conditions as the existing political and economic 
institutions shape the balance of power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Political 
contestations between social groups in a given polity before the founding of state 
exhibit path dependent effects on how political structures are arranged in the 
aftermath of the power struggle (Slater, 2010a, p. 19). In other words, the critical 
antecedents as well as the timing and sequence were important causal factor on 
how social groups choose to proceed with its security concept. Thus, the structure 
of institutional arrangements either allow or avoid domestic actors to exercise its 
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influences through their capabilities of mobilising its political resources that 
orient states foreign policy choices (Alden and Aran, 2016, p.64).  
In the case of Southeast Asia, state actors remain the most dominant 
decision makers through the representation of government in policy decision-
making (Alagappa, 1998).  Though it will be explained in greater detail in the 
subsequent empirical chapters, the main point is that different historical 
trajectories that are embedded in state’s institutional arrangements either 
strengthened or weakened the political actors depending on how the political 
institutions are set up in the state to influence policy decision-making. The 
institutional making of a state-society is a result of political contestation between 
the political elites (Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005).  
Historical institutionalist approach has generated important insights on the 
understanding of policies that can be conceptualized as a political process. The 
study of historical conjunctures in tracing the policy formulation is nothing new 
in the study of comparative politics (Thelen, 1999; Steinmo, 2008). In the case of 
Southeast Asia, it is widely acknowledged that each country has different 
domestic setups in its views on security practices that are unique to the state. The 
social cleavages in a state particularly a political contest between social groups 
can help define the security issues as social groups evaluate issues and push for 
policies that are beneficial to their own ideologies (Jones, 2010).  
 
3.3 The Origins of Social Conflict in Southeast Asia 
 
In Southeast Asia, all countries (aside from Thailand) were colonies of 
Western powers. Although different states were colonized by different Western 
powers, it nevertheless conditioned the territorial borders of the modern nation-
state, its political institutional setup, and institutional arrangements in Southeast 
Asia (Cribb and Narangoa, 2004). This, however, cannot be undertaken 
satisfactorily without understanding their historical conditions of the more salient 
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features of their environment and how it influenced state’s security policies. By 
examining the colonial influences in these states, it provides a comparative 
opportunity on the dynamics of colonial relationship that shaped the development 
of the modern nation-states which is vastly distinctive. Different colonial 
experiences generated unique sets of security challenges faced by the colonialist 
as well as the subsequent decolonisation. This section analyses the different 
impacts on how colonial powers with specific references to the Dutch colonial in 
Indonesia, the British in Malaysia and Singapore, and the Spanish and 
subsequently the U.S. in the Philippines had constructed the existing institutional 
arrangements and social cleavages before the decolonisation period. To better 
understand how each state leader perceives security concept, it is worth briefly 
tracing how colonial legacies provide institutional structures and processes and 
the struggle for power.  This section seeks to expose the consequence of the 
colonial impact on the trajectory of its distinct political institutional 
arrangements. 
The existence of nation-states in Southeast Asia today are far from unitary. 
The colonial experiences in Southeast Asia have precarious paths towards the 
formation of how modern nation-states shaped its national security concept. The 
national security concept to a large degree is a by-product of the historical 
experiences of the nation-state and political actors’ perception are constituted to 
draw the structural reality in determining the laws and policies (Mihăilă, 2015). 
During the pre-colonial period maritime states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines were much more fragmented and organised by a patrimonial 
system ruled by a few local monarchs and chieftains, comprising of mostly 
Muslim and Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms (Acharya, 2012b, p. 7). Differences in 
culture, language, religion, and politics brought different ethnic identities in the 
makeup of modern nation-states (Cribbs, 2018). The advent of European imperial 
powers in Southeast Asia changed the political dynamics which largely defines 
the genesis of the political conflict that persist in the nation-states in the region 
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today. During the colonial expansionism, the British, Dutch, Portuguese and the 
Spanish were competing for geographical areas in Southeast Asia for control on 
trade with China and the rest of Europe. However, the effects of colonial legacies 
are still present today as the temporal process and events during these periods 
influence the society in governing its political and economic relations.  
Political environments in the archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines were not homogenous during pre-colonial era. Political organisations 
in both archipelagic states constitute of plural societies inhabited by ethnicities, 
cultures, languages and religions. During the precolonial period, the Philippines 
comprised of several thousand islands which were loosely ruled by local 
barangays grouping of villages, datos (chieftains) and some Muslim Sultans, 
similar to Indonesia which was ruled by smaller kingdoms across parts of the 
islands that were often tied by kinship (Ricklefs, 2001; Abinales, 2005). 
However, the arrival of colonial powers changed the institutional features through 
integrative and administrative changes that would lead to the emergence of 




The origin of social and political struggles that exist in Indonesia today 
were largely inherited during the Dutch colonisation which changed the social 
composition in the state. The Dutch had established its power since the 17th 
century following its colonial conquest under the Dutch East India Company, 
competing with other major European powers during this period. Encouraged by 
the Dutch monarchy, the Dutch East India Company monopolised the colony’s 
economy and its commodities were exported to the Europe (Israel, 1998). The 
Dutch presence was initially focused on the economic values to gain access to 
spices and trade routes (Ricklefs, 2001). However, the bankruptcy of the Dutch 
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East India Company forced the Dutch state to take over in administering the 
Dutch East Indies.  
In 1824, the colonial territory in Southeast Asia between the British and 
the Dutch were redefined under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, which was to settle 
conflict between the two colonial powers. The treaty was important to the 
boundaries of modern Indonesia and Malaysia as the two colonial powers 
cooperate in the Malay Archipelago in avoiding the French colonial expansion in 
Southeast Asia (Ricklefs, 2001). However, the Industrial Revolution in Europe 
saw greater demands for world commodity exports which had unintended 
consequences to the Dutch East Indies. After the Napoleonic War, Belgium 
successfully fought for independence, which caused the Dutch to emerge weak 
and impoverished. The Dutch began to concentrate on the Dutch East Indies to 
extend their rule and began taking control of the outer Island of Sumatra, Borneo 
and Sulawesi. The Dutch began its colonial adventurism by engaging in two 
major wars- the Padri War in Sumatra and Java War, both of which it emerged 
victorious. By the early twentieth century, the Dutch also overcame the Muslim 
dominant part of Sumatra, Aceh as part of its colonial territory. These colonial 
territories were becoming more essential to the Dutch empire as most of its 
economic activities for agricultural export as well as oil occurred in the outer 
island, primarily in Sumatra (Barlow, 1989). It would also have a significant 
effect to its contemporary security problems as Dutch interventions attempted to 
consolidate these islands with different ethnics and religion produced tensions in 
massive proportions.  
 The Dutch colony introduced an interventionist policy under the 
cultivation system which sought to profit from its colonies (Tarling, 2004). Under 
this policy, the local farmers were obligated to pay taxes to the administration in 
the form of land, labour and products. Local farmers were forced to cultivate 
export-oriented crops such as coffee, sugarcane, and tobacco on their rice-land. 
To administer the colonial territory, the Dutch overlaid the pre-colonial 
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institutional arrangement through a system of informal ruling by utilising patron-
client relations with the local elites known as the priyayi, that claimed part of the 
labour power of the peasants in Java as well as in the outer islands (Van Zanden 
and Marks, 2013). The colonial state incorporated the priyayi to act as local 
intermediaries for the Dutch into an even more centralised authority in Batavia, 
now known as Jakarta (Anderson, 1983). The increased intervention of the colony 
saw the emergence of a new capitalist class that benefitted from the Dutch system. 
The increase in landless peasants, endemic poverty and the rural social structures 
were crucial to the social tension during the post-independence. 
The colonial empire did little to strengthen and institutionalise the linkages 
between various islands and community in the archipelagic state (Brown, 2003, 
p.118). To protect their interest in the Dutch East Indies (later known as 
Indonesia), the local elites provided local military support deriving from the 
KNIL (Royal Indies Army) mostly from the Javanese conscript natives with the 
Dutch backings to fend off any resistance from external and internal struggles 
(Anderson, 1983). Such assimilation of the local indigenous natives in the 
military created deep grievances between the different ethnics in modern 
Indonesia. In light of the colonial conquest of the outer island, proponents of the 
Dutch liberal colonialism wanted to put an end to its exploitation in the Dutch 
East Indies.  
By the early twentieth century, the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy 
which was equally consequential to the earlier cultivation system. In an attempt 
to garner legitimacy among the indigenous, the ethical policy was conceived as a 
developmental aid for the natives to be compensated with higher living standards 
and infused with western values (Weber et. al, 2003). Although it was intended 
to break from the colonial past, the ethical policy was also an extension of the 
state apparatus to intervene in the indigenous population’s livelihood primarily 
on education, health, infrastructure, and religion (Anderson, 1983). While the rise 
of capitalism seems to have contributed to migrations of Chinese merchants and 
 84 
Javanese labours to the outer island for agricultural and manufacturing projects, 
it may also have had a deleterious effect to its contemporary security problems. 
Migrant groups formed informal relationships with the local political elites who 
were loyal to the Dutch rulings to suppress the local populations which created 
ethnic disharmony especially in the post-colonial era (Vickers, 2013).  
In other circumstances, the ethical policy did create new opportunities for 
the local elites. The Dutch legacy shaped the social hierarchy that segregated the 
indigenous population from the business savvy Chinese merchants as well as the 
Dutch upper echelons (Ricklefs, 2001). Although the education reform saw 
greater educational opportunities, it also produced a dissatisfied group of elites 
and aristocrats against the colonial Dutch. These local aristocrats tied to the 
traditional society created the nationalist movement through language and the 
identity of ‘Indonesia’ which spread across the archipelago (Ricklefs, 2001; 
Drakely, 2005). On the other hand, the peasant continued their traditional life 
with agriculture and other economic activities especially in the rural areas 
(Christano and Cummings, 2007).  Perhaps, another major consequence of the 
Dutch Ethical policy to change the existing social order was the spread of 
Christianity. The Dutch’s intentions to replace the predominant religions of 
Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism through education had a political effect which 
caused tension between social forces in the archipelagic state (Benda, 1962). 
Muslim clerical leaders were often brutally suppressed especially in Sumatra and 
other parts of the Dutch Indies as they had the political capacity to mobilise the 
nation-state (Drakely, 2005). 
Despite its attempts to provide welfare especially in the earlier twentieth 
century, the majority of the indigenous population were largely uneducated. The 
unintended consequences gave opportunities for the priyayi to mobilise the mass 
for anti-colonialist movement during the critical juncture (Robison, 2009). In 
some senses, the legacies of the Dutch colonialism left a pluralisation of class 
structure with economic activities that are skewed towards agriculture, religious 
 85 
tensions and ethnic resentment which define the socio-political struggles faced 
by Indonesia today. The absence of developing indigenous large landowning 
elites and powerful bourgeoisie led to the coalition of local elites which generated 
resistance in the form of communism, Islamism, and nationalism (Mortimer, 
1969; Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Although such institutional changes in 
Indonesia appear to be incremental, it nevertheless produced a path dependent 




Parallel to Indonesia, colonisation in the Philippines also changed the 
social composition of the state-society relations. However, what separates the 
Philippines from other case studies is that it suffered from two different colonial 
conquests. The colonialisation of Spain (1521-1898) and then subsequently the 
U.S. (1898-1946), left problematic legacies that constitute its social structure and 
political institutional arrangements which conceptualized its security concerns 
today. The origins of security concerns in the Philippines derived from the 
Spanish ruling resulted from the development of social and geographic 
delineations of religious identities and class structure (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, 
p. 155). During its 333 years of colonialism, the Spanish authority mainly focused 
on the islands of Luzon and Visayas for trade and implemented Catholicism as 
an institutional structure in the surrounding islands which consequently made it 
the hub for religion widespread (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005).    
In order to exercise its power, the Spanish authority in the Philippines was 
mediated through the church that was inseparably linked, and civil servants, local 
elites and priests collaborated for state administration (McCoy and de Jesus, 
1982; Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 67). However, as Spanish powers were 
limited, this further incapacitated the colony to consolidate the whole 
archipelagic to be converted to Catholicism. Despite their attempts to diffuse 
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political power in the predominantly Muslim South, it was met with continued 
resistance by the sultanate of Sulu and Mindanao. Because the Spanish never fully 
controlled the Southern part, the Muslim state building proceed and would 
become rival states to the Spanish (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). As the Spanish 
lacked the ability to take over the South, the Spanish was mainly focused on 
Manila as the entrepôt for Spanish trading with China. This severely highlighted 
the fragmentation in the state-society relations as the Spanish delineated the 
archipelagic state as they created the social structure which delineate the Muslims 
from the South. The different religious identity left enduring legacies which 
added to another layer of complexity for conflict and security concerns in post-
colonial period (Hedman and Sidel, 2000; Simbulan, 2005). 
On the other hand, the Spanish legacy also provided the foundation of a 
patrimonial state in which the state is captured by strong social forces of 
oligarchic interest (Hutchcroft, 1991). Although the Dutch were more 
interventionist in the Dutch East Indies under the cultivation system, Spanish 
colonial administration especially outside of Manila was decentralised. Members 
of the elite were given the chance to compete in the municipal election, which 
allowed them to exercise and control vast power and economy to a small but 
powerful group of the caciques (Hutchcroft, 1991). They were vested with the 
Spanish authority to maintain social order and to collect taxes and tributes which 
further diluted the power of the central state (Doronilla, 1994). The predatory 
behaviour of the strong landed capitalist elites is privileged from a weak 
centralised political structure of the Philippines which also weakened elite 
cohesion (Anderson, 1988). Under the Spanish ruling, they divided the 
archipelagic state into provinces ruled by strong local municipals who were the 
local chieftains who collaborated with the church to form a clerical-secular state 
with its own private armies (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 67). The Spanish 
reliance on the patronage system allowed for the local elites to increase their 
political capacity to be intertwined with the power structure in the Philippines 
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(Morada, 1998, p. 551). Similar to the Dutch East Indies, the competition to 
control economic trade in Southeast Asia saw the Spanish transform the common 
land into private properties. This led to the creation and growth of Chinese and 
Spanish mestizo strata elite families of landholders who had access to higher 
education to consolidate political and economic influences in the provinces 
(Simbulan, 2005; Querubin, 2016).  At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
increasing number of wealthy and landowners in the Philippine began to 
challenge the Spanish control. As the socioeconomic condition yielded more 
local elites to be more educated, political dissatisfaction grew with the Church’s 
vast economic power and their political repression. Local elites began to organise 
and assert themselves into challenging the Spanish authority for reforms and 
subsequently for independence (Caoili, 2006).  
Although the Spanish initially provide the genesis for political conflict in 
the Philippines, it was during the U.S. era that is especially important in 
understanding the modern Philippines on how its political structure contributed 
towards the security problems which persist today. Hedman and Sidel (2000, p.7) 
argued, “the broad contours of recent Philippine history are best understood not 
against the backdrop of “traditional” Filipino culture of Hispanicised society, but 
rather in the context of the state structures erected and imposed in the course of 
the American colonial era”. In the aftermath of Spanish-American war in 1898, 
the Philippines fell into the control of the U.S. under the Treaty of Paris. 
Resistance for anti-colonialism driven by nationalistic concept of ‘Filipino’ was 
driven by small groups of elites to declare independence from the Spanish 
(Banlaoi, 2004). However, due to the superiority of the U.S. armies and lack of 
support from other elites, the rebel groups were successfully suppressed in 1901.  
Not to mention, whereas the Spanish power was concentrated in the Central 
part of Luzon, the southern part of the Philippines, Mindanao, dominated by the 
Muslims was left to its own accords under the Spanish Treaty of Peace 1878. 
Succeeding the Spanish territory, the U.S. initially compromised with the Sulu 
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sultanate as a sovereign ruler under the Bates treaty of 1899, while they 
concentrated in subduing the rebellions in the North (Tarling, 2004). However, 
by 1905, the U.S. used its superior military to subdue the local Moro leaders in 
Mindanao and Sulu by integrating and the pacification of the Muslim to Manila 
(Tan, 1995).  
To dismantle the Spanish influence, the U.S. organised a constitutional 
structure through political and economic reforms which separated the power of 
the church and the state to provide and prepare them for self-rule and political 
order closely modelled to the U.S. (Philippine Organic Act, 1902; The 
Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, 1935). To limit the power of the 
church, land owned by the friars were bought from the Vatican and sold to the 
mestizos in order to discourage the indigenous from further revolutionary 
movements (New York Times, 1903). This changed the political economy 
whereby the mestizos would accumulate massive land properties which became 
the dominant economic elites and eventually consolidating the political power in 
the archipelagic state at the expense of the larger population (CIA Report ORE, 
1950). Further, in order to keep the mestizos loyal to the new colonial power, 
many of these agrarian based landowners were exempted from the U.S. tariffs 
which provided more opportunities to export their product to the U.S. (Hillier, 
2015). However, this created social unrest amongst the agrarian peasants as the 
patron-client relationship between the landowners and farmers became less 
paternalistic and arrangements became more impersonal (Quimpo, 2014).  
The unintended consequences on the annexation of the Philippines created 
an important institutional legacy. The colonial master established a similar 
institutional structure to the U.S. Congress-style bicameral legislature, which 
decentralized power to the municipals and provinces in the Philippines rather than 
creating a centralized state (Sidel, 1999). The local elites quickly learned that the 
Congress provided political power to pursue policies for their own self-interest. 
Because political contestation seats in Congress were limited to the few educated 
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elites, it meant that the elected representatives were accommodated largely by 
local elites to gain access to the Congressional purse (Anderson, 1988). It 
provided a political arena for political contestation through formal channels for 
political elites to capitalise on state resources for rent-seeking activities 
dominated by the mestizos to give economic opportunities to political allies, 
families and friends in a legalistic manner (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).  
Moreover, the introduction of the pork barrel policy in 1922 is one of the 
most important U.S. legacy tutelages in the Philippines (Teehankee, 2012). The 
pork barrel policy provided a budgetary spending allocated to benefit certain 
social groups to extract state resources to fund programs they see fit to develop 
its own provinces in return for their political supports (Coronel, 1998). Coupled 
with the pork barrel policy, this also meant that to attain power, patronage 
alliances needed to be formed with the wealthy landowners’ families, who had 
amassed their wealth during the Spanish and U.S. colonisation (Abinales and 
Amoroso, 2005, p. 168). It was also during this period that the wealthy political 
elites also expanded their landholdings to the south in Mindanao and encouraged 
transmigration of Christian-Filipino and did nothing to stop from Christian elite 
landlords and their goons to forcibly seizing the Muslim’s ancestral land 
(Hedman and Sidel, 2000, p. 72).  
 This created a weak state with a political system that was controlled by a 
small group of oligarchic mestizos in which powerful social forces extract state 
resources from a weak bureaucracy through patronage (Hutchcroft and 
Rocamora, 2003). The Congress would be a useful social ground for the local 
elites to gather and exchange ideas on how to pursue and protect their economic 
interest in the hacienda-based provinces (Anderson, 1988). The policy legacy left 
by the U.S. colony created an unlevel playing field as these institutional 
arrangements privilege the ruling elites in the political domain to exploit the 
economic resources which exclude the political participation of the mass. As 
such, political actors build and maintained a large network of patronage from 
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municipal to provincial and national levels which is controlled by the few. 
Because the government functions were highly monopolized by the strict access 
that benefits the wealthy elites, state apparatus were used in order to preserve 
their economic interest at the expense of improving the social status of the larger 
population (Putzel, 1992). However, such institutional arrangements have 
unequal implications for resource allocations which are intended to benefit 
certain social groups over others (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This led to the 
creation of a weak state, out of which extracting state budget for developmental 
projects was manipulated by the dominant social groups for their own benefit 
rather than for alleviating poverty (Hedman and Sidel, 2000; Hutchcroft and 
Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009).  
What happened to the Dutch East Indies bore some resemblance in the 
Philippines. The state institutional arrangements between the U.S. and the strong 
cacique elites created a large number of landless peasants which led to social 
unrest especially in the 1920’s and 1930’s. The growing communist ideas in 
Southeast Asia and social struggles led to the creation of the Labour unions and 
Leftist party, which mobilised the masses in retaliation against the dominant elites 
(Putzel, 1992). This would be the genesis of its security problems as social 
inequality and pervasive poverty caused social unrest which generated a growing 
consensus to the need for institutional change (Banlaoi, 2009; Cruz De Castro, 
2014). The institutional design of the Philippines created a concept of security 
designed for the protection of the small influential group of elites to maintain 
their access to political and economic interest. To further reinforce their position, 
the U.S. also established the Philippine Constabulary, made available for the 
elected mestizos to be utilised for maintaining social order to suppress the local 
peasants (Pobre, 2000). Rather than creating an effective bureaucratic law 
enforcement in the Constabulary, appointments, promotions and reassignments 
became the prerogative of the politicians (Sidel, 1999). From its inception, the 
functions of the law enforcements were politicised as the local politicians had 
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discretionary powers to use the coercive apparatus of the state to serve their own 
parochial interest. Lack of diverse political representations in the Congress meant 
that the dominant Filipino social class enjoyed relative autonomy in defining how 
security is conceptualized.  
By 1935, the Philippines became a commonwealth nation which allowed 
an elected Filipino president became the head of state with the Congress being 
dominated by the oligarchic mestizos. Due to the prominence of the nature of the 
patron-client network, the executive branch has vast influence over the legislation 
and legislative to allocate national budgetary (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). 
Uneven power distribution to the provinces and municipals controlled by the 
oligarchic elites from Manila reduced its economic dependency from the colonial 
administration (Hillier, 2015). The lack of transformation in nation-building and 
consolidation efforts in the Philippines gave rise to a patronage system to certain 
political elites, superimposing the structure of a weak state with uneven levels of 
economic development (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). In short, the U.S. created 
a premature state with a democratic institution and weak bureaucratic structure 
that formalised its source of power through the institutional arrangement. Further, 
it consolidated the economic and political system that benefits a relatively small 
social group of wealthy elites prone to corruption, cronyism, and patronage (CIA 
Report ORE, 1950; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). The trajectory of the 
oligarchic political elites, however, created a path dependence where the power 
structure is concentrated within the local elites excluding the peasants from 
economic activities and the room for political penetration within the institutional 
framework. Limited political representation created grievances between the 
social classes which would forge a security paradigm that persisted in the post-




3.3.3 Malaysia and Singapore 
 
Today’s Malaysia and Singapore were no less of a product of colonial 
conquest. Similar to its European rivals, the British colonisation of Malaya (later 
known as Malaysia) took form though in a slightly different manner. The British 
began to expand its influence in Malaya from the 19th century making it a 
centralised territory via the annexation of the Malay sultanates in the 1870s. After 
the opening of Suez Canal and trade with China and Japan grew in importance, a 
secure maritime passage (the Melaka Straight) was needed to connect the East 
and South China Seas to the Indian Ocean (Shamsul, 1998). Under the British 
divide and rule policy in the earlier twentieth century, the British territories in 
Malaya began to expand which were divided into three parts in the form of direct 
control of administrative system in the Strait Settlements which comprised the 
coastal areas of Melaka, Penang and Singapore became the most important 
strategic territory for the British, while imposing the Resident system in the 
Federated States- Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor. On the other 
hand, the British had indirect control in The Unfederated States through separate 
treaties- Johor, Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu (Stockwell, 1979).  
Where the Dutch East Indies saw direct intervention by Dutch colonies, in 
both the Federated and Unfederated states, the British practised indirect rules in 
some settings, while also successfully forging positive relations with the local 
Sultans. The Malay rulers were given sovereignty to maintain political order, 
although the latter group of states enjoyed greater autonomy. Although both 
territories were still under the direct supervision from the Empire over all political 
and economic matters, the Sultan maintained autonomy on cultural and religious 
matters (Andaya and Andaya, 2001). Under the British administration, the 
colonial empire separated the local Malay aristocrats from the peasants out of 
which they enjoyed certain privileged status in civil service, land ownership and 
education (CO877/25/7/27265/7, 1942; cited in Stockwell, 1995). To administer 
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the colonies, the British made Singapore its administrative city-state that was 
highly bureaucratic where key policy decision-making took place in Singapore.   
 But the most profound legacy that Malaya inherited from the British was 
the presence of immigrants and the colonial division of labour in the Malayan 
Peninsular and the Western Borneo, which became evident to its current security 
problems (Henderson and Phillips, 2007). Above all, the key institutional changes 
were the construction of a plural society which led to the hardening of the ethnic 
paradigm that gave rise to the social cleavages in contemporary Malaya (Abdul 
Khalid, 2014). As demands for imports on tin, rubber, and plantations became 
imperative to British industrialisation, the British led a large-scale migration 
policy that saw an influx of workforce from China and India. The British colonial 
implemented policy of segregation whereby the Chinese and Indians were mostly 
populated in the mines and plantations. The colonial division of labour saw the 
increase in Chinese capitalist to exploit its natural resources in tin mining, rubber, 
timber and rice had resulted in the shift of its demography into a plurally diverse 
society (CO537/3746, 1948, cited in Stockwell, 1995; Brown, 2003). Economic 
inequalities between the local indigenous and migrants soon began to develop as 
the local Malay chieftains and the Chinese merchants saw the increasing 
competition for economic access between the social groups (Khoo, 1972). This 
would also inevitably create class division that takes root across the ethnic 
communities, which provided the contextual origin for its contemporary security 
challenges.  
In order to protect the Malay ruling interest, the local elites exerted political 
pressure to the British to implement the Malay Regiment Bill in 1933. This policy 
led to the formation of a native armed forces which exclusively reserved to the 
Malays conscription, partly to satisfy the demands from the Sultans. The Malay 
Regiment became a symbol of Malay culture and to promote loyalty amongst the 
natives both to the British officers as well as to preserve Malay feudal system 
(Ramli, 1965). Even during wartime, there were legitimate concerns in the British 
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Colonial office that the Malay rulers were in fear of non-Malays over its position 
in the state. Since the British did not attempt to emphasise the integration of the 
Malays with non-Malays, the weakness of identification especially in the post 
war would become more politically contentious between communal. As such, 
post war planning led the Colonial Office to attempt to increase the efficiency of 
the Malays, which the colonies were to provide the necessary knowledge to fill 
the civil services in their own territories in hopes that the Malays would not be 
left out from the proficiency of the Chinese and to a lesser extent the Indians in 
Malaya (CO825/35/4, 1942, cited in Stockwell, 1995).  
The colonial policy did little to integrate the racial diversity for a peaceful 
community as the segregation further aggravated the Malays as indigenous 
people were mostly left out of the economic wealth gained from its native natural 
resources (Wade, 2009). Though before the conquest of colonial powers in the 
region, there were few differences between the Southeast Asian states of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in terms of ethnicity. Despite 
their commonalities, the colonial conquests were consequential towards the 
institutional setup which produced a divergent path in the post-independence 
state. The colonial antecedents were the causal factors on how political actors 
shape their security policy after the critical juncture. The trajectory of security 
issues during colonial policies conditioned the political affairs in these states 
which evolved during World War II. The political trajectories during this period 
were significantly different from what existed within these territories which 
defined the social cleavages and were exploited during the Japanese occupation 
producing divergent state outcomes (Slater and Simmons, 2010). 
 In all of these states, the extent of colonial influences in the domestic 
politics consequently have different effects on the trajectory of political 
structures. Not only did the western colonialism impact the political structure, it 
also affected the economic conditions that are different from each other. 
Nevertheless, one of the principal legacies left by the colonial powers was the 
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development of ethnic hierarchies which intensified their domestic problems and 
national security concerns suffered by these nation-states (Brown, 1994). 
Economic exploitations had left pervasive poverty which would also become the 
main security problems in these states as the ethnic hierarchies led to the 
concentration of power to the few ruling classes that collaborated with its 
colonies.  
These social conditions were significant towards the long-term factors on 
the political order and its national security concept. Similar to Indonesia and the 
Philippines, the colonial presence created a path dependent process on how post 
independent states define its national security struggles and its security policy 
options in the decolonisation period. Not only that, the carving of territorial 
borders became the source of power struggles between social forces in the society 
both domestically and regionally (Cribb, 2018). The incremental changes 
introduced by the colonial powers primed the nuance for political conflicts in 
these states. The colonial legacies also explained the path dependence of political 
strength that these nation-states enjoy in post-colonial period. It became a catalyst 
towards social cleavages in the society and how power structures were rearranged 
towards the dominant social groups which enforced their perception to the state’s 
strategic concept and security policies in the making of a nation-state (Slater, 
2010a, p. 57). However, as will be shown in the next section, the occupation of 
Japan in Southeast Asia was pivotal since the colonial system was destroyed, 
which provoked the security challenges in these states during the post-colonial 
era.   
 
 3.4 The Japanese Occupation and the Intensification of Social Cleavages 
 
If the principal legacies of these colonial powers were the creation of class 
struggles, racial tensions and an underdeveloped economy that was skewed 
towards agriculture, then the main impact of the Japanese occupation during the 
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World War II triggered social conflicts in the region. With the onset of World 
War II, Southeast Asia suddenly became one of the most contested regions for 
the Allies and the Axis for control. While the colonial antecedents provide the 
pre-existing conditions of political contestation, the Japanese occupation 
exacerbates the social cleavages in the region. World War II demolished the 
institutional structures placed by the western colonies in these states which 
provided temporary space for open contestation between social groups for a new 
form of mass politics (Slater, 2010a, p. 57).  
By mid 1942, Southeast Asia had fell into the Japanese occupation. 
However, the short period of Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia during the 
World War II as harbingers of change was crucial to the structural changes on the 
political and economic institutions in the colonial territories in the region (Times, 
1943). The Japanese presence in the region triggered a series of events, creating 
divergent paths in the institutional arrangements in the nation-states in the 
aftermath of war.  The lack of strong attachment to the existing institutional order 
and the Japanese propaganda had worsened the political situation which 
aggravated domestic conflict in these states during the nation building phase.  
In the case of Dutch East Indies, the Japanese arrival had a profound impact 
on the social cleavages and the institutional structure that was created by the 
Dutch. As the indigenous people perceived Dutch colonialism as exploiting its 
raw material resources to support the Dutch economy, the Indonesian economy 
remained poor (Ricklefs, 2001). Although nationalist movement had existed even 
before the war, resentment towards Dutch economic policies fuelled nationalist 
sentiment over independence from the colonial power (Feith, 2007). In contrast 
with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, the indigenous population in 
Indonesia saw the arrival of Japanese troops in 1942 during the World War II 
initially seen as liberators from the oppression of the Dutch colonies (Drakely, 
2005). In many ways, the Japanese destroyed the existing institutional order that 
the Dutch had built. One of the principal legacies during the short period of 
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Japanese occupation brought to Indonesia was the appeal towards economic 
autonomy that was previously absent during the Dutch (Aziz, 1955).  
The Japanese encouraged the peasants to be more involved in the economic 
activities, especially agrarian to supply to the Japanese forces. The Japanese also 
separated political administration which was previously held in Batavia (Jakarta) 
island of Java to three territories-Sumatra, Java and Eastern Indonesia as part of 
its administration (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003). Where previously only certain 
indigenous people were allowed to work in the bureaucracy, the Japanese 
changed the institutional structure by including Islamic leaders, nationalist 
advocates and local chieftains as part of its administrative team to maintain its 
power over the locals (Reid, 1975). Moreover, the Japanese also created a local 
indigenous military (PETA) which recruited young, Islamist and nationalist 
locals to provide support to the Japanese administration to control the society and 
for external defence (Lubis, 2005). Nevertheless, the military organisation would 
be the foundation which grew politically relevant for the revolutionary political 
group in the aftermath of the WWII and became the political machinery to claim 
independence.  
During the Japanese occupation, the military’s role was divided into two 
governmental roles, both military and civil which would be the evolving 
principles of  the ‘dwifungsi’ dual government (Kingsbury, 2003). This marks 
the difference whereby the Japanese arrival gave some impetus towards 
politicising new groups which mobilised local elites and secularist Muslim 
leaders through cross-class coalitions for nationalist movements led by Sukarno 
and Hatta for an independent Indonesia (Abeyasekere, 1976).  The indoctrination 
of the military by the Japanese and its continued support for the nationalist 
movement were aimed to legitimise the Japanese war efforts to pushback Western 
powers in the region (Times, 1943; Vickers, 2013). The Japanese legacy in 
organising the coalesce of local elites for independence which would be 
detrimental to the Dutch attempt to recolonize the nation-state in the post WWII. 
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Although the Japanese surrendered in the aftermath of WWII, their occupation 
accelerated the process for independence by gearing the nationalist movement 
with faction of armies armed with weapons around the archipelagic state (Zed, 
2005; Monfries, 2014).  
As in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore would also be the subject of 
ruling change from the British colonial to the Japanese conquest in Asia. The 
Japanese Occupation in Malaysia and Singapore also had similar far-reaching 
consequences on the political and socio-economic changes, overturning the 
existing order set by the British (Hirschman, 1986). However, when the Japanese 
occupied Malaysia, they were confronted by a deeply divided society. To put into 
perspective, the racial intensity on the encroachment of the Chinese population 
in Malaysia in 1947 were 49.5% Malay, 38.4% Chinese, 10.8% Indian, out of 
which the majority of the population in poverty were from the Malays (Chandler, 
1975)1. The Japanese forces entered Malaya with little resistance from the 
colonial army in 1942, toppling the Western imperial state which surrendered 
after Singapore fell to the Japanese (W.P., 42, 177, 1942). As the British colonial 
power were responsible for Malaya’s external security, Malay local elites did not 
feel compelled to provide support in resisting the Japanese invasion (Soh, 1998).  
In an effort to fend off the Japanese from the Malay peninsula, the British 
officials collaborated with the Chinese mainly from the Strait Settlements to fight 
in Singapore. The lasting effect of the Japanese Occupation in Malaysia and 
Singapore exacerbated social tensions between indigenous and the migrants 
which already pre-existed during the British ruling. During the 1930s economic 
depression the local Malays began to culminate resentment over the immigrants 
fearing that they would become minorities and lose their land rights to the 
foreigners (Nadaraja, 2016). The Japanese policies in Malaysia fomented racial 
 
1 Now, Malaysia is a heterogeneous society where the Bumiputera (Malays) constitute 67 percent, Chinese 25 
percent, Indians 7% with others making up of the remaining population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 
2011) 
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tensions whereby the Chinese were forced out of their land and being 
discriminated by the Japanese, while the Malays were working as civil servants 
and recruited in the police during the Japanese administration (Cheah, 2012).  
The Japanese propaganda were intended to win the indigenous support had 
worsened ethnic tension (Times, 1942a). For the Malays, their lack of economic 
involvements in the more progressive economic activities such as mining, and 
rubber fuelled their resentments over the Chinese (Abdul Khalid, 2014). 
Moreover, the increasing surge of migrant population limits the Malays 
participation in the economy. Although this was largely under the British policy, 
the Japanese were exploiting the already fragile racial tension. However, 
resistance in Malaya came from the Malay Communist Party (MCP) which 
formed the resistance movement known as the Malayan People Anti-Japanese 
Army (MPAJA) that was based in Singapore (Tan and Quah, 1996). As part of 
the Strait Settlement during the British era, the general population was 
overwhelmingly Chinese. Because the Chinese were sojourners in Malaya, 
sympathy towards China had led to the MCP which originated in Singapore 
sanctioned by the British Ministry of Information to cooperate with the Allied 
troops (Times, 1942a). They would also became the main victims of Japanese 
occupation largely because of their support against Japanese policies in China 
(Singh, 2001).  
During the Japanese Occupation, it provided the MCP the political capacity 
to mobilised its resources through coalitions with the Chinese which received 
military guerrilla warfare training from the British to provide resistance in 
Singapore and Malaysia (Soh, 1998). On the other hand, the policies by the 
Japanese were generally favourable towards the indigenous population. To 
legitimise its occupation, the Japanese sought to recruit the Malays in the security 
sector as they believed that they would be more loyal to the Sultans as opposed 
to the Chinese and the Indians (Milner, 1995). In order to suppress the communist 
in the jungles, the Japanese also used the police force largely from the Malays 
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against the Chinese dominated MPAJA (Abdul Wahid, 1970). Although the 
Japanese Occupation was short-lived, its policy of segregation nevertheless was 
essential backdrop for political contestations between the communal that had 
long-term threats and consequences confronting Malaysia’s security policies.  
Similar to other nation-states, the Philippines was also occupied by the 
Japanese in 1941-1945. Given that much of the Philippines state was run by the 
local mestizos, the highly stratified society was disrupted by the Japanese. As the 
bulk of mestizos supported the Japanese, they were happy to assume their power 
with limited interruptions from the invaders (Hillier, 2015). Local officials were 
keen to collaborate with the new Japanese to operate in the Philippines under a 
puppet government (FRUS, 1943). In order to put down the social unrest of the 
local population, the Japanese deployed the local Police Constabulary to engage 
with guerrilla insurgencies. Japanese policies to mobilise the state machinery to 
deal with social unrest however aggravated further tension between state and 
society (Ladwig, 2013).  
However, the Japanese invasion gave solidarity to the peasants to organise 
and mobilised the masses in central Luzon to fight the war (Kerkvliet, 2002). The 
timing provided the mass the political capacity that was long dominated by the 
mestizos to change the political structure to benefit the mass. This led to the rise 
of the Communist resistance which legitimised its position amongst the peasants 
the (Hukbalahaps) which challenged the Japanese authority and the collaborators 
in the Philippines. With the U.S. support on munition and training, the Huk began 
their insurgencies in many parts of the islands (Lapham and Norling, 1996, 128-
9). The Huks took this wartime period the opportunity to seize some of the lands 
previously held by the mestizos as they were seen as collaborators to the Japanese 
(Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). However, this would also become the cause 
of further tension in the state-society relationship in the aftermath of the World 
War as the mestizos were left unpunished by the U.S. (Anderson, 1988).  
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3.5 Decolonisation and Divergence of the Nation-States in Southeast Asia  
 
Although the modern Southeast Asian is now composed of independent 
nation-states, it is important to note that most states achieved independence 
through a series of political opposition and coalition of elites from the former 
colonial powers. Power struggles between political forces often awarded new 
political institutions to the winners during critical junctures (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). It created new institutional arrangements which benefitted 
certain group of actors within the given polity to organise the main security 
challenges that the state faced (Hacker and Pierson, 2014). The importance of the 
social construction of states as institutions in Southeast Asia is causally linked to 
the historical trajectory of the nation-states.  
Throughout Southeast Asia, the most enduring consequence of the state 
institutions came from its historical legacies and political trajectories which 
impacted each state’s domestic political legitimacy. To reinforce the major theme 
of this thesis, despite World War II bringing the sort of shock that led to the 
institutional changes, it is a consequence directly resulted from the endogenous 
process of political contestation that had been generated during the western 
imperialism that shaped the discourse on national security. One of the most 
important facets of the processes of national security in Southeast Asia was the 
aftermath of WWII. The Japanese occupation fragmented the Western colonial 
empires which gave the idea of national independence to locals in Southeast Asia. 
However, the Japanese occupation set the motion for a contentious politics which 
created a critical juncture in the post-war. It allows the ability of certain social 
groups to play a decisive role within the state in setting an institution and the 
interest that besiege them (Capoccia, 2015).  
This section seeks to explain how intense social cleavages were 
exacerbated during Japanese occupation set motion to the initial paths for 
institutional changes and the policy decisions during the period of decolonisation 
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that shaped the development of the state’s national security concept over time 
(Pierson, 2004; Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 64-8). The region saw the 
reoccupation of the Western colonial powers in order to establish political order 
left by the Japanese invasion. However, the rules changed dramatically at the end 
of World War II as the establishment of the United Nation led to the 
universalisation of the nation-state system (Berger and Weber, 2009).  
The period of the post-war saw intense contestation among social group 
because of the distribution of power and resources left by the Japanese which 
created distinctive types of contentious politics within Southeast Asia. It provided 
powerful actors to exploit the period of uncertainty to manipulate the preference 
of certain social groups through the promotion of institutional change (Capoccia 
and Kelemen, 2007). The attempts of colonial powers to exert its authority in 
Southeast Asia, however, were met with nationalist struggles for independence. 
The remnants of the Japanese interregnum dislodged the colonial institutional 
arrangements, puncturing the socio-political structure in the region. It allowed the 
local political elites to shape their strategic preference with the ideological 
capacity of national identities such as languages, religions and ethnicities which 
unites the indigenous population towards the movement for independence. The 
political order previously established by the colonial powers was destroyed in the 
post war (Cribb, 2018).  
The Japanese occupation created revolutionary movements in all states out 
of which large numbers of local populations were more politically conscious than 
ever before with more political tools at their disposal. Ethnic, class and religions 
were institutionalised as norms, views and practices which provided the 
worldviews and shape how actors perceive national security (Alagappa, 1998; 
Acharya, 2014). These national identities led to an institutional inertia which 
accelerated the process of decolonisation. However, the terms, period and 
processes for decolonisation varies in these states.  
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The unintended consequences of the Japanese occupation left an 
institutional void for political contestation in the domestic arena. For the first 
time, the Japanese occupation led to the organisation and mobilisation of certain 
social groups associated with the communist ideology to compete for an 
independent state. As Pierson and Skocpol (2002, p. 701) argued, “increasing 
returns processes occurring during particular periods generate irreversibilities, 
essentially removing certain options from the subsequent menu of political 
possibilities.” Nonetheless, this brought consequences on open political 
contestation between social groups in the domestic on how state is formed and 
how it shaped their discourse on national security. Such political contestation 
between the social groups in the domestic before the decolonisation exhibits 
effects on the national security concept. It organises the political actors in certain 
ways at the outset of a new political dispensation to protect their dominant views 
and interest in the form of state security.  
 
3.6 Social Conflict and Elite Organisation in Malaysia and Singapore: How 
British Weakness after WWII provided institutional changes 
 
In Malaysia and Singapore, the initial paths for state formation after the 
post war were politically contentious along the communal and racial lines. The 
post war policy saw the urgency to create and restructure the administrative and 
constitutional arrangements sought to provide the capacity of politically stable 
states that would protect their strategic, and economic interest after the eventual 
transfer of power. According to a memo of the Colonial Office (CO 825/35/4, 
1942: cited in Stockwell, 1995),  “Owing to the development by foreign capital 
(British, Chinese, American etc.) of the valuable natural resources of the states, 
it has fallen to the British to develop the local administrative systems to build up 
the social services and to ensure law and order.” The British saw great importance 
in safeguarding its interest in Malaya as resources were vital in the reconstruction 
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of its economy in the post-War (Darwin, 1984: 197; Stockwell 1984: 68-9). To 
that end, the British introduced the Malaya Union in 1946 which seceded the 
Malay Rulers from its independent position to the British Crown. The British 
perceived that it was under its obligation to develop all the Malay states except 
Singapore (due to its strategic importance) to be united as a single colony for 
administrative efficiency (CO825/35/6, 1943: cited in Stockwell, 1995. 
Moreover, the inclusion of Singapore would further complicate the political 
condition in Malaya as it is due to the overwhelmingly Chinese majority, 
challenging the predominance of the Malay demographics (Yeo, 1973). Although 
the partition of race did not persist, however, it highlighted the precedent that the 
path to sovereignty was largely designed to benefit certain racial classes. The 
proposal for Malaya Union inadvertently helped consolidate communal identity 
(Harper, 1999).  
The British did not anticipate the level of resistance from the locals towards 
the constitutional proposal (CAB129/7, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The 
proposal for the constitution of Malayan Union received strong resistance from 
the general population, the local aristocrats and the Malay rulers which beset 
Malay’s identity, political and economic position (Cheah, 2002). The 
institutionalisation of the ethnic identity of ‘Malaya for Malays’ was greatly 
embedded during the Japanese occupation that the indigenous holds the birth 
rights to rule Malaya over other races (Wade, 2009).  
As the Malay political elites maintained good relations with the British 
colony, this gave the political actors the advantage by inculcating their own 
ideational views to further strengthen their position in the society. Within the 
local elites, Tunku Abdul Rahman, a prince from Kedah and Dato Onn Jaafar, 
son of the former Johor chieftain was amongst the most vocal advocates against 
the Malaya Union. Out of anxiety on the Malaya Union, the local elites formed a 
political party called the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to 
mobilise the Malay population to challenge the rights for equal citizenship, driven 
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by concerns over Malay survival (Singh, 2004). They also feared that under the 
Malaya Union, reducing the Sultan’s authoritative position threatens the Malays 
Islamic values as it was essential towards preserving the Malays political capital 
in the Peninsular (CO537/1548/66, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). For UMNO, 
the re-emergence of armed communist MCP as victors from fighting the Japanese 
further complicated the political situation. With its credentials, the MCP was a 
legitimate force to challenge the British and UMNO negotiation for a nation-state 
with its political capacity to mobilise the Chinese population and the Malay 
radicals.  
To this end, the All Malaya Council for Joint Action (PUTERA-AMCJA) 
supported by the MCP was formed along the communal racial lines challenging 
the Malaya Union on the basis subsequent self-government (CO537/2174/1, 
1947: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The strategic effect of establishing a strong 
federal state led by UMNO consequently fostered the Malay position and 
brokered a compromised deal British for a Malaya Federation in 1948. Under the 
Malaya Federation, the political arrangements privileged the Malays to have 
special rights as an indigenous population in economics and education, while the 
Chinese and Indian immigrants were granted with restrictive equal citizenship 
(Tadin, 1960; Balasubramaniam, 2007; Lemiere, 2014). Though the grand 
bargain was agreed upon between the Malaysia and British, the negotiation 
process was only preserved between the elites. Political grievances between the 
elites and the mass grew as a result of the political arrangements. Against this 
backdrop, the MCP came to challenge the Malaya Federation through violence.  
However, this political contestation would be the conjuncture for the 
political elites to develop its security that are based on racial lines. Animosity 
between the Malay and Chinese strained the communal relations as the Chinese 
were commonly associated with the Communist for severing their belief and 
culture during wartime. The Colonial review described that the views of the 
Malays towards the MCP during wartime conducted: A. Compulsory 
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subscription; B. Taxing of Malay produce; C. Demanding mosques to be made 
their meeting places; D. Demanding Malay girls to work for them in the jungles; 
E. Abducting and killing Malays and destroying their houses and property 
(CO537/1581/14/15/16, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). However, this had a 
long-lasting repercussion on the attitude of the Malay leaders and their perception 
towards communal partition.  
For the British, the growing presence of Chinese Communists in the 
Peninsular present a security threat which weakened its position in Southeast Asia 
(CAB 21/1954, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 1995). The British feared that the 
growing influence of the Communist inspired Chinese would challenge its 
authority and the political arrangements to create a political stable government in 
the economically devastated country (CO537/1529/110, 1946: cited in Stockwell, 
1995). The British were sympathetic of the Malays standpoint as they were unable 
from compete both politically and economically in equal rights to citizenship (CO 
537/1529/110, 1946; cited in Stockwell, 1995). In many ways, the re-emergence 
of the MCP as a racial threat to the Malays deliberately reinforced the perception 
of the local Malay population that was already threatened by the economically 
superiority Chinese (Abdul Khalid, 2014). This gave the UMNO elites the 
nationalist credential as the protector of the community (Singh, 2004). In order 
to counter Malaya from communism, the British ceded with the pro-British 
Malays to form a government that could guarantee access to the Malaysia’s 
natural rubber and tin to generate the construction of British economy that was 
destroyed in World War II (CO825/35/4, 1942: cited in Stockwell, 1995; Wade, 
2009).  
It was within this framework that ethnic animosity between the Malays and  
Chinese led to a racial clash in Malaysia (Heng, 2017). The MCP managed to 
infiltrate trade unions in Malaysia and Singapore to overthrow the feudal 
aristocratic system by replacing it with a Soviet Union style political institution 
at the expense of Malay dominance as they saw the physical presence of Chinese 
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was at stake (Short, 1970). As large members of the MCP were Chinese squatters 
living outside of the Malaysia society after the Japanese occupation, conflict 
between the government and the MCP led to the declaration of State of 
Emergency in 1948 to 1960 (Cheah, 1981; Singh, 2004). The struggle by the 
Malay leaders and the British counterpart to quell the Communist provided the 
institutional capacity to the government through using draconian methods for 
counter-insurgency (Hack, 2009).  
With the support of the British, UMNO elites had the political capacity 
legitimated by the Emergency to mobilise the Malay Regiment  (later reformed 
as the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces (RMAF)) with intelligence support from 
the Police Special Branch led by British to use force against the communist in the 
jungle while the British were tasked with providing external security (Nathan, 
1998; Loh, 2002; Wade, 2009). Armed by the British, the RMAF was created 
which was largely conscripted by the Malays to deter communism (Crouch, 
1992). This also provide avenue where the Malays could dominate the political 
arena and further exclude the Chinese from the Malaysian political process. 
Through coercive power, it firmly established the Malayan leaders by 
empowering a particular set of actors to allocate authority over the security 
agenda (Pierson, 2016). 
As a precondition by the British to self-governance, power sharing was 
necessary to prevent communal conflict in Malaysia. Recognising that the 
Malaysian government were out of touch and the already strained relationship 
between the Malays and the Chinese, the British and the Malay rulers encouraged 
Chinese leaders to form a political party called the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA) to counter against the ideological appeal of the Communist MCP in 1949 
to maintain political order in Malaysia (CO537/4242/5, 1949: cited in Stockwell, 
1995). Shared perception amongst the Malay elites and the conservative Chinese 
elites on the political threats towards workers revolt in the Chinese community 
led to the UMNO-MCA Alliance. The MCA appealed to the Chinese community 
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through rapprochement with the middle class by appealing to fight for Chinese 
right within the government (Kua, 2007). A noteworthy of the Alliance was that 
the MCA was aware of the special position of the Malay rulers in the colonial set-
up, and the predominance of Malays in the electorates (Kua, 2007). After The 
UMNO-MCA alliance dominated in the municipal election in 1952, the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC) also joined the Alliance which led to the formation of 
Barisan Nasional (BN) which won 51 of the 52 seats in the 1955 Legislative 
Election with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister to form the first Malayan 
government. The UMNO-MCA alliance government led a delegation to London 
in 1956 to negotiate with the British for the drafting of Malaysia’s Constitution 
under the Reid Commission for a handover for self-government (Wade, 2009). 
The broad coalition of the elites unified by support from the general population 
led to the formation of a unitary state (Slater, 2012). Such collaboration between 
elites gave a pathway for a strong political structure along the racial lines and 
how national security would be conceived in Malaysia. Given the dominance of 
BN alliance during the process of state formation, the concept of security policies 
was determined by the postcolonial order shaped to protect their political survival 
and its interest.  
Political contestation between social groups in Singapore also played a big 
role in its formative years. However, this is where the path began to diverge 
during the genesis of the institution. Where Malaysia used the new institutional 
apparatus to manage ethnic cleavages, the principal struggle in Singapore pitted 
against the predominantly Chinese chauvinist leaning to the left (Thum, 2019, p. 
50). High unemployment, dilapidated housing and discrepant education system 
was a fertile ground for social conflict (United Nations, 1961). At the same time, 
the British asserted control over public discourse by limiting discourse to English 
in a Chinese dominant language which caused political unrest amongst the 
Chinese speaking population (Thum, 2019). The frustration about the systemic 
bias initiated the communal Chinese to be indoctrinated with the Communist 
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ideologies through education and trade unions because of the oppressive 
measures that the British policies were implemented to the large part of the 
Chinese population in Singapore (Turnbull, 2009, p. 252).  
In the case of Singapore, although it was established as a separate colony 
with its own constitution, many security policies pursued in Malaysia overlapped 
with Singapore. Much like Malaysia, in Singapore, the aftermath of Japanese 
occupation led to a rising national consciousness by the people for self-
governance. From the period of 1946 to 1948, social conflict grew out of the mass 
mobilisation organised by the MCP with various parties and trade unions to 
challenge the colonial government for independence (Yeo, 1973, p.22). However, 
as the eventual Malaya Federation becoming inevitable, the MCP was declared 
illegal and sought for unconstitutional political measures through violent 
measures in both the Peninsular and Singapore (Marshall, 1974).  
The Emergency brought political order to both Singapore and Malaysia 
which would also give path to its independence. The Emergency also established 
a precedent for an authoritarian regime in both Malaysia and Singapore which 
provided a strong state apparatus in implementing its views on security policies. 
However, the British colony realised that in order to fight communism in 
Singapore, local allies were to be defeated through an elected government backed 
by the British government (CAB128/86, 1957: cited in Stokes, 1995). As a small 
city-state, the close association of Singapore to the Malayan Federation was vital 
to its survival as the French defeat in the battle of Dien Bien Phu risked a domino 
effect of Communist influence throughout Southeast Asia (CO1030/93/1, 1954: 
cited in Stockwell, 1995). However, as a precondition for Singapore’s 
independence, Singapore’s internal security remained under the Internal Security 
Council, with joint responsibility between Singapore, Malaya and the British.  
Likewise, these new institutional arrangement not only facilitate changes in the 
power dynamics, it also benefit certain social groups during the power struggles 
at the expense of other groups (Mahoney, 2000).  
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Similar to Malaysia, the State of Emergency in Singapore was also 
declared in 1948. The British Colonial office expanded the government’s 
authorities with the introduction of draconian laws such as Internal Security Act, 
Sedition Act and the Criminal Law Act that gave unrestricted power to the 
governments to maintain political autonomy at the expense of individual liberty 
(Harper, 2001). Thus, these newfound institutional arrangements became central 
to the local leaders which provided the political capacity to govern and protect 
their interest (Cortell and Peterson, 1996). Despite measures were taken to 
partially restored order with the arrest of students and trade unions, the precarious 
situation for a new state combined with the growing nationalist movement for 
independence was ripe for social conflict. Realising that developing a democracy 
in Singapore was imperative to prepare for its eventual decolonisation process, 
the British was forced to appoint a commission in 1953 called the Rendel 
Commission to study the changes in the constitution for a partial self-government. 
With surmounting pressure from the local elites, the Rendel Constitution led to 
the allocations for culminating in the election of 25 seats in the 32-legislative 
assembly as a first step towards self-governance (Rendel, 1957).  
Under the provision of this constitution, Singapore retained internal self-
governance while external matters such as defence and internal security would be 
reserved by the Security Council represented by the British, Singapore and the 
Malayan Federation (Marshall, 1974). In 1955, the first election took place in 
Singapore to govern the domestic affairs which saw the Labour Front led by 
David Marshall winning the largest number of seats and formed the first elected 
Singapore government as the First Singapore Chief Minister (Chan, 2001). On 
the other hand, these circumstances also led to the formation of PAP in 1954 to 
contest in the election. The political marriage between the progressive leftist with 
strong support from students and pro-communist groups led by Lim Chin Siong, 
and the Western educated middle-class moderate nationalist led by Lee Kuan 
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Yew formed the People’s Action Party (PAP) was formed out of the struggle for 
independence and won 4 out of 5 seats in the legislative (Fong, 1979; Sim, 2006). 
After replacing the Rendel Constitution in 1955, two more constitutional 
conferences were held in 1957 and 1958 as a preparation for independence in 
1959.  However, political conflict erupted in 1956 when the labour movement led 
by the left-wing destabilised Singapore’s domestic politics that cast doubts on the 
survival capabilities if it was granted full independence (Chan, 2001, p. 90). With 
the domestic problems ripened threatening to destabilise the city-state, David 
Marshall and other members of the parliament went to London to discuss for a 
grant for full independence. However, due to disagreement between the colonial 
power, David Marshall resigned in 1956 due to his disinclination towards British 
precondition on security matters towards self-governance. This gave path to Lim 
Yew Hock to take over the helm to become the New Chief Minister of Singapore 
(Marshall, 1974). As a precondition by the British for Singapore to achieve 
independence,  Lim Yew Hock was pressured by the colonial government to 
maintain political order (Thum, 2013). As Singapore was still at the period of 
State of Emergency, from 1955 to 1957, prominent leaders such as Lim Chin 
Siong and other subversive faction of the PAP Executive Committee, trade union 
leaders, students, businessmen were arrested without trials as protest erupted. The 
arrest of these prominent figures of the Left leaning leaders were politically 
orchestrated by the British, Singapore and the Malaysian Federation as part of 
their efforts at crippling the Communist activities (Ramakrishna, 2015).  
This was possible because after the 1955 election the PAP became a 
political juggernaut. Despite only winning few seats in the legislative, the PAP’s 
constituents drew large support from the grassroot that was vastly superior to 
other party organisation as it had large appeal to the Chinese population that was 
mainland oriented (CIA Report CREST, 1955; CIA Report CREST, 1956; Ang, 
2018). However, in order to retain control and secure Singapore’s independence 
under the condition of merger with the Malayan Federation, Lee Kuan Yew and 
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the Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock had to politically engineer an arrest of the PAP 
left wing faction that would allow him to contest in the election with the support 
of the British (National Australian Archive, TS/383/5/3, 1957). This provided the 
political opportunity for Lee Kuan Yew to reform the party structure and 
subsequently commanded a majority in the 1959 election. The PAP contested all 
55 of the available seats and won 43 seats available which constituted the majority 
of the first Singapore government after independence. This set precedent for the 
PAP to capture the state apparatuses and deploy them instrumentally to shape and 
contour the specific security policies.  
The preceding analysis has traced the political origin of Malaysia and 
Singapore’s state provided strength through constitutional laws, promoted by the 
British in order to deal with social conflict in the 1940’s to 1950’s. The contours 
of the political upheaval in both states have exhibited how security perceptions 
are shaped. The path to state formation was politically contentious in both 
countries. Social cleavages were overlapping with race and class. Not to mention, 
with  communism looming in both states, this provided the opportunity for 
strategic actors the capacity of shifting the contextual condition to dictate 
preferred policies that are favourable to their own political position (Steinmo, 
Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). Although communism was an international threat, 
it also influenced the domestic events which triggered changes. Thus, counter-
revolutionary collaboration between the British and local elites in Malaysia and 
Singapore formed a strong state (Slater, 2012). The causal role of social conflict 
expanded the opportunity for local leaders with the institutional capacity to 
implement preferred strategic policies designed to protect their power. 
 
3.7 Rescinding Sovereignty in the Philippines 
 
Similar to Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines was also subjected to 
the Japanese overlord during the World War. However, how the Philippines 
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emerged with independence was in stark contrast to other case studies. In the 
absence of nationalist struggle, the Philippines achieved independence through a 
gradual phase of decolonisation from the U.S. ruling which began before World 
War II, only to be interrupted during the Japanese occupation. After the Japanese 
surrender, the task for the Philippines elites and the U.S. colony was to revive the 
government from the strong Communist anti-Japanese resistance of the Huks. 
The attempts to reoccupy the Philippine by the elites and the U.S. was different 
from Malaysia. In contrast to Malaysia, the U.S. troops were already present 
before the liberation where approximately 100,000 troops were already in the 
archipelagic state shortly before the Japanese invasion (Constantino and 
Constantino, 1978).  
The World War II briefly opened up political contestation for institutional 
changes in the Philippines. During wartime, the peasant-led group called the 
Huks played a huge role in the Japanese resistance. This was possible through 
collaboration with some of the U.S. troops in coordinating assaults towards the 
Japanese forces (Ladwig, 2013; Hillier, 2015). This empowered the mass 
mobilisation which gained momentum in the post war to push for reform on the 
political institution for broader political participation. Moreover, the peasants 
were seeking agrarian reform against the landed elites that as the social inequality 
continued to plague the Philippines. However, the task for political reform was 
challenging for the peasant group. Although the Huks and the U.S. joined hands 
battling against the common enemy, the presence of U.S. troops throughout the 
war in the Philippines meant that any political movements designed to change the 
institutional arrangements were limited (Goodno, 1991). In the post war, the Huks 
were treated suspiciously by the Philippines government and the U.S. fearing 
social uprising as the Huks were armed and could challenge the political order 
(Castillo, Taruc and Roxas, 1946). Not to mention, the Huks struggled to maintain 
coalition beyond the wartime due to divided opinions. The Huks alliance only 
saw that the purpose for unification against the oppression of the Japanese and its 
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collaborators, failing to consider the U.S. and pro-American elites as part of their 
enemy (CIA Report CREST, 1951).  
According to Kerkvliet (2002), the urban penetration of the Huk based 
party remained weak against the politically resourceful elites. Political and 
economic elites collaborated using private armies and the Constabulary to 
suppress the Huks and pacify the nation favouring to install the pre-war political 
structure (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Quimpo, 2009). For the oligarchs, 
any changes in the previous institutional design limits their access to political 
power and state resources. This can be seen largely from the history sequencing 
of the American colony where it gave rise to the wealthy land elites for private 
accumulation of power (Kuhonta, 2011). Not only that, the elites who 
collaborated with the Japanese administration were reasserted in the position of 
authority and pardoned (FRUS, 1945b).  The oligarchs were concerned that the 
peasant unity and capability to mobilise the mass would threaten their political 
power (Kerkvliet, 2002, p. 143-155). As the oligarchs enjoyed a wider array of 
political mechanism at their disposal in the pre-war, their aim was to maintain 
and expand its political power through which private interest would dominate 
rather than for public interest (Sidel, 2013).  
The U.S. could have used this period to strengthen the institution as a basis 
for broader political participation. Instead, with close personal and business 
relations, the U.S. led by Commander General McArthur sought to protect the 
local elites through the deployment of U.S. military force to combat the peasant-
led movements (FRUS, 1945a; Constantino and Constantino, 1978; Manchester, 
1978). With the U.S. staunch support, the Liberal party candidate Manuel Roxas, 
who was a member of the Japanese puppet government and a close friend of 
General MacArthur, was elected as the President in the post-war against the 
Nacionalista Party Sergio Osmeńa (Manchester, 1978, p. 1150). For the U.S., 
having a friendly regime to lead the Philippines such as Roxas was critical to its 
security interest. Guaranteed access to the naval base and airbase was important 
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for the U.S. to maintain presence in the region, while the oligarch the guaranteed 
access to the U.S. market (Anderson, 1988, p.14).  
Political and social grievances between the elites and the mass grew as the 
latter group were left bitter that the collaborators during the Japanese occupation 
were left unpunished (FRUS, 1945c). Nevertheless, the Huks attempted to push 
for institutional reform agenda through the ballot box by backing the candidates 
from the Democratic Alliance (DA), though was unsuccessful. The DA 
candidates who won seats in the lower house were barred from participating in 
the Congress (Quimpo, 2014, p. 140). Instead, the Congress was dominated by 
two major parties the Nacionalistas and the Liberal party which both represented 
the wealthy landowning elites and the interest of the big business interest 
(Teehankee, 2012). Consequently, the opportunity to progress reformist agenda 
to address the problem of land reform, social inequality and pervasive poverty 
through formal institutions were limited (Rodan, 2015).  
This is a stark contrast to the British in Malaysia on how they responded to 
mass mobilisation. The British presence assisted the orchestration of a strong 
administrative structure in the form of federal state with a more broad-based 
political parties to facilitate a more collective elite coalition along the racial lines. 
However, this would seal the fate of the Philippines and its enduring security 
problems in the post-war. By contrast, rather than creating a strong state with a 
coalition of elites, the post war Philippines was a weak bureaucratic state with 
divided political elites, bequeathing the state system to be monopolised and 
manipulated by the oligarchic interest (Kang, 2002). It created a political vacuum 
that substantiated the clientele politics to enjoy a degree of political autonomy 
and decentralised power away from the central government. Political choices 
made during the defining years were embedded in the permissive condition that 
drove the leftist and mass peasant movement. With the DA being abstained from 
Congress, the formation of institutional arrangements that was set forth for self-
 116 
governance was mutually exclusive between the oligarchic elites and the U.S., at 
the expense of broader political representation.  
Under the 1935 Constitution, the Philippines became a Commonwealth 
that was modelled on that of the U.S. political system. The President had the 
authority to make appointments to critical departments while the Congress holds 
the rights to approve the cabinet candidates. This created an unlevel playing field 
as the wealthy local elites consolidated the institutional arrangements that would 
greatly benefit its political and economic position in the polity (Hall, 2016). The 
formation of security concept was ultimately shaped by the particular 
constellation of power and interest that underpins the state (Jones, 2012b). After 
achieving its independence from the U.S., the national security interest was 
ultimately formalised and intertwined with the oligarchic interest (Morada and 
Collier, 1998, p. 551). With a weakened state structure, and the power resides in 
the periphery, the culture of clientele politics to extract resources became the 
norm for political actors to access state resources.  
After self-governance was granted, the oligarchs declared an all-out war 
against the Huks. Fearing that the Huks might threaten the newly independent 
regime, Roxas demanded Taruc, the Huk leader to surrender their weapons 
(Taruc, 1953). The peasants who occupied the land during wartime were 
forcefully removed as landowners started to reclaim their properties often through 
coercion of the private militia and state security force in the post war (Kreuzer, 
2009). The decentralisation of security forces to the municipals and the provincial 
elites created an uneven level playing field with security through private armies 
and arming the police further entrenched the power of the local bosses (McCoy, 
1993, p.14; Kreuzer, 2009). As Anderson (1988, p.31) puts it, “their very 
dispersion and localism show how confident the caciques are, and how little they 
feel the need to crawl together under the apron of the military”. This severely 
weakened the central government to implement a cohesive security policy to 
combat Communism where political violence was concentrated largely in the 
 117 
rural areas (Morada and Collier, 1998, p. 551). Because the leftist did not present 
a challenge to the political arrangements, the cacique felt little pressure for 
institutional reform (Slater, 2010a, p. 99).  
With growing violence against the mass enforced by the private armies and 
the Police Constabulary, the Huks effectively took an informal approach in 
pursuing the institutional reform. The rearming of the peasant movement became 
the military wing of the Partido Komunista Ng Philipinas (PKP) which launched 
a series of campaigns against the government from 1946 to 1954 (Kerkvliet, 
2002). Moreover, the Philippines economic condition worsened with income 
inequality growing larger than during the pre-war due to the lack of agrarian 
reform that sparked peasant discontent on how the landlords were treating them 
and how the state was defaulting to the cultures of patron-client (FRUS, 1950). 
Violence in central Luzon grew in 1949 when the Quirino administration won the 
election that took hold in the same year was charged with fraud (FRUS, 1951). 
Emboldened by the population discontent, it provided the Huks the opportunity 
to carry out more frequent attacks in Manila declaring to overthrow the corrupt 
regime which further weakened the state to assure internal security (CIA-NIE, 
1954).  
The U.S. blamed that the widespread corruption in the Quirino 
administration were catalyst to civil unrest and made the U.S. officials suspicious 
that the local elites were capitalizing the financial aid to the Philippines for private 
interest (Ladwig, 2017). With significant pressure for institutional reform from 
the U.S., the Philippines reluctantly receded security enforcement by absorbing 
the Police Constabulary to the Army. This gave back political power to the central 
state, thereby weakening the patron-client relations in the provincial elites (Hall, 
2018). This would promote a dependent path to the military to play a more 
significant role in internal security problems. In order to control the internal 
insurgencies, the U.S. reorganised the Constabulary, absorbed and trained the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to be an effective counterinsurgency force 
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(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p. 175). The Philippines security approach took 
an institutional turn when President Magsaysay took office in 1953. In many 
ways, this was a window of opportunity that might have shaken up the 
institutional lethargy of clientele politics (Kuhonta, 2011). With his broad popular 
support and lacking in cacique origin, he took a different approach from that of 
the oligarchs (Cullather, 1993). Under his tenure, Magsaysay introduced several 
reform programs to improve efficiency in the bureaucracy, rural economic 
development and agrarian reform which saw a substantial growth in the economy 
as well as living condition (CIA-NIE, 1957). With U.S. aid, Magsaysay improved 
the corrupt bureaucratic system through higher wages and providing the political 
power to the local forces in the municipal the authority to remove unqualified 
armed personnel (Ladwig, 2017). At the same time, with the CIA support, the 
Philippines expanded the military’s role by deploying them in various communist 
prone with nation-building projects and counterintelligence (Berlin, 2008, p.42-
78). Such institutional programs were necessary to levelling the uneven level 
playing field that was dominated by the oligarchs in the Congress. It substantially 
improved the state-society relations as abusive security personnel were removed 
and built the public image that the security forces were present for community 
building projects by using the aids to build bridges, wells and roads (Danguilan, 
1999). Shortly after the surrender of Huk leader Luis Taruc, the Huk rebellions 
collapsed while some of the rebels were absorbed back to society through 
Magsaysay’s social program (Ladwig, 2017).  
Magsaysay’s security policies would have a lasting impact on the 
patronage-clientele politics with the subsequent expansion of military’s role in 
the polity. Because of Magsaysay’s modest reformist programs, the military 
occupied several civilian posts which weakened the patron-client relationship of 
the oligarchs (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012). However, the interim period 
of Magsaysay’s centralised state would be undone after his untimely tragic death. 
With political contestation waning between the mass and U.S.’s other security 
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commitments in Vietnam, the institutional reform set by Magsaysay would be 
undone by his successors. Land reforms initiated during his presidency would 
become obsolete as the oligarchs regained control of the Presidency with the 
support of the oligarchy dominant Congress, reverting back to its previous 
institutional arrangements (Putzel, 1992). In many ways, the causal connection 
between the social conflict and the centralisation of power to the state intensified 
the power to the President to conduct a more broad-based security policy 
(Arugay, 2012). However, while Magsasysay’s approach was touted to be 
progressive to the development of state-society relations, the significance of these 
changes appeared to be temporary which gave path to the return of class 
contentious politics in the 1960s. These successes have been counterbalanced by 
the oligarchs for further institutional reform that undermined many of their 
institutional privileges. There was strong resistance driven by the oligarchs to 
revert power back to the municipals (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). This is 
largely because the social unrest did not contribute to the elites to create a 
coalition pact and build a stronger bureaucratic state (Slater, 2010a). Instead, 
despite pressure from the U.S., the oligarchs still maintained its political presence 
in the Congress with little competition from the mass population. Such historical 
legacy can be difficult to undone as a fragmented state which is open to demands 
and pressures limits the capacity of coordination for a centralised policy (Bell, 
2002).  
Despite this, the unintended consequences of institutionalising the practice 
of deploying the military in the civilian roles would also set path for the AFP to 
acquire much larger roles during Marcos’s era. The involvement of the military 
in nation building categorically altered the role of the military to be an apolitical 
institution (Huntington, 1995). It developed a special civilian-military relation by 
forming a patronage links with the civilian institutions that are dominated by the 
oligarchs through  a “partnership”  between the civilian government and the AFP, 
although the AFP was subjugated as the junior partner for coercive tactics and 
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offered economic development to maintain the ruling regime (Arugay, 2012). 
This would however become the unintended sequencing as the power of the 
oligarchs could be curtailed through the strengthening of the bureaucrats (Crisol, 
1980). By privileging the military to take up the role for nation building projects, 
this gave a blueprint for Marcos to use the military institution in creating an 
autocratic state. 
 
3.8 The Struggle for Independence and Territorial Cleavages in Indonesia 
 
Thus far, this chapter has shown that the aftermath of the World War II 
saw the return of colonial powers shortly before they were granted self-
governance. Although achieving self-governance was relatively smooth in 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines without necessarily resorting to military 
to maintain political order, Indonesia appeared to be on the other end of the 
spectrum. By contrast, the path to self-governance in Indonesia was more 
complex, pitted with struggle against colonialism and fragmentations around their 
claimed chain of islands (Van Klinken, 2001). The magnitude of violence in the 
aftermath of World War II sparked a revolutionary struggle against the colonial 
power which would be the primary concern for Indonesia’s security concept. 
Similar to Malaysia, the idea for Indonesian independence had been greatly 
strengthened during the Japanese occupation and had significant political impacts 
to the locals (Aspinall, 2016). However, departing from Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Singapore, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the Japanese 
war with its leaders returning from exile and were well positioned in the Japanese 
administration to rally support and mobilise the population (Sidel, 2013). Shortly 
after the war, the Japanese surrender created a power vacuum that gave the 
opportunity for nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahir to quickly 
declare independence (Ricklefs, 2001). By late 1945, the British military began 
to arrive to reoccupy Indonesia to install political order on behalf of the Dutch 
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government (FRUS, 1945d). Rich in natural resources and a strategic point of 
entry for trade, Indonesia was vital for the Dutch to rebuild its collapsed state that 
was occupied earlier in the war by the German forces. However, when the British 
troops arrived in Indonesia, the Republic administration had already existed and 
were fully functioning in Java and Sumatra (Cribb and Kahin, 2004). Armed with 
Japanese weaponry, the British operation to reclaim these territories were met 
with fierce resistance from the locals (Kahin, 1952).  
In an effort to rally the population against the colonial troops, local leaders 
used the nationalist ideology of the Perjuangan (struggle) to mobilise the mass 
across various islands that are ethnically diverse to fight for independence 
(Ricklefs, 2001; Drakely, 2005; Vickers, 2013). Whereas in Malaysia saw the 
need for elites to collaborate from different racial lines, by contrast the struggle 
for political autonomy led to the coalition of cross-class elites deriving from the 
nationalist party (PNI), the communist party (PKI), the Muslim and the military 
to fend off from the Dutch to reclaim Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004). This was largely 
because the returning Dutch gave common grounds for the elites to collaborate 
to protect themselves from a much stronger political force (Kingsbury, 2003). In 
contrast to the Philippines, the struggle for class would not be applicable to 
Indonesia as they were lacking in bourgeoisie class that controlled the economy 
which further pushed the leftist to work with a more practical cause of liberating 
Indonesia from Dutch control (Gouda and Zaalberg, 2002). 
To further consolidate the idea of a federal system, Sukarno released his 
five guided principles called the Pancasila as a preamble to the constitution that 
was drawn by a major compromised by the elites in an effort for unity that served 
a basis for an Indonesian state (Drakely, 2005, p. 73). However, the struggle for 
maintaining an Indonesian Republic faced several challenges both internally and 
externally as some leaders disagreed with the Constitution (Bertrand, 2004, p. 
32). Shortly after the Dutch arrival in Indonesia, Eastern Indonesia was being 
occupied by the Australian troops while parts of Sumatra and Java were re-
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occupied by the British-Dutch troops (Ricklefs, 2001). By 1948, the Republic 
was facing armed struggles both internally and externally that severely 
fragmented the elite coalitions. The Republic was facing challenges from its 
claimed territories with a faction of PKI waging war for self-autonomy especially 
in Madiun, killing the Republic government officials (CIA Report CREST, 
1948a). Despite that, due to the strength of Republic’s military, Hatta initiated a 
military campaign in Madiun against the PKI that was quickly won by the Tentera 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI).  
On the other hand, due to frustrations from the Dutch over failed 
negotiations with the Republic, the Dutch initiated the ‘Police Action’ which saw 
the Republic leaders being captured by Dutch forces, weakening the 
revolutionary government. This caused fragmentation between the civilian elites 
and the military as the Republic government’s political legitimacy to claim for a 
unitary state especially after the war (Mietzner, 2008, p. 38-42). This gave the 
opportunity for the military to consolidate its position as national heroes in the 
revolutionary struggle while civilian leadership was regarded as weak and frail 
(Kingsbury, 2003; Bertrand, 2004; McGregor, 2007; Mietzner, 2008). While the 
historiography of Indonesia was severely distorted by the dominant narratives 
during Suharto’s era, which will be discussed in the next chapter, it was in fact 
the international pressure led by the U.S. that forced the Dutch to ceded Indonesia 
(CIA Report CREST, 1948b). The Dutch ‘Police Actions’ however was a fatal 
mistake by the colonial side as the Dutch forcefully took over the Republican 
territory, including its capital Yogyakarta that could potentially destabilize the 
already frail region. For the UN, the Dutch ‘Police Actions’ would pave way for 
the PKI to consolidate power from the pro-U.S. elites, allowing the Soviet Union 
to influence its power beyond China to control the vast natural resources in 
Indonesia that was vital for the economic recovery for the U.S. and its Allies (CIA 
Report, ORE 26-48, 1948). Inevitably, with the U.S. intervention forced the 
Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia while maintained its presence in the West New 
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Guinea until the 1960s contributing to the internal rebellions and consistent 
political unrest in the postcolonial era.  
The revolution left behind a legacy towards the political order in Indonesia. 
Although the Dutch finally agreed to an independent Indonesia, its strategy of 
divide and conquer in Indonesia had left a fractious politics with a fragmented 
society that privileged the leaders from the periphery (Bertrand, 2004, p. 32). 
They promoted the establishment of independent states based on major ethnic 
groups which polarize the society and created further disunity in Indonesia. It 
provided the local leaders in these areas to have ambitions for local political 
autonomy and a strong distaste for the Javanese leaders on how the political order 
would be constructed after independence (Slater, 2010a, p. 108). On the upshot, 
except for the Communist Party, the revolutionary created a levelling effect for 
the political actors to achieve a similar path towards shaping the socio-political 
system that emphasized all parties to cooperate in achieving a stable polity 
(Kahin, 1952, p. 146).  
 
3.9 Parliamentary Democracy and Fragmentation in Indonesia 
 
If the principal struggle for independence was a revolutionary struggle 
against colonialism, the period of 1950s to the 1960s was marked with internal 
conflicts. After Indonesia achieved its independence in 1949, the task for the 
political elites in Jakarta was to incorporate these areas into a functional 
centralized state and its political actors that were mobilised during World War II 
(Sidel, 2013, p. 478). However, the postcolonial idea of a nation-state was deeply 
fragmented in various parts of Indonesia. With the absence of Dutch power, it 
was difficult to facilitate the need for elite coalitions, which devoid the need for 
a strong state. This was especially apparent in the areas controlled by the Dutch 
for a dissolution of their individual states (Bertrand, 2004). With a frail coalition 
of political groups, no particular group that dominated power existed as was the 
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case in Malaysia after its independence in search for a common political order 
(Slater, 2010a, p. 108).  
Conversely, in the aftermath of formal independence, the period of 
Indonesia parliamentary democracy was facing an institutional crisis as a number 
of conflicts erupted that were often short and episodic. The transition for a 
parliamentary system did not offer contending political forces for immediate path 
to power. Intense party politicking were rampant in the 1950s. Political parties 
used the parliamentary platform as a tool for assembling coalitions concerned 
with the allocation of power and resources rather than impose distinctive policy 
agendas and improving the economic condition (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Thus, 
from its inception, the process of state formation was poised with a political 
struggle that was left by a legacy of Dutch policy of amalgamation that 
transcended to political contestation within Indonesia, triggering elite 
contestations, ethnic conflict, and tensions from religion, severely dividing these 
elites on the composition of the nation-state (Drakely, 2005, p. 86). These 
conflicts were mainly about the reconfiguration on how Indonesia as a nation-
state should look like in postcolonialism. Pressure from the Dutch retreat 
increased tensions around its regional islands. Although the decision to absorb 
these areas were widely accepted in Java, however, it threatened the non-Javanese 
elites that led to armed revolts. The process for regime legitimacy was arduous 
for political elites to present to the mass on the need for a central state to increase 
ethnic cohesion rather than an invasion of Javanese identity as an imposition of 
imperialism towards different ethnic backgrounds (Vickers, 2013).  
Between the 1950s and 1960s, several conflicts outburst in various parts of 
Indonesia that were intertwined with the frustrations in the parliament: conflicts 
between the secular political elites and Islamic parties over the Constitution, and 
a Darul Islam movement that took hold in Aceh, Kalimantan, Western Java and 
Sulawesi (Brown, 1994); separation from centre-periphery conflicts were 
manifested against the Republic for an independent state that occurred in Ambon, 
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Sumatra and Sulawesi (Bertrand, 2004); to class conflict  that was reflected by 
the growth of membership in the PKI (Aspinall, 2014). These political 
contestations around the Indonesian region had a serious impact on the efficacy 
of the centralized government. Fearing that it created a chain of dissolution of the 
Indonesian national boundaries, the parliament often relied on the military that 
were loyal to the central state to suppress and maintain their territorial integrity 
(Tarling, 2004).  
Whereas in other case studies, the absence of military struggles meant that 
civilian elites were the principal actors during independence, in Indonesia it 
appears otherwise. The military’s role in Indonesia during independence gave the 
preservations that it should be politically involved during the process of nation-
building (Lee, 2000). Whereas the Malay Regiment in Malaysia remained loyal 
to the Malay rulers, the military in Indonesia was formed with militia units in 
different parts of its islands principally to fight during the struggle for 
independence. This complicates Indonesia’s path for political autonomy as the 
political elites in the Republic maintained little authority over the military in the 
vast web of territorial units which stretches from the centre to the periphery level 
(Mietzner, 2011).  
In the post-war, the military as an organisation was also deeply 
factionalised with no institutional or ideological cohesion that binds the military, 
which splintered their allegiances instead to their local commanders that were 
oriented in party politics (Mietzner, 2008). This was problematic for Sukarno’s 
PNI to unify a broad elite coalition as the division between the military, as well 
as rivalry for economic and political control between the military and central 
government had politically fragmented the newly independent state. To increase 
the military’s professionalism, reducing factionalism, and subduing any 
intervention of military affairs in the parliament, the army Chief of Staff, 
Brigadier General A.H. Nasution proposed for a reform in the military to reduce 
the number of personnel  (Crouch, 2007). However, the decision to centralise the 
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army and reduce its forces by half created deep division amongst the regional 
forces against the central military technocratic group (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 298).  
The parliamentary opposition in support of the regional army dissidents 
were regarded as unwarranted interferences in the military affair that led to the 
17 October Affair in 1952. The protestors led by Nasution demanded Sukarno 
that the parliamentary to be dissolve and support its plan for military reform,  
however, with no success that resulted in the purged of Nasution and his 
accomplices (Lee, 2000; Crouch, 2007). With a weak decentralised parliamentary 
government, military had to resort to unorthodox methods to support its upkeep 
of military operability, through involvement such as racketeering, private security 
and other methods (Honna, 2017).  The deep factionalised military increased its 
vulnerability for the military to be exposed to civil interference and party 
politicking that weakened its position in Indonesian politics (Mietzner, 2008).  
With growing frustrations over the effectiveness of the central state, it 
gestated suspicions between the non-Javanese elites and Javanese elites. As the 
economy was still suffering from remnants of the war, the politicians perceived 
that the economic policies were often lopsided to benefit Java at the expense of 
other non-Java territories (Anwar, 1998, p. 480-482). Rather than political 
solidarity, the frequent failure by the parliamentary democracy in solving the 
nation’s economic problems and internal rebellions gave the military the 
opportunity to intervene in Indonesian politics (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 315-317). 
Nasution criticised that during the parliamentary democracy, the TNI was heavily 
politicised by the party politics creating factions within the military (Nasution, 
1963). The frequent eruptions of internal conflict would recede the political 
legitimacy and usher in the collapse of democracy in Indonesia in the late 1950’s, 
which cemented the military’s political power in Indonesia.  
The upsurge of rebellions would hasten the conviction to create a unitary 
state that required a strong central government to be more effective to avoid from 
territorial cleavages. With its successes in the military operations in almost all of 
 127 
these internal rebellions, the military was constantly deployed in these areas in 
order to suppress these internal rebellions (Kingsbury, 2003). Pitted with 
economic problems, military disunity, political party rivalries in the 
parliamentary, internal unrest, and finally the Dutch refusal to transfer West 
Papua, the fate of these rebellions would be sealed in the late 1950s. In 1957, 
Sukarno dissolved the parliament and declared a martial law with the support of 
A.H. Nasution. With the support of the army, Sukarno had established political 
access to control over the state power and established new institutional 
arrangements which he termed as the ‘Guided Democracy’ (Ricklefs, 2001). The 
transition from a liberal parliamentary democracy to the new authoritarian rule 
saw the consolidation of power to the president, while the army also grew 
stronger steadily in Indonesian politics (Bertrand, 2004). In his attempt to end the 
contentious politics, Sukarno took this opportunity to formulate the state ideology 
of NASAKOM-(nationalism, religion, communism) in an attempt to unite these 
social forces with a balanced stream to create a strong political order (Cribb, 
2001). Meanwhile, under this new institutional arrangement, it gave the military 
access to state capacity to eliminate their inter-service rivalry and further 
consolidate its power within army that had been deeply fractionalised (Anderson, 
1983). 
Paradoxically, pressure from the increasing Communist and the “solidarity 
makers” also saw the increase in military cohesion that would change the civil-
military relations to the TNI to challenge the PKI/PNI forces for political 
authority (Anwar, 1998, p.481). This would play a major factor over the long-
term consequences on the civil-military relations. It provided the army branch the 
political edge and the institutional capacity as a coercive strength in maintaining 
and diffusing territorial conflicts (Mietzner, 2006). It expanded the army’s roles 
in the field of politics with military personnel being appointed in the bureaucracy, 
cabinet, and the regional governors (Crouch, 1979). Further, in order to maintain 
balance between major political forces, Sukarno distributed the ministerial 
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position to political parties while also accommodating the military in the civilian 
politics (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019). However, Sukarno’s precarious efforts 
to balance the political force in reducing tension were met with limited success 
as the elites were ideologically divided between the PKI/PNI communist forces 
and the TNI with other parties that had limited access to state power (Kingsbury, 
2003).  
However, by late 1950s the security perception shifted from internal 
stability to a resurgence view of Western Imperialism. In contrast to other case 
studies, the post-war parliamentarism saw the involvement of the leftist slowly 
creeping in the government and closely associating it with Sukarno (Ricklefs, 
2001). Moreover, Sukarno’s perception over the West intervention strengthened 
when the Malaysia Federation was created fearing that it was aimed at containing 
Indonesia (Anwar, 1998). By 1955, the U.S. and its Allies were increasingly 
concerned with Sukarno’s cabinet that saw the leftist increasing its presence 
under the guise of the nationalist support. In 1958, a rebellion movement broke 
out in Sumatra and Sulawesi which were supported by Jakarta based politicians 
from the Socialist Party (PSI) and the Muslim, Masyumi party that was led by the 
local military commanders (Kahin and Kahin, 1995). In part, the rebellion was 
significantly influenced by the increasing PKI presence in Indonesia politics 
which supported Sukarno’s political vision for completing national revolution 
(Aspinall and Berger, 2010). The suspicions over Western intervention were 
confirmed when the U.S. and its Allies fighter plane was shot down and the pilot 
captured which saw the deterioration relationship with the U.S. (FRUS, 1958a). 
From the U.S. point of view, it was a strategic move as part of its deterrence 
policy during the Cold War against Communist movement. The 1958 rebellion 
would however seal the fate for Indonesia’s security perception on the basis of 
nationalist struggle against imperialism (Anwar, 1998, p.481). The perception of 
Western intervention in Indonesia’s domestic politics led to the re-alignment of 
its security policy that was focused on the anti-colonialist struggle.  
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On the international front, the failure of the consolidation of West Irian 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands and their failed bid in the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1957, it strengthened the position of the nationalist 
movement for solidarity on the Dutch territories (Anwar, 1998, p.481). 
Subsequently, Sukarno formulated a policy that saw the nationalization of foreign 
companies by seizing foreign businesses to be taken control under the 
management of the locals that was administrated by the military (White, 2012). 
On the other hand, as the Cold War continued to grow in Southeast Asia, the US 
covert operation and the military support for regional rebellions in 1957-1959 had 
seriously threatened Indonesia’s national sovereignty. Western intervention 
created deep mistrust in Sukarno’s worldview, pushing his administration for 
international support from the Soviet Union and China, backed by the PKI under 
the guise of nationalism (Drakely, 2005).  
 
3.10 Conclusion- Comparison of the rise of Social Forces in Southeast Asia 
 
This chapter has set the stage for the subsequent chapters on how the 
conceptualisation of security in Southeast Asia is determined by its past legacies, 
between social forces that inhabit the states that were shaped during the colonial 
period. It has laid the comparative groundwork by measuring the power relations 
between the social groups before and after the decolonisation process in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and the degree of change 
experienced in each state. This chapter argued understanding the way in which 
states deal with the origin of the conceptualization of security is impossible 
without exploring their historical conditions and the levels of social conflict that 
unfolded during the post-colonial era. A proper analysis of the historical 
antecedent provides us the narrative to understand the variations of social 
cleavages during pre-war that were essential in shaping the forms of conflict that 
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erupted in Southeast Asia. Different political interest between different social 
forces lea them to different conceptualisation of security and thus potentially 
provide divergent security responses. Many contemporary security problems that 
occurred in Southeast Asia are due to the obdurate social conflicts in the domestic 
that took root during the colonial period. This would also explain why state 
formation and its security practices diverge.  
In all case studies, political contestation between social groups had already 
existed during pre-war, only to be exacerbated during the relatively short tenure 
of the Japanese was consequential to the state-society relationship. As Pierson 
(2004, p.45) argued, ““Small” events early on may have a big impact, while 
“large” events at later stages may be less consequential”. The colonial legacies 
and Japanese occupation punctured the equilibrium which set motion to a critical 
juncture that changed the power structure in Southeast Asia in the post-war. In 
all case studies, national elites sought to establish new states after World War II, 
however with varying degrees. Whereas previously the colonial powers gave 
privileges to certain social groups which contributed to ethnic, racial, religious 
and class diversity, the Japanese policies towards Southeast Asia aggravated 
political contestation between the colonial powers and local elites, as the Japanese 
aimed to wipe out the Western influences. However, the nature of its policies 
varied across the states which set path dependence unique to each polity, with 
different political consequences during the course of independence. As Mahoney 
(2000, p.507) explained, the logic of path dependence refers to “those historical 
sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or 
event chains that have deterministic properties”.  
Radical groups and nationalist sentiments were mobilised by both the 
Japanese and the Allies during the World War II. Such historical events triggered 
the power struggles which provided opportunities for political actors to 
collaborate to challenge the pre-existing institutional arrangements prior to the 
war (Slater, 2010a). Although the nationalist sentiment pre-existed in all case 
 131 
studies, however, the Japanese occupation rooted a reactive sequence which 
spurred the local elites for institutional change that led to the decolonisation. The 
causal influence on the security concept was similar in all cases as the power 
struggles were indigenous in nature but exacerbated during the Japanese 
occupation. The Japanese propaganda provided the institutional capacity on the 
ideology for independence in the indigenous population during its short 
occupation.  It created new avenues for mass mobilisation in the colonized states 
which eventually led to independent states. This has helped shaped the 
divergences of security problems that exist in the post-independence where these 
social cleavages provided certain social groups to exploit for institutional changes 
during the end of WWII.  
By tracing the origins of political conflict that shape state, it provided an 
institutional context on how power relations exist in the society and how security 
policy originates from these domestic concerns. The upsurge on contentious 
politics in the post-war saw the process of institutional changes, a new nation-
state, which took course differently in these states. The particular nature of the 
socio-economic development has created dominant political forces to that were 
able to organise themselves to create a state designed to pursue their interest. In 
the case of Malaysia, the colonial legacy of creating a multiracial society led to a 
series of contentious politics between classes that exacerbated to ethnic tensions 
between the Malays and the Chinese. The mobilisation of the leftist movement 
influenced by the Chinese communalism in response saw the configuration of a 
new nation-state and party coalition to maintain the mass from revolt. 
Nevertheless, it created an institutional foundation to legitimise the regime 
protection under the guise of Malay interest. Political contestation in the case of 
the Philippines in contrast did not exhibit the need for creating a strong state as 
was the case in Malaysia. Although the Huk rebellion represented a threat to the 
establishment, however, it lacked the coerciveness to create an elite cohesion as 
opposed to Malaysia. Not only that, because the threat around Manila was 
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manageable, it lacked the necessity to create a political militarisation as presented 
in Indonesia. On the other hand, the political situation in Indonesia was more 
contentious than in any other case studies with outbreaks from regional islands 
for autonomy, ethnicity, religious and class which saw the military slowly 
elevating its position into power. The long process of political contestation saw 
the need for the elites for the politicisation of the military in order for the maintain 
regime legitimacy rather than the gain of support from the parties in the 
Indonesian parliament. Finally, in the case of Singapore, although it was still 
under the British protection, the increasing influences of the leftist movement for 
anti-colonialism saw the need for the creation of a moderate party-state in order 








The preceding chapter have explored how the historical antecedents have 
largely influenced the domestic problems and mass mobilisation in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. The aftermath of decolonisation in the 
Southeast Asia saw the reconfiguring of state’s political and economic order. 
However, contentious politics reached its zenith in the 1960s following the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia. The looming threats internally as well as externally have 
forced the ruling elites to use coercive tools both legally and militarily to maintain 
political order. Tension over the control of state power was politically contentious 
especially in the domestic between the social forces which principally derived 
from ethnic, class, and ideological differences seeking to advance their preferred 
interest on the state’s political and social order. However, the severity of the 
regime threats would however lead to a different path dependence for structure 
of these states.  
This chapter examines how the conceptualisation of security is politically 
contingent that took form in a particular historical context, which becomes 
institutionalised in Southeast Asia. To do so, it would require us to analyse how 
the different types of political contestation between social forces in the Southeast 
Asian states that took place helped shape the distinct state institutional structures. 
Whose preferences prevail in security policies depend largely which social 
groups that captured the state power. Certain social, political and economic 
conditions can enable or constrain particular security policies.  This would in turn 
help us understand how different social forces interest, perceptions and 
preferences lead them to adopt different security strategy and may potentially 
help push for different security responses. From this perspective, it provides us 
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the necessary context that security policies are products of historical processes of 
struggles between the social forces that besiege within the state (Lipschutz, 1995, 
p. 8). This chapter begins each section by analysing the level of domestic threats 
that occurred in each state. By determining the severity of the domestic threats, 
this chapter argue that it would affect the levels of elite coalitions. This would in 
turn influence how power is organised in relation to the domestic threats and the 
process of history endogenised the institutional designs to maintain the regime 
survival.  
 
4.2 Malaysia- Class Conflict and Ethnic Problems as a National Security 
Concern 
  
Malaysia’s path to independence in 1957 was a relatively peaceful 
negotiation for self-governance rather than a revolutionary struggle between the 
UMNO led Alliance party (which was later renamed Barisan Nasional (BN))-
constituted from UMNO, MIC and MCA and the British. The outcome of the 
Alliance government winning the election was an important juncture for the state 
and the society which gained popular support from the rural Malays and urban 
Chinese (Wade, 2009). From its inception, the nature and configuration of 
Malaysian institutional structure is communal politics (Crouch, 1996).  
The coalition would however inherit three colonial legacies namely, a 
pluralist society that was frail with ethnic friction; an economy that was designed 
for the primary commodity export; and a rapid rural-urban mobilisation (Abdul 
Khalid, 2014, p. 73). As part of the genesis of the coalition party, 
consociationalism politics manifested itself on the proposed composition of an 
institutional configuration of power sharing between inter-communal elites. For 
the indigenous, recognition of the Malays as having a special status in the nation-
state in exchange for a concession of citizenship for the Chinese and Indians with 
the assurance for a laissez fair economic system in which the majority of the 
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ethnic Chinese owned large share of domestic owned capitals (Haji Ahmad, 1978; 
Mauzy, 2006). In this sense, Malaysia’s politics is described as consociational 
politics whereby the ordering power are shared along the ethnic lines are 
represented in access to state power (Lijphart, 1977). With the social contract 
being born out of the sacrosanct between the ethnicities, the elite bargains allowed 
the formation of certain institutional arrangements which UMNO candidates 
would assume the executive power to be Prime Minister while the ministerial 
positions were distributed amongst the elite coalitions (Ong, 2015). Through 
power sharing agreement between ethnics, the elites would be able to set the rules 
of the games so that the institutional structure would foster cooperation between 
ethnics (Means, 1991).  
However, such obscurity downplays the domestic struggles that was about 
to unfold in Malaysia. The political arrangements gained during the ‘Great 
Bargains’ was ripe for social conflict, which heightened income and wealth 
differences between classes (Nathan, 1998, p. 516-517). Although the coalition 
bargain appeared to be appropriate at the time for independence, it was 
unsustainable in the long-term as the Malay ethnic grievances began to be 
heightened over the uneven economic development. The Alliance elites suffered 
immense pressure to hold their coalitions together as political pressure began to 
mount from the party hardliners. Between 1957 to 1969, there was growing mass 
discontent between UMNO’s elites and the Malay rural constituents over the 
grand coalition. Although initially the English educated Chinese held control over 
the economy, over time, they had yielded more state power and control over the 
cultural symbols over UMNO (Case, 1996). Further, increasing demand for civic 
political participations by the Chinese and the Indians and their strong protest 
movements over the institutional arrangements began to fractionalise the elite 
bargain coalitions. 
Power struggles between the Malay elites began to intensify as the UMNO 
elites grew distant from the rural Malay constituents over the glaring absence of 
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economic growth especially in the rural. On the other hand, the constitutional 
bargain also began to crack as the looming crisis between the ruling elites 
emphasised import substitution and urban infrastructure over rural development 
and agricultural spilled over ethnic tension. The political and economic issue once 
again become intertwined between managing ethnic and class issues (Gomez, 
2004). Despite the government’s efforts to address the predicament of the 
Malays, the majority of the Malays in the rural areas remained poor. The uneven 
economic distribution and limited access to markets caused growing discontent 
over the uneven political and economic development (Kuhonta, 2011). As Jomo 
aptly puts it “With different ethnic representation in these classes, reinforced by 
ethnic differences in educational levels and location (urban-rural), as well as 
cultural preferences and prejudice, it is not surprising that economic competition 
has been at the core of inter-ethnic disharmony” (Jomo, 1989, p.37).  
 
4.3 Ordering Power of the BN: Institutional Change, Malay Domination 
and Path Dependency  
 
By the 1960’s, social cleavages started to grow in Malaysia as the 
distribution of wealth and power began to widen. Hoping that Singapore’s 
removal from the federation would improve the growing ethnic resentment, the 
political order achieved during the 1957 grand coalition bargain quickly declined. 
Relations between the ruling elites, the sub-elites and the opposing elites hastened 
the deterioration of ethnic relations with the Malays emboldened and demanded 
that only the Malay language to be used in the state transaction (Case, 1996). The 
dissatisfied middle class instead formed new parties such as the Chinese 
dominated Democratic Alliance Party (DAP) and the more radical Malay Muslim 
party such as Party Islam (PAS) to challenge the pre-existing political 
arrangement (Kua, 2007). The right factions of the Malays were discontented 
with the power-sharing arrangements between UMNO’s tolerance for the laissez 
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faire system and skewed distributions voted for PAS. On the other hand, the 
growing middle-class Chinese was resentful with their ‘second class’ citizenship, 
disgruntled by the Bumiputra policy especially on education inequality and the 
role of Malay language which became the national language (Case, 2015, p. 41). 
Social cleavages, modernisation, rising ethnic tension and socio-economic 
changes threatened to destabilise the elites power arrangements that were 
achieved during independence (Jomo, 1989).  
The rising tension culminated during the 1969 election that saw the ruling 
alliance lose its two-third majority to the opposition parties DAP and PAS. The 
ruling coalition failure symbolised the loss of the Malay dominance in politics 
and was a critical juncture for the May 13 incident in 1969 (Slater, 2010a; 
Kuhonta, 2011). With the ruling elites severely weakened, the Alliance 
supporters clashed with the opposition forces which became a racial conflict that 
led to casualties, with most of the victims being the Chinese (Crouch, 1996, p. 
24). As Slater (2010a) argues, because the social conflict was unmanageable, it 
forced the ruling elites to restructure for institutional reforms.  
Because the rules of the game were becoming increasingly suboptimal to 
provide the allocation and exercise of political power for the dominant social 
group, institutions can change during the critical juncture (Thelen, 1999). The 
racial riot gave a window of opportunity for the ruling elites with unfettered 
power to institutional reform that would consolidate its power. Subsequently, the 
ruling elites declared a State of Emergency and suspended the parliamentary. In 
an effort to wind out the racial riot the National Operation Council (NOC) was 
set up. With Tun Abdul Razak swept into power, the NOC effectively centralised 
and expanded its institutional capacity to exercise state power in pursuit of 
political order. However, the outcome of the formation of the NOC was seen as 
a purge against Tunku Abdul Rahman’s regime until it was lifted in 1971 (Case, 
2015, p.41). Tun Abdul Razak began a series of organisational structure reform 
to centralise power and institutionalised the party and the bureaucratic procedures 
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to ensure that UMNO and stood above other parties to make the final decisions 
(Kuhonta, 2011, p.83). As power within the new regime spread beyond its 
institutional origins, the ruling elites began to use coercive apparatus to quash the 
racial riots through deployment of the military and police to maintain political 
order. Their implementation to marginalise rival elites were possible with the 
support of the state bureaucrats as they inherited from the British colonies that 
were largely dominated by the Malays. With the support of the bureaucrats, 
UMNO were able to consolidate its political power to implement policies.  
With the security forces predominantly Malays, the informal linkages 
between UMNO as Malay dominant party and the security forces saw the use of 
state repression. Consequently, the violent repression of state were 
indiscriminately aimed against the Chinese to dissuade the ethnic minority from 
challenging the regime (Kua, 2007). Further, under the state of emergency, the 
government used repressive legal measures such as the existing ISA, the Official 
Secrets Act and the Sedition Act to intimidate and silence political oppositions 
which left them immobilised (Pepinsky, 2007). The May 13 incident ostensibly 
gave UMNO an uncontested power to replace the existing institutions that saw 
the Malay party strengthening its position to capture the state apparatus (Nathan 
and Govindasamy, 2001). With the Alliance being dissolved, a new coalition 
party called BN was introduced with almost all opposition parties co-opted into 
the coalition that centralized power (Mauzy, 1983). The initiative to institutional 
reform changed the rules of the game as UMNO attempt to solidify its position 
as the political foundation for the Malays to represent their interest in the political 
system. Subsequently, the UMNO led regime intensified and implemented its 
redistributive policies to improve socio-economic condition to refurbish its 





4.3.1 Institutionalising UMNO as a Party State 
 
To further institutionalise the primacy of UMNO as the Malay champions, 
the ruling regime pursued a radical legislative reform of the Constitution in 1971 
and incorporated as the Malay position in both political and economic structure, 
the principle guideline in the formulation of policies and institutions (Mauzy, 
1983). In particular, the Constitution restricts any discussion that are seen as 
sensitive matters such as restricting public speeches, citizenship issues, Malay 
special rights in education, public jobs, subsidies, as well as the issue of national 
languages that are still applicable to date (Malaysia Federal Constitution, 2010). 
Further, the Internal Security Act (ISA) enacted in 1960 gave the Malay ruling 
elites a powerful political tool to coerce any political opposition, which was 
previously used as a tool to deter communalist activities through political 
detention to limit civilian engagements (Barraclough, 1985).  
In order to secure the Malays support, Tun Razak appeared at the UMNO 
Mother’s and Youth Movement meeting in 1971 to appeal to the sub-elites. Tun 
Razak justified that the growing autocratic regime was necessary to guarantee the 
Malay rights to firmly change the public’s attitude in dealing with the socio-
economic problems (Hussein, 1971a). To ensure Malay dominance, the NOC 
increased the bureaucratic position that was promised to be allocated to the Malay 
in the previous Alliance grand bargain  to be enacted, giving the ruling coalition 
the capacity to dominate and set policy agenda to secure Malay’s position in 
Malaysia’s politics (Doner, Ritchie and Slater, 2005). With a centralised party 
state, the NOC implemented a state-led development plan called the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) (1970-1990) plan to redistribute resources and spur 
economic growth. During its post-mortem of the riot, the ruling BN government 
perceived that the ethnic divisions which led to the racial riot were caused by 
economic inequalities (Economic Planning Unit, 1971). The institutionalisation 
of the NEP was not only aimed to redistribute resources to benefit certain 
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ethnicity, it also becomes a form of domination for the BN’s state power (Jomo 
and Wee, 2014). 
In order to appeal to Chinese constituents, Tun Abdul Razak delivered a 
speech at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He highlighted that the NEP with 
the objectives of “the eradication of poverty among our people irrespective of 
their racial origin, and, secondly, to rectify the social and economic imbalance 
among the various races to ensure and attain real national unity” (Hussein, 
1971b). Tun Razak considered that economic development is essential to 
maintain the civil security from falling to communism and communalism (Wahab 
et al., 2015). The ruling elites perceived that by improving the economic 
conditions of the Malays, it would reduce racial sentiments as well integrate the 
divided society. Further, these would reduce the classification of race inherited 
by the colonies to restructure the Malaysian social fabrics (Jesudason, 1989).  
Thus, the intense political upheaval allowed the BN ruling government to 
create an unlevel playing field. By adjusting the rules of the game, it gave UMNO 
significant advantages in implementing security policy while limiting the 
opposing parties to challenge. Although the nature of conflict was initially 
between a dissatisfied middle class and the upper class, it nevertheless reinforced 
the BN’s narratives that the cause of conflict was along the communal line. In 
consequence, one of the critical legacies of the May 13 riot is that ethnic politics 
had become the centrepiece of its security practices. The BN government 
institutionalised Malaysia’s national security that is premised under ethnic 
politics in Malaysia’s politics (Singh, 2004). The overpowering might of the BN 
government complicates later attempts to replace security practices beyond the 
ethnic paradigm.  
With the BN party coalition, it set the scene for UMNO to achieve 
hegemonic position in the domestic, taking centre stage in the policy agenda 
setting with all the key ministerial positions while other parties such as the MCA 
ceding its position in the Ministry of Finance where it traditionally held this 
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position. Policy formulation was presided over by the UMNO-led coalition party 
in charting over the affairs of Malaysia aided by the bureaucrats (Suffian, 2019). 
With the concept of national security seen as the prerogative of state party, the 
ruling elites were conditioned to produce certain institutional arrangements to 
create linkages between advancing their domestic concerns in its foreign policy 
objectives (Haji Ahmad, 1999). Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, Malaysia was 
focused on diversifying its economy by increasing the Malay capitalist class. As 
part of Tun Razak’s initiative to improve the socio-economic condition and 
redistributive program, the ruling elites distributed resources through patronages 
that were close to the regime. Such dramatic transformation of its economy in 
terms of expanding its manufacturing sector. In order for policymakers to have a 
grasp on policy implantation, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was set up as a 
core special branch under the Prime Minister’s office to create direct linkages 
between ministries and agencies.  
However, in the early 1970’s, Malaysia would face a major blow to its 
external security. With pressure mounting domestically, the British Labour 
government formally withdraw its military in Malaysia and Singapore due to 
budget constraints (Longinotti, 2015). As the regional uncertainties mounted 
during the Cold War, the Malaysia ruling elites were compelled to build their own 
military capabilities (Storey et. al, 2011). This also forced the ruling elites to 
embark on intense diplomatic relations to maintain economic and strategic 
partnership with the great powers. Malaysia emphasized the need to be self-
reliant and pragmatic in its foreign relations in meeting these strategic concerns 
(Jeshurun, 1980; Ministry of Defence Malaysia, 2010). At the time, Malaysia’s 
military capabilities were still focused on the communist insurgencies, while also 
facing the regional challenges following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam 
creating security uncertainties to the region. Despite this, the U.S. still maintained 
its bases in the Philippines and Thailand which provided a security layer in the 
region. By 1968, Malaysia-Philippines relations would also stabilise after 
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pressure from Suharto on Marcos to drop the case for ASEAN solidarity (Yuen, 
1997).  
To sum up this section, even though Malaysia inherited a strong state after 
the institutional reform in the 1970’s, intra-party elites remain a subject for 
political contestation for state power. The deep fractions would not only affect 
the capacity of the ruling elites to implement their policy agenda, but it also re-
energises the communal tension fracturing the state-society relations. Such 
fractions allowed the winning ruling elites to create a powerful state apparatus 
that captured the hegemonic power of the state to implement their policy agenda. 
By using the legal and coercive apparatus, it scaffolded the trajectory of a single 
coalition party dominance while at the same time limiting competition to 
challenge the state to capture its scarce resources.  
In the subsequent chapters, we will explore in more detail Mahathir’s 
policy on military modernisation, the intra-party elite division and the implication 
on Malaysia’s national security policy. What requires attention here is the 
renewed communalism saw the ruling elites heavily invested to promote the NEP, 
the government pursued to converge the national state policy to create linkages 
between its domestic problems and its foreign policy objectives (Singh, 2004). 
Reformist projects began to intensify in the 1980’s under Mahathir in a dual-
pronged approach on the grounds of sovereignty in modernising its military, but 
also to bolster efforts in public investment to create a credible defence industry 
capability (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 2009).  
In conjunction with the NEP, the Malaysian government attempted to 
diversify its economy that is historically focused on rubber and tin industry. 
Consequently, under the NEP, the government was firmly invested in 
technologically advanced manufacturing industry by introducing the National 
Defence Production Policy in 1982 which provided a guideline towards 
Malaysia’s defence industrial planning (Balakrishnan, 2008). The ruling elites 
perceived that creating an industrialised country could transcend the Malaysian 
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economy from an import-substitute country to export-oriented, which would 
enhance the UMNO legitimacy as a ruling party-state (Jomo, 2002).   
In sum, these unprecedented events provided a path dependence process 
that shaped the institutional arrangements focused on accommodating internal 
issues to maintain political order and subsequently the regime legitimacy. 
Primarily, the uneven economic distribution would dominate Malaysia’s social, 
economic and political discourse leading up to the 1969 riot. However, with the 
social unrest becoming more unmanageable, such political conditions would also 
see the elite coalescence into creating an authoritarian regime (Slater, 2010a). 
With a powerful coercive tool, it provided the ruling elites with high degree of 
political autonomy for institutional reform designed to strengthen UMNO’s 
position as well as appeasing the Malay population in the already ethnically 
fragmented society.  
By institutionalising the Malay rights in the Constitution, the ISA as a 
political tool, as well as the implementation of the NEP, further consolidated the 
BN party coalition political power in the government. It also empowers the 
political elites to implement policies that are ethnically driven to reduce ethnic 
cleavages through socio-economic policies. The spate of political outcomes after 
the riots determined how political elites formulate policy in the future to maintain 
political legitimacy. As such, it has allowed the coalition regime to focus on 
tackling ethnic cleavages with economic policies rather than through military 
(Izzuddin, 2017). In short, Malaysia’s historical legacies led to the unintended 
consequences in Malaysia politics which fomented its policy preferences that are 
driven by ethnic cleavages. The colonial legacies provided the political autonomy 
to the civilian political elites subjugating the military which invariably allowed 
the political elites to dictate policy decision-making. It also created internal 
linkages with the military to provide political order to ensure Malay dominance. 
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4.4 Singapore- Institutional Change, the PAP’s Survival Singapore’s 
National Security Policy  
 
Singapore’s path to legitimacy in the face of political challenges during its 
critical juncture exhibits astonishing stability on its path to centralize the party 
state. Similar to Malaysia, what appears to be a manifest sense of political 
legitimacy in the case of Singapore showcases a durable party state. Lacking in 
historical identity, Singapore was a by-product of colonial city that inherited with 
sojourners from the British empire. Singapore’s political legitimacy was severely 
tested after the untimely exit from Malaysia and threats from Indonesia 
influenced PAP’s security perception.  
In examining Singapore’s path to legitimacy, it is therefore important to 
understand the political condition that gave the PAP the authority to govern. 
Singapore’s nation building process was constructed on what appears to be the 
institutionalisation process that manifest from PAP’s perception. For the PAP, its 
legitimacy rests on its ability to provide security and economic prosperity for the 
population. Such legitimacy sought the need to create a militarised population to 
establish a strong relationship between the state and society. Building on this, the 
ruling elites were determined to institutionalise through articulating the ideology 
of survival and the profound sense of vulnerability of security that is manifested 
by a sense of citizen’s duty to defend the nation-state. With a strong party and 
elite cohesion that are organised and well structured, the consolidation of PAP as 
a state party granted an unfettered access to state power in mobilising state 
resources. This is where Singapore departs from the rest of the case studies. 
Whereas in Malaysia the path was to secure the Malay position in the 
development of Malays in the socio-economic domain, Singapore’s perception 
was to focus on the securitisation of the society for its regime legitimacy.  
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4.4.1 Singapore’s Merger with Malaysia  
 
From the outset, Singapore’s path to security share the same historical 
legacies with Malaysia. Threats from the MCP largely subsided and the 
Emergency was lifted in the 1960s, communal tension was still rampant in that 
period. The possibility for Singapore and the North Borneo was touted by Tunku 
Abdul Rahman (Times, 1961). For the British and the PAP, the merger of 
Singapore  and its northern part of Borneo territories were vital to maintain the 
broader regional security, fearing that its foreign base in Singapore would be 
jeopardised in the hands of the left wing government (Ball, 1999). Despite its 
reluctance, the Malay elites in the Federal Malaysia feared that Singapore which 
is predominantly Chinese would fall to the MCP and convert the city-state as a 
base to contest the Malaysian government that would cause ethnic unrest in 
Federal state (Thum, 2017).  
For Singapore, the merger with Malaysia was crucial for the ruling party 
PAP’s Lee Kuan Yew’s political survival as the economic condition deteriorated 
and was institutionally constrained due to elite fractions in the party on the terms 
for merger (Thum, 2013). Although it was granted formal independence in 1959, 
the British continued its presence for internal and external security with the MCP 
remaining a dominant force. In 1961, disagreements between the moderate 
faction led by Lee Kuan Yew and the left-wing faction of the PAP led by Lim 
Chin Siong began to emerge. However, the inevitable occurred when the latter 
group split from the party and formed the Barisan Socialis Party. The elite 
polarisation severely weakened the PAP position to negotiate for a merger with 
Malaysia (Wade, 2013). With its strong staunch support from the grassroots, the 
Barisan Socialis provided a legitimate political challenge towards Lee Kuan 
Yew’s regime (Thum, 2013). Given their large base of support deriving from the 
working class, Malaysian elites were concerned that the Barisan Soialis would 
contest for power through class uprising in Malaysia (Wade, 2013). 
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On the other hand, during the negotiations between the British, Malaysia 
and Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed his concerns that the Barisan 
Socialis Assemblymen would pose a security threat to the Federation (National 
Australian Archives, TS 682/22/5/1, 1963, p. 176). As a predominantly Chinese 
state, Tunku Abdul Rahman feared that Singapore would be converted into 
‘Cuba’ as a base for political offensive that would rally the Chinese in the 
Peninsular (Thum, 2013, p.37). The Brunei Revolt was a politically decisive 
moment for the PAP. With British and Malaysian support, the PAP leader 
commanded the use of state instrument and launched the Operation Cold Store to 
suppress the opposition in 1963 that saw the arrest of Barisan Socialis leaders 
Lim Chin Siong and other party executives, trade union leaders and members 
associated with the Communist (Thum, 2013). With a weakened opposition, Lee 
Kuan Yew’s PAP emerged victorious in the election that gave the mandate for 
the PAP to negotiate for merger (Pang, 1971, p. 17).  In the aftermath of the 
Operation Cold Store, Singapore was formally annexed to the Federation of 
Malaysia.  With the oppositions severely weakened in Singapore, this would pave 
way for the ruling PAP to dictate the city-state’s security perception unopposed. 
For Lee Kuan Yew, the annexation to the Federation was important to 
Singapore’s political and economic survival as it does not have any natural 
resources (Lee, 1961). Though the caveat of the annexation also meant that 
defence and internal security would fall under the jurisdiction of the Federation 
(Thum, 2013).  
Despite being initially welcomed, the Singapore merger would have a 
significant impact on the communal tension in the Federation and the city-state. 
As a predominantly Chinese population, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew was actively 
engaged in challenging the dominant ideology of Malaysia’s ethnocracy (Wade, 
2009). However, challenging the existing political order would not only affect 
the power relations, but also the institutional arrangements of ethnic bargains 
which were previously agreed between the UMNO-MCA Alliance (Rahim, 
 147 
1999). The contentious politics between the Alliance and the PAP on communal 
caused elite conflict exacerbated ethnic tension in both Malaysia and Singapore 
between 1963 and 1965 (Lau, 2003). In the 1964 election in Malaysia, Lee Kuan 
Yew mobilised the Chinese voters in the Peninsular to openly contest with the 
Alliance party that ruptured the relations between Malaysian and Singapore 
elites. Lee’s political insensitivity towards the Malay survival was championing 
for a meritocratic based system with equalities to all ethnicities, a “Malaysian 
Malaysia” as opposed to “Malay Malaysia” challenging the institutional 
arrangements under the Constitution that would weaken the Malay’s political 
capacity (Mauzy and Milne, 2002). By directly challenging the primacy of 
UMNO, whose support derived from the rural areas, the abolishment of the 
Malay’s special rights would erode any chance for the Malay’s survival who were 
both economically and educationally disadvantaged to non-Malays (Abdul 
Khalid, 2014). The decision by the PAP to contest in Malaysia’s politics in 1964 
fractionalised the elite coalitions which invariably exacerbated the ethnic tension 
that led to the racial riot in 1964 in Singapore (Barr, 1997). However, Lee Kuan 
Yew’s open contestation with UMNO led to the eventual separation of Singapore 
in 1965. The separation from Malaysia plays an important historical juncture to 
Singapore that impacted upon its ideologies and foreign policies, which continues 
to date (Singh, 2003). The unintended consequences of the expulsion from 
Malaysia, coupled with the strategic uncertainties from the Vietnam War further 
exacerbated the state’s vulnerabilities.  
 
4.4.2 The Foundation of Singapore’s National Security 
 
At its onset, Singapore’s authoritarian regime rested upon the PAP ruling 
elites to create state’s perception on vulnerabilities threats from the its separation. 
Informed by its recent history, the perception on the need to create a strong state 
was to restore its legitimacy and political order. The period may be characterised 
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as a time for national crisis for the ruling elites. On the one hand, concerns to 
Singapore’s security were that other bigger states would interfere in its domestic 
politics against the predominantly Chinese state. As the then Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew (2000, p. 3) stated in his memoir on the eve of the separation, “we 
faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival”. This was an 
important backdrop to understand Singapore’s transformative years because his 
worldview forced how the city-state shaped its security policy. As Leiffer (2000) 
explained, due to its underlying structural tension with its neighbours, it is a deep-
seated concern in Singapore that they have never fully come to terms with its 
separate sovereignty.  
The untimely exit has critically compounded its security perceptions and 
its relations with foreign policy behaviours (Ganesan, 1998; Singh, 2017). The 
transition process after its departure from Malaysia was occupied with 
uncertainty, facing many challenges. Even before its formal separation, almost 
all political parties in Singapore conformed that the key to Singapore’s survival 
was dependent on access to Malaysia’s military and economic access such as raw 
materials and fresh water (Thum, 2019). Nevertheless, the ideological clash 
between Lee Kuan Yew and Tengku Abdul Rahman and racial tension in 
Malaysia led to Singapore’s eventual departure from the Federation.  
Singapore was perpetually facing considerable uncertainty especially on 
its relations between neighbours. For the PAP, Singapore’s biggest problems was 
its geostrategic location as it is sandwiched between the Malay-dominant states 
of Malaysia and Indonesia (Mauzy and Milne, 2002). During that period, internal 
security was still largely under the prerogative of the Federal Malaysia (Ang, 
2016). The issue on the initial refusal of withdrawal of the Malaysian troops in 
Singapore was noted by Singapore’s First Defence Minister Dr. Goh Keng Swee 
in his speech in the parliament. Dr. Goh stated that “all property which before 
Malaysia belonged to Singapore reverted to Singapore once again” (Goh, 1966). 
For Singapore, the continued presence of the Malaysian troops in the city-state at 
 149 
the expense of its own troops would jeopardise the regime’s legitimacy and its 
sovereignty.  
On the other hand, historical animosities with Indonesia also influenced 
the ruling elites’ perception on Singapore’s siege mentality of survival and 
vulnerability. As part of Sukarno’s adventurism of the Konfrontasi 
(Confrontation) policy to protest Malaysia, the ideological battle was at the 
expense of Singapore’s security. Sukarno blamed the formation of the federation 
as part of the colonial west to preserve their power in Southeast Asia (Omar, 
2008). As a form of protest, Indonesia began targeting Singapore aimed at 
disrupting its economic and trade (Ali, 2015). The turbulent and violent condition 
in the region would devastate its economy that is dependent on international trade 
through its port. In particular, the bombing of Macdonald House on 10 March 
1965 left a devastating effect on the bilateral relationship between Singapore and 
Indonesia, which resulted in 3 deaths and 33 suffering injuries (Hamid & 
Saparudi, 2014). Though the confrontation was never a full-scale war with the 
British and U.S. presence barring from regional instability, it genuinely reminded 
the ruling elites that foreign intervention can cause serious domestic instability.  
After adjusting to the unanticipated exit, and the Cold War heightened in 
the region, Lee Kuan Yew saw the urgency to build Singapore’s indigenous 
military capability in order to maintain its sovereignty (Huxley, 2000; Ganesan 
2005). Thus, the concept of security during its formative years was largely 
concentrated by the ruling elites’ worldviews (Ganesan, 2005; Loo, 2012; Ang, 
2016). Singapore’s security concept was reiterated during Lee Kuan Yew’s 
interview, stating that “But some things are not negotiable. My survival and how 
I design my security is not negotiable. This is something fundamental. We may be 




The ruling government was also facing intense domestic pressure to 
political order. Trade exports plunged as Malaysia erected trade barriers after the 
separation (Winters, 2011). With no natural resources, high unemployment and a 
multi-ethnic society, the PAP’s regime was vulnerable for social conflict 
(Acharya, 2008).  In the domestic context, the PAP government believe that its 
legitimacy lay securely by anchoring its economic development and social 
reform. For Singapore, its society was vulnerable for regional tension that would 
inherently affect its domestic legitimacy. Singapore shared similar fate of 
communal tension in 1969 as a result of spill-over from Malaysia’s racial riot. It 
demonstrated the linkages that Singapore’s society was vulnerable to communal 
uprising.  
Perhaps, the catalyst for Singapore’s vulnerabilities was the decision by 
the British to withdraw its troops from Malaysia and Singapore in 1968 formally 
leaving the city-state in 1971. The fierce competition between the capitalist states 
and the communist bloc would be unsustainable after the U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam creating security uncertainties to the region. Under this AMDA, the 
British, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore provided a nexus of security as it 
became the security umbrella for Malaysia (Chin, 1983).  
The ruling elites saw the urgency to build a credible deterrent military 
capability to fill the security gap left by the British. Economically, the British 
base was also a source of employment which employed 40,000 locals and 
accounted for 33 percent of Singapore’s GNP (Time, 1965). In his speech to the 
Parliament in 1965, Dr. Goh stated: “It is no use pretending that without the 
British military presence in Singapore today, the island cannot be easily overrun 
by any neighbouring country within a radius of 1,000 miles, if any of them cared 




4.4.3 Institutionalising the PAP as a Party State 
 
Nonetheless Singapore’s disadvantages as a small city-state would also be 
politically beneficial to the ruling elites. Due to its geographic size, it enabled the 
ruling elites to rally the population on the basis of state’s perpetual vulnerability 
of the city-state from foreign powers (Mutalib, 2000). Crucially, though, 
Singapore’s political institutions after its independence was inherited by the 
British colonies. Parallel to UMNO, the PAP came to power as a result of its 
cooperation with the British, politically engineering its dominance in domestic 
politics. With its departure from Malaysia, Singapore was virtually left in the 
hands of the PAP in a hegemonic position, creating an unlevel playing field. 
However, the consolidation of power by the PAP did not emerge in a vacuum. 
With the tightening of power under the PAP as a result of the Operation Cold 
Store in 1963, political opposition was marginalised with little chance for the 
opposition to capture the state power (Jones, 2000). This was crystallised with 
the colonial repressive institutional tools such as the ISA which expanded the 
concentration of arbitrary power to the ruling elites after its independence (Thum, 
2019, p. 59). It gave the PAP ruling elites a window of opportunity to create 
Singapore’s path to shape the political institutions that would ensure the regime’s 
security (Acharya, 2008).  
Meanwhile, a social contract was formed between the state and the society 
to ensure its turbulent politics and economy into a strong stable state. In return 
for their loyalty, the population was expected to suppress its democratic demands 
to support the ruling elites to bring about economic prosperity and political 
stability (Ortmann, 2009). Since its independence, the PAP government was 
determined that rapid economic growth is tied to alliance with FDI’s with foreign 
capital and multinational companies set up to ensure its political legitimacy 
(Wong and Huang, 2010). On the security realm, Singapore’s strategic perception 
was devolved to the ruling elites. As its transfer of sovereignty from Malaysia 
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was abrupt, the PAP swiftly took measures to further secure its position in 
governance. The PAP took considerable measures which transformed the 
relationship between the party and the public bureaucracy (Rodan, 2006). 
Inherited during the British era, top echelon English educated bureaucrats were 
more sympathetic with the PAP’s views. The PAP further politicised the 
bureaucrats by exploiting new appointments loyal to the ruling party to entrench 
their network of power in policymaking. To ensure that policy formation is 
centred around the state party, the PAP ruling government rapidly transformed 
policy process to be preserved around the small team of PAP executives in 
consultation with the civil servants (Barr, 2016). Over time, the nexus between 
state bureaucrats and the party became institutionalised as the top echelon civil 
servants became the dominant route for political leadership (Worthington, 2003).  
In effect, it gave an avenue for PAP ruling elites power to shape the political 
institutions to structure the power relations among them that would privilege the 
state party while disadvantaging others (Wong and Huang, 2010).  
On the other hand, the rival parties’ access for policy formation in the 
parliament was completely removed. Instead, the process of merging the state and 
the PAP changed the institutional arrangements where policy formation became 
preserves of the PAP and the senior bureaucrats (Rodan and Jayasuriya, 2009). 
To prevent any challenges from the civil society and the opposing party, the state 
media was constantly used to push its political agenda to the society while 
opposing party’s access to media was controlled (Rodan, 2004). In 1967, the PAP 
passed another piece of legislation called the Societies Act in refinement of its 
inheritance during the British rule. This now restrict any unregistered 
organisations from political participation. With the process of depoliticisation in 
Singapore now may have led to new sets of power between the ruling party and 
the state machinery, it provided the PAP the opportunity to institutionalise a 
particular style of regime that stabilize its legitimacy. It bolstered the public 
support for PAP to implement its security perception. In the absence of checks 
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and balances on the executive power, the scope of the state power widened 
considerably which gave the government greater capacity to shape their policy 
agenda.  
 
4.4.4 Militarising the Civilians 
 
Recognising the need to an uncertain political future would avail to 
political struggle, it facilitated a policy agenda rooted in a perception of security 
policy augmented by the image of Singapore’s proneness to external 
interventions and communalism (Trocki, 2006). The PAP ruling elite created a 
social contract with the population with economic growth and security over 
political autonomy. To this end, Singapore established the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF)  and the National Service (NS),  overseen by the Ministry of 
Defence as a core tool of the state for nation-building (Chong and Chan, 2017). 
As a multi-ethnic society that is predominantly Chinese and Indian sojourners 
inherited by the colonial legacy, Singapore had no embryonic notion of 
nationhood (Barr and Skrbis, 2008, p. 40). The ruling elites were cognizant of 
Singapore’s lack of identity appeals on the possibility of traditional divine rights 
to rule that was present in Malaysia or the nationalist struggle for independence 
in Indonesia (Brown, 2003; p.85). With a weak stratum of nationhood among the 
public, the dilemma that emerged then was the ruling elites gestating an ideology 
of survival premised upon the Singapore’s supposed vulnerabilities by 
establishing a militarised civilian (Vasu and Loo, p. 26).  
Though the SAF remained rudimentary and defensive in posture, Lee Kuan 
Yew described the deterrence that was sometimes referred to as the analogy of 
‘poisonous shrimp’ (Lee, 1966b). Given the limited resources and the cultural 
difficulties in recruiting the predominantly Chinese conscript, Lee Kuan Yew 
needed societal compliance over the requirement of the public to defend its 
regime. Using the informal approach of analogy, it would enhance its appeal of 
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strategic vulnerabilities to the public to its rationale for survival. For the ruling 
elites, the SAF and the NS had two important implications. The SAF, bolstered 
by the introduction mandatory conscript under the NS amendment Bill played an 
integral part by linking the state’s security to the regime source of legitimacy 
(Tan, 2015). As it was difficult to gain large conscripts especially from the 
Chinese ethnicity, mandatory of male conscript would solve Singapore’s 
problems of being undermanned in defending the small-state city (Huxley, 2000). 
To further institutionalise the conscript, harsh legal proceedings such as fines and 
penalties were also implemented that structure the individual’s behaviour to serve 
the state.  
Perhaps, more significantly, there is another dimension to Singapore’s 
defence effort in nation-building. Although the ultimate aim of NS is to produce 
a conscription population capable of defending the city-state, its other purpose 
was also for mass socialisation among ethnics from different class background to 
further enhance the integration of the nation, thereby nurturing the Singapore 
national identity among the population (Velayutham, 2007). According to Goh 
Keng Swee “nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily 
and more thoroughly than participation in defence and membership of the armed 
forces … The nation-building aspect of defence will be more significant if the 
participation is spread over all strata of society…” (Goh, 1967). In many ways, 
militarising the population would informally institutionalise the PAP’s own 
interest to create a multicultural society. By breeding the siege mentality in the 
NS during their service, it would also invoke the functional need to create a 
collective defence of the regime to structure the society’s behaviour. To attract 
the brightest young minds, the SAF also distribute a series of prestigious 
scholarships as a recruiting tool. This is beneficial for the ruling elites as the NS 
men are able to gain transferable managerial skills that would be useful in the 
civilian economy and maintain high quality personnel for Singapore’s defence 
(Da Cunha, 1999).  
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To further consolidate the state-society relations in the collective defence, 
Lee Kuan Yew promoted the state’s perception by linking economic prosperity 
to defence. In the view of the ruling elites, the Minister of Defence Lim Kin San 
who replaced Goh Keng Swee in 1968, he mentioned that “without this defence 
build-up, there may come a time when all the economic growth in the world will 
not stand us in good stead, because we would be captured and it would be too late 
to regret that we should have given priority to our defence build-up first (Lim, 
1968)”. With the common perception for collective defence by the state and the 
society, the mutual reinforcement becomes institutionalised in Singapore’s 
security policy.  
However, the gloomy prospect for Singapore’s survival saw a different fate 
as the regime changed in Southeast Asia. Faced with their own growing domestic 
problems, the inception of ASEAN in 1967 provided an institutional framework 
for other members to refrain from interference in members domestic affairs 
(Acharya, 2014). Through elite concessions, ASEAN provided the institutional 
platform for the state elites to promote their interest of maintaining regime 
security as its national interest (Jones, 2010). As Acharya (2008) stated, for 
Singapore ASEAN provided a layer of security within the region as it acted as 
vital mediums for its neighbouring countries for socialisation through bilateral 
and multilateral means to overcome strategic dilemma. To further consolidate its 
security, the regional security architecture such as FPDA consisting of Australia, 
New Zealand, UK, and Malaysia enhanced Singapore’s security while it 
strengthened its defence bilateral ties with the U.S. (Emmers, 2010). On the other 
hand, the decision by the eventual withdrawal of major powers such as the British 
to withdraw its troops from Asia in 1971 and the U.S. in 1975 from Vietnam 
intensified the need for an institutional guideline. This has prompted Malaysia 
and Singapore to equip their own military to be able to defend from external 
threats.  
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The creation of these institutions invariably allowed the PAP to organise 
and facilitate the institutional arrangements through agenda control, so as to 
systematically favour the party’s interests. As Slater (2012) notes, once state 
power is constructed, it would become a stable source for political stability. With 
the bureaucracy heavily politicised, political institutions such as SAF and NS are 
all linked to the Prime Minister’s Office became avenues for agenda control that 
support for the ruling party’s ideology could be fostered and disseminated 
(Rodan, 2006). As Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 19) pointed out, the civilian 
government should have complete autonomy over defensive matters especially 
on the security policy to maintain military control and professionalism. 
In sum, through various political manoeuvres, the PAP’s unfettered access 
to state power has allowed it to expand its power through the creation of various 
institutions to maintain the state’s sovereignty and regime legitimacy. Similar to 
Malaysia, ruling elites in Singapore inherited a coercive tool institutionalised 
during the British legacy to be deployed in order to strengthen its grip on the state 
power. The shocking events of communal tension in the 1960s and the outbreak 
of leftist unrest ushered into a new nation-building effort in both countries. With 
little political contestation from other parties, however, the ruling elites in 
Singapore took a divergent security policy. By ushering a strong ideology of 
survival to the population, the ruling elites created various security institutions 
designed to support and enhance their ideology in the spatial territory in order to 
reinforce the PAP’s regime.  
 
4.5 Indonesia- Konfrontasi and Regime Change: The Institutionalisation of 
the Military’s Dominance 
 
In the 1960s, the Cold War reached its peak in Southeast Asia which 
exacerbated the fragility of the ruling regimes and the competing forces over the 
control of the state. In the international front, state elites would also be divided 
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over which ideal social and political order should form in the region (Narine, 
2004). Uncertainties over regional politics, Southeast Asia was ripe for political 
conflict. In 1963, Indonesia strenuously protested against the Malaysia 
Federation and launched the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) War fearing that 
Malaysia would be a neo-colonial state (Rahman, 1963: cited in the Malay Mail, 
2013). As Sukarno perceived it, the covert operation conducted by the U.S. and 
its Allies to interfere in Indonesia’s politics in the 1957-58 internal rebellion saw 
that the creation of Federal Malaysia was an extension effort by the Western 
powers to penetrate Indonesia’s sovereignty (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 330). Moreover, 
Sukarno had a vision that the ideal postcolonial order in Southeast Asia should 
be a political unification of a Malay Nusantara as a geopolitical concept, free 
from colonial influences politically and economically (Ariffin, 2015). The 
Philippines on the other hand also protested against the Federation, claiming that 
Sabah as part of its territory based on its historical links of the Sultan of Sulu 
(Noble, 1976). Such uncertainties in Southeast Asian politics would disrupt the 
political order in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and its Allies were alarmed with the 
growing influence of the PKI and its grassroot appeals with 20 million members 
that would pose a serious threat to the regional political order (Anderson, 1983). 
For the Western powers, Sukarno’s gradual radicalization towards the left saw 
the greater urgency in backing up the non-communist political forces (Mietzner, 
2008).  
On the other hand, the policy of Konfrontasi launched by Sukarno as a cast 
to mobilise the social forces while simultaneously creating check and balance 
against the military’s power. As Indonesia’s politics were increasingly 
contentious, the ideological clash between the leftist/nationalist and the TNI and 
the deepening politicisation of the military, concomitantly heightened tension 
between the social forces (Anwar, 1998, p. 482). The struggle for political 
autonomy would eventually transcend to into international struggles between 
states for regional order. In order to avoid a political pitfall that was teetering on 
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the brink of clash between social forces, the Konfrontasi was adopted as a rally 
around the flag to provide a nationalist common ground to unite the political elites 
in an anti-colonial struggle in the international domain (Anwar, 1998). However, 
with limited support from the military, Indonesia only launched small-scale 
military skirmishes as Sukarno was concerned that the major powers would 
openly intervene in the fight against his regime (Mackie, 1974).  
As Pierson (2004) posits, when power relations are levelled between social 
forces, it opens up a contentious political space for social forces to gain authority, 
termed as ‘critical juncture’ for an institutional change. By the 1960’s, power 
relations were levelled in Indonesia as the PKI managed to gain political 
influences in the public power and its popularity with the support of Sukarno to 
appeal to the masses as an alternative vision for Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004, p.37). 
However, the most threatening to the military was the PKI’s attempt to penetrate 
in the already factionalised military fuelled antagonism which would create a 
precondition to the 30 September movement (Robinson, 2018). The creation of 
the ‘fifth force’ authorised by Sukarno in arming the PKI militias which made up 
of peasants and armed workers infuriated the military leadership as this would 
give the PKI coercive capacity to challenge the army (Roosa, 2006). 
However, it was the PKI’s attempt for land reform to redistribute to the 
landless peasant which threatened the military’s economic position that drove the 
tension between the social forces (Melvin, 2018). After declaring the martial law 
in 1957, the military’s influences in the domestic politics vastly increased the 
prerogatives of the TNI. The subsequent nationalisation of the economy 
institutionalised the military’s role in the economy and in national development 
as it took control by appointing some of the high-ranking military officers in these 
various foreign-owned companies that could pose as a challenge Sukarno’s power 
(White, 2012). This would also be an important source for a network of patronage 
as the military used these economic resources as a source of income and an 
informal form to support the military in the deteriorating economic climate 
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(McCulloch, 2003). Moreover, the growth in population, mismanagement of 
government resources, and the U.S. economic sanctions hampered the economic 
condition in Indonesia causing strenuous relations between the state and the 
society (Drakely, 2005). This would not only limit the military’s income, but also 
create tensions between the PKI and the local rural elites who feared that the land 
reform would lead to the loss of their assets.  
 
4.5.1 The New Order- The Institutionalisation of the Military  
 
Political conflict between these powerful social forces erupted in 1965 in 
Indonesia. The coup attempt instigated by the PKI in the Gerakan 30 September 
(G30S/PKI) 30 September movement saw the murders of Council of Generals 
(CIA-RSS, 1968). This would serve another critical juncture that saw an 
institutional change in Indonesia’s politics, which aspired the military to grab the 
political power from the civilians. Although the G30S has been contentiously 
debated among historians as to whether it was instigated by the PKI or a faction 
of the military (Anderson, 1983; Cribb, 2001; Rinakit, 2005; Roosa, 2006; 
Melvin, 2018; Robinson, 2018), nevertheless the coup attempt saw a counter-
coup in October 1 by the military led by General Suharto that led the military rise 
to prominence. Sanctioned by the U.S. and the Western powers, and a coalition 
of political allies from major political parties, students and rural elites, the TNI 
conducted a massive violence through the mobilisation of paramilitary Muslim 
organisation across Indonesia (FRUS, 1958b; FRUS, 1964). The brutal 
crackdown saw the purge of PKI and its members between 1965-66 which turned 
into one of the bloodiest Communist campaigns in Southeast Asia’s history 
(Roosa, 2006). Suharto’s effort to sweep into power was welcomed by the 
Western investors in favour of the left-leaning Sukarno regime. Amid the political 
decay, it provided the political opportunity for the military to ascend as the de-
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facto power that saw Sukarno formally ceding his power to Suharto in 1968 
(Rinakit, 2005).  
The displacement of the existing institutional arrangements saw the 
removal of democracy. The consolidation of the state power saw the forged 
relations between the conservative elites and the military, although the latter 
became the most dominant social force. With the military in power, state’s 
security policies are organised to systematically favour them while they exercised 
full control over the coercive apparatus over their political opponents (Croissant, 
Kuehn and Lorenz, 2012). In order to ensure stability and the legitimacy of a 
military ruling, the New Order guided with the Democracy Pancasila was 
implemented by the military as the new state ideology, replacing Sukarno’s 
Guided democracy (Vickers, 2013). More importantly, it also saw the military be 
formally involved in the civilian politics thereby extending their political 
functions as ‘dwifungsi’ dual functions of the military. In 1969, the election Bill 
saw the institutionalisation of the military to formally participate in the economic 
activities (Suryadinata, 1987).  
Under this doctrine, the military would not only play an active role in 
defence, but it also institutionalised their functions that privileged access to 
policymaking responsible for socio-economic development (Anderson, 1983). 
Under Suharto, the regime cleared the radical populism and would pave way for 
financial aids and economic investments to open up the market capitalisation in 
Indonesia (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). As Mietzner (2008) writes, the long 
duration of economic decline, political cleavages and social tension saw that the 
ascending military rule was accepted by the public as the entrenching praetorian 
rule. As Robison and Hadiz (2004, p.40) argued, “the re-engagement with global 
capitalism was the means by which he replaced the former ramshackle and 
bankrupted regime with a more efficient and centralised form of authoritarian rule 
and extended the foundations of that vast system of state capitalism, constructed 
by Soekarno but never consolidated.” 
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This would also shift the military’s role from regional expansionism in 
Sukarno’s era to instead focus on internal stability (Anwar, 1998). Under Suharto, 
political participations were restricted while the military became the integral part 
of the New Order, providing security and controlling the society through 
surveillance and coercion (Aspinall, 2005). Consequently, the deepening political 
process of the military as a guarantor for political stability as well as an economic 
player institutionalised the military’s political power. As a result of Suharto’s 
economic policy, foreign investment increased in the period to encourage income 
opportunity for the military to create state-owned enterprises to supplement the 
state’s expenditure to support the military’s operations. The regional commanders 
were encouraged to forge business alliances with business elites to provide 
extractive contributions to the state (Mietzner, 2009, p.53). With the newfound 
authority, it did not only impact the military’s institutional standing, but also 
provided the military’s growing incentives to explore their influences in business 
activities with unfettered access from other social forces (Lee, 2008). “Political 
order and economic development”, writes Schwarz (2000, p. 29) “were two side 
of the same coins”.  
With a strong centralised political figure and a military loyal to the regime, 
it allowed Suharto to further absorbed the national unity coercively as well as 
financially through patronage. Having gained control of the state power, Suharto 
and his inner circle did not feel the need to share power for formulating policies 
with the civilians in return for acquiescence as the military had dominated every 
aspect of the government (Crouch, 2007). Suharto and his cronies began to slowly 
assert their power to marginalised rival military factions by revising the political 
system. Closest allies were given important cabinet roles by Suharto to control 
the administration as the Head of state and the government, while the key cabinet 
positions such as Ministry of Defence and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Secretariat (Mietzner, 2008, p. 52). More 
importantly, the military imposed control over internal security matters through 
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the Kopkamtib (Operational Control to Restore Security and Order) which 
allowed them to detain regime opponents. The practice of distributing patronage 
came to be institutionalised as routine practice for the ruling elites.  
Territorial military units often  relied on the off-budget activities in 
business activities to maintain the upkeep of the military instead of relying on 
state resources (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011). As the military has massive 
personnel and under-equipped, they were encouraged to raise their own funds to 
ensure they can maintain their operations especially in remote areas (Made and 
Supriatma, 2013). Business contracts were distributed from Central Jakarta for 
developmental budgets to local governments, which then allocated these funds to 
various projects (Anderson, 1983). Politically, this gave Suharto effective control 
of the military which provided access to state power to influence the allocation 
of state contracts, mining and fishery rights, and forestry concessions (Robison, 
2009, p. 251-270). Further, Suharto also employed a military promotion system 
and patronage politics through the divide and conquer rule to keep the military 
internally divided while his power slowly grew (Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz, 
2012). Favoured military close to Suharto were also appointed as governors and 
leaders in the regional territory. This gave him the opportunity to maintain the 
regional military’s loyalty as patrons in return granting access to rent-seeking 





Source: SIPRI Military Index, 2019        Figure 4.1 
 
To ensure that the territorial military and business groups maintained their 
loyalty to his regime, they were instructed to affiliate with Golkar, which 
strengthened Suharto’s political machinery (Honna, 2006). According to Ward 
(1974, p. 83), by early 1970s Golkar would become “the greatest source of 
patronage, greatest provider of facilities, greatest distributor of offices, greatest 
procurer and supplier of finance”. This can be seen from figure 5.1 that the 
military expenditure began to slowly descend as Suharto consolidate more power 
in the military before the fall of Suharto in 1998. With this intricate network of 
influence, Suharto institutionalised the arrangements on networks of power from 
the military, business elites as well as the bureaucrats to attain access to state 
resources. With the military being in power in the local provincials and territories, 
crackdown on opposition movements and counter-insurgencies that were deemed 
as threats were often carried out under Suharto’s supervision, often using 
excessive coercive force to maintain political order (Crouch, 1979).  
To marginalise the influence of the militants and incorporate civilian 
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and the parliaments in such a way that other political forces could not compete 
with the executive office for power (Schwarz, 2000, p. 30). Suharto and his allies 
introduced the Golkar party, organised from a functional group of military 
personnel into a pro-regime party, which all civil servants were required to join. 
Golkar would be an important political vehicle for Suharto as a quasi-party with 
an institutional structure dominated by the military rather than upstaging them, 
while providing an outlet for non-military supporters (Tomsa, 2008). Opposing 
parties were forced to fuse into two government sponsored bodies, with the 
existing Islamic groups to join the PPP (United Development Party), while the 
nationalist groups were pushed to join the new nationalist party, the PDI 
(Indonesian Democratic Party) with the military overseeing their activities that 
prohibits them from establishing below the district level (Bourchier and Hadiz, 
2003). Though the institutionalisation of these parties were limited, it would also 
allow for communal elites to manoeuvre as the New Order gradually weakened.  
Nevertheless, instead of consolidating into a strong party institution that 
was present in Malaysia and Singapore, it saw three separate institutions in the 
executive, party and the military for power. According to Slater (2010b), this 
institutional bifurcation of the civilian and military support was fragile as the New 
Order did not enjoy steadfast coalitional backing that was present in Malaysia or 
Singapore. Instead of trusting the military and the party institution to create a 
strong state institution, the military and the elites were treated as potential rivals 
(Aspinall, 2005). This would gradually weaken his coalition as the elites 
gradually fragmented focused on purveying patronages to maintain faction 
considerations.  
 
4.5.2 Konfrontasi and ASEAN as a Protection Pact for Regime 
 
As the Konfrontasi was a strategic bifurcation in light of the ideological 
battle during the Cold War for influence in the region. With the fall of Sukarno, 
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Indonesia abandoned the Konfrontasi policy during Suharto sought for the 
normalisation of its relationship with Malaysia. Through a series of concession, 
the three states namely Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines signed the Manila 
Accord in 1963 to prevent from interference in the domestic politics which would 
later institutionalised under ASEAN in 1967 (Acharya, 2014). Amid great 
uncertainty in the region and Sukarno’s fall from power, the new military regime 
led by Suharto saw the shift in Indonesia’s political expansionism to focus on 
internal stability (Lee, 2009). ASEAN formally provided an institutional 
framework for the original signatories (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines) which saw the regional elites to form a protection pact that 
allowed the newly independent region to develop the logic of security in the 
region (Narine, 2004). Through the recognition of sovereignty as the principle 
core of this framework, it provided a non-binding legal institution that 
authenticates a political order in the region for state to not intervene in each 
other’s territorial space.  This allowed the dominant ruling elites to exercise their 
autonomy to focus on nation-building to solidify their ruling in the domestic to 
maintain legitimacy  One of the main principles was to maintain their sovereignty 
in the existing political order was the principle of non-interference which 
Acharya (2014, p.56-7) writes “can only be understood in the context of the 
domestic security concerns of the ASEAN states”. 
With the support of the Western powers, the founding of ASEAN was seen 
by member states as an effort to protect the states ruling elites from managing its 
domestic order. According to Ayoob (1995), states insecurity emanates from its 
contestation in the domestic as different groups compete for autonomy. 
Moreover, the inception of ASEAN was an expression of collective actions to the 
survival of its capitalist regimes to defend the prevailing social order from 
interferences within members (Jones, 2010). With the common goals of 
containment of Communist from the capitalist states, the aim of ASEAN was to 
reduce the spill-over effect of domestic conflicts especially ethnic, political and 
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ideological that would pose challenge to regime legitimacy (Acharya, 2014). This 
would also allow the dominant political forces in the ASEAN to continue 
dominating its ruling give rise to the authoritarian regimes to consolidate their 
power in the domestic politics often through coercive force. In his memoir, 
Singapore’s then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained about ASEAN:  
 “The unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead 
of the power vacuum that would come with an impending British and 
later a possible U.S. withdrawal . . . We had a common enemy – the 
communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, 
China and the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter 
and deny the communists the social and economic conditions for 
revolutions.” (Lee, 2000, p. 329-330). 
For Suharto, ASEAN played an integral role to his regime as the principle 
of non-intervention allowed Indonesia to use coercive forces to maintain political 
order. With relations normalised between Indonesia and Malaysia, Suharto 
quickly consolidated the regional territory through populist mobilisation and 
coercive integration by emphasising order and stability as the necessary 
precondition for Indonesia’s economic growth (Honna, 2005). However, 
recurring secessionist movements began to challenge Suharto’s regime 
legitimacy. According to Anwar (1998), these secessionist movements in Aceh, 
West Papua and East Timor were viewed as a threat to the idea of Indonesia as a 
nation-state as well as to its territorial integrity. Military crackdowns and counter-
insurgencies were deployed in these areas, strengthening the need to maintain the 
needs for non-interference from other states in its domestic affairs (Narine, 2007).  
For Indonesia, as its history suggests in Chapter 3, these regional territories 
were vital to the ruling elites as these territories have historically been exploited 
by the colonial powers of its vast natural resources. In the case of Aceh, the GAM 
(Aceh Free Movement) was formed by a separationist group after the 
disagreement between the central state over religious laws in 1976. Though Aceh 
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became a special regional status similar to Yogyakarta, this arrangement was 
revoked by the central government when Suharto came into power.  
More pertinently, Aceh became a critical value to Indonesia’s political 
economy when the new discovery of gas reserves in 1971 by Exxon-Mobil. To 
exploit these reserves, Exxon-Mobil entered a joint concession with Pertamina, 
the military run state-owned enterprise for a joint operation that would generate 
U.S. $2-$3 billion revenue yearly (Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989). Political 
grievances grew among the Acehnese elites when royalties were paid to the 
central government as opposed to the local government (Ross, 2005). However, 
with the Western powers support for regional stability, it allowed the military 
regime to consolidate these regional territories which are made up of different 
ethnic to be absorbed into a centralized state under the control of Jakarta 
(Bertrand, 2004). For the political elites who have established themselves in 
power, these intense economic interests over these resources certainly carried a 
political motivation in maintaining its control.  
On the other hand, the annexation of East Timor to Indonesia was important 
to both domestic and international players. The ASEAN bloc sanctioned 
Indonesia’s military intervention in East Timor following the decolonisation of 
Portugal in 1975. East Timor began its decolonisation process in 1974 when 
Portugal’s fascist regime was overthrown by the leftist military coup. Fearing that 
East Timor would fall into the Communist bloc which would pose a threat to 
Suharto’s New Order which could potentially destabilised the region, Indonesia’s 
military began infiltrating the territory led by General Moerdani and eventually 
invaded which saw the annexation of this territory in 1976 (Bertrand, 2004).  For 
Suharto, the annexation of East Timor was critical to Indonesia’s domestic 
politics due to its vast oil reserves, as it was rocked by economic mismanagement, 
bad foreign debts and the near bankruptcy of Pertamina (state-owned oil 
company). As the regime relied on steady stream of patronages to maintain social 
order, the oil shock in 1973 would smoothen the state to provide basic 
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infrastructure in the rural but at the same time to provide state funded projects to 
reduce animosity among the middle class (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). For the 
military, the East Timor operation was critical to its military budget as it relied 
on the U.S. military assistance to supply military equipment to modernize and 
provide defence in its territory (Crouch, 2007).  
For Indonesia, the end of Konfrontasi was integral to its foreign policies as 
its regional problems were also a source of management against domestic 
problems, causing a spill-over to its foreign relations. With the meteoric rise of 
the PKI, it inevitably exacerbated the communal tension in Indonesia. Though, 
this provided a regime favoured by the Western powers, it also inevitably created 
an opportunity for an illiberal military regime to intervene and formally 
institutionalise its power in the domestic politics. What appeared to be a territorial 
sovereignty only insofar as to manage the domestic social conflict from these 
states to fall from the growing communal tension, which saw the rise in 
authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia (Jones, 2012a). The formation of ASEAN 
was perceived as an institutional framework designed to protect from other 
members from interfering in its domestic politics. It also was designed as a 
protection pact for the elites to deal with the social cleavages that was commonly 
related with communist clash in their own societies.  
 
4.6 Philippines- The martial law and Regime Change: The 
Institutionalisation of the Military 
 
Democratic governance from 1946 to 1972 marked the period of the 
Philippines oligarchic democracy, which did not lead to any significant changes 
to policy reforms and institutional changes. The oligarchs faced no serious 
challenges as the leftist rebellion was largely quelled in the 1950’s. For the 
population, the Nacionalista and Liberal parties were virtually indistinguishable 
as both parties served as machines to distribute patronages in which kinship and 
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personal ties were used to access state resources (Lee, 2014). However, it was the 
election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 that played a significant role in the 
Philippines politics. When Marcos bid for a second term in 1969, there was a 
growing discontent in the society over the political system that was dominated by 
the clientelist oligarchs (Putzel, 1999). Marcos faced multiple domestic unrest 
that was consequential to Philippine politics.  
In order to appease the social anxiety on the economic condition, Marcos 
took a similar approach of Magsaysay and initiated several rural programs 
centred on developing the infrastructure and civic programs that was financed 
from foreign borrowings (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005, p.197). During this 
period, the AFP was primarily controlled by the Congress, the President and the 
local oligarchs with the military appointments used as part of a bargaining chip 
for their own self-interest (Anderson, 1998, p.213). Even though the military was 
deployed during Magsaysay’s administration that initiated the deployment for 
civic programs, their access to power was limited after his Presidency. 
Nonetheless, it was under Marcos that saw the expansion of military’s activities 
by assuming a greater role in the civilian sector as part of its nation-building 
efforts (Hernandez, 1985). Inevitably, this would also be laid as a groundwork 
for further military involvement that is parallel to Indonesia. 
On the economic side, the Philippines was hit by high inflation and 
unemployment. To reduce its reliance on rice imports, Marcos introduced 
farming programs as part of his land reform program to increase smaller farmers’ 
rice and corn production to meet the growing population needs (Abinales and 
Amoroso, 2005, p.197). On the other hand, despite the promotion of new crops, 
smaller farmers that harvested corn and rice were affected as a result of the 
fluctuation on commodity prices while landed elites continued to produce for the 
narrow base of agricultural products as a consequence to meet the higher 
international demand for sugar, coconut and forestry products (Abinales and 
Amoroso, 2005, p. 197). The rising cost of imports and the inability of smaller 
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farmers to meet the demand affected the economic progress. However, the 
Philippines economy had suffered from decline as a result of heavy financial 
burden from foreign borrowings at the assumption that debts could be repaid by 
export earnings (Putzel, 1992, p. 120).  
At the same time, it became clear that after the Huk rebellion that land 
reform was one of the priority concerns. However, even though land reforms were 
introduced in 1955 and 1963, the law was riddled with loopholes, allowing 
landowners to retain their land from being redistributed to the farmers (Putzel, 
1992). With the institutional arrangements largely designed for the benefits of the 
oligarchs, it also possessed the coercive tool as well the economic capacity to 
maintain this political order (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). After a period of 
chronic corruption hampered by the oligarchic politics, it aggravated the class 
tension which led to a new leftist movement inspired by the Maoist Communist 
group called the New People’s Army (NPA) emerged (Quimpo, 2014, p. 124). 
Whereas previously the Huk rebellion were only focused at the periphery of 
Luzon, the NPA protest was an urban uprising (Timberman, 1991). At the same 
time, the Marcos administration also faced an armed separatist of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the South of the Philippines, Mindanao 
where the Muslim secessionist during the 1970s MNLF waged war to gain 
autonomy of the island from the Christian ruled government (Hedmann, 2001). 
The MNLF also had an estimate of around 30,000 men ready to challenge the 
northern government (Molloy, 1985). Although it was never fully proven, the 
Marcos government claimed that the MNLF and the NPA formed an alliance that 
would threaten the stability and governance of the Philippines, which was a 
precondition for Marcos to declare a martial law in 1972 (Molloy, 1985).  
On top of the urban unrest and the rise of second wave Communist 
uprising, it was the intra-elite polarisation that would exacerbate the political 
condition. The 1969 election between Marcos and the Nacionalista party against 
Osmeña and the Liberal party would unleash a wave of political turmoil between 
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elites until it was abated with the arrest of the Liberal Party leaders during the 
martial law (Lieberman, 2015, p. 63). The traditional power of the landed elites 
was already waning as a result of post-war economic policy to increase the 
manufacturing industry in its effort to shift the economy from agricultural 
economy (Doronilla, 1992, p.94). However, with Marcos attempt to further 
diversify the economy, it also gave prominence to new technocratic oligarchs 
(Hutchcroft, 1991). In an effort to consolidate both economic and political power, 
both party elites depended on the patronage that were passed down to their clients 
in an effort to gather votes(Quimpo, 2005). This would determine the control of 
local and provincial offices, with the local elites firm grip on the workforce as 
well as its own private armies (Hedman and Sidel, 2000).  The intense political 
rivalries between the elites caused further fractions between the society and state.  
 
 4.6.1 Institutionalising the AFP for Nation-State Building 
 
With intense political competition and partisan politicking between the 
elites, combined with the endemic domestic unrest from below, gave the window 
of opportunity for acquiescence for Marcos to initiate an institutional change. As 
competition for resource grew intense, Marcos chose the path of militarisation.  
In order to retain power beyond his second term, Marcos declared a martial law 
in 1972 with the support of his elite cronies and a faction of the  military to subdue 
the opposition elites under the pretext of rising communist insurgency that serves 
as a critical juncture in Philippine politics (Quimpo, 2008, p. 55). During an 
interview, Senator Jose Enrile who was the Defence Secretary in 1972, ceded that 
the martial law “in the initial stages, we must emasculate all the leaders in order 
to control the situation… and afterwards, when we have quieted the society, we 
started releasing them (Enrile, cited in Romero, 2018).” Whereas previously 
power resided in the local politics, the martial law led to the consolidation of 
power to central Manila (Kang, 2002).  
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To further enhance his regime legitimacy, Marcos used the legal apparatus  
by introducing the 1973 Constitution Law to institutionalise the Presidential 
power, while the Senate was abolished denying any civilian oversights for policy 
processes (Hernandez, 2006). With the Constitution greatly augmented his power 
resources, it provided Marcos with the legal basis to centralise the networks of 
patronages to the military and his close oligarchic elites by redistributing the state 
power and the economy (Hutchcroft, 1991, p.443). In addition, whereas the pork 
barrel was often used by officeholders to create a patronage-client network, 
Marcos also used other institutionalised channels to circumvent the oligarchs’ 
power in Congress by introducing other institutional platforms such as the Barrio 
Funds and the Presidential Arm for Community Development (Doronilla, 1992, 
p.123-149). This power shift gave the institutional imperatives for Marcos to 
consolidate and establish his control in the government (Hedman and Sidel, 
2000). With the legal and coercive apparatus firmly gripped by Marcos that was 
similar to Indonesia’s Suharto, it changed the dynamics of civilian-military 
relations while restraining the democratic values of civilian oversights towards 
the military (Beeson and Bellamy, 2008, p. 159).  
Above all, it also marked the destruction of fractious elite democracy to 
authoritarianism, shifting the security policy to domestic security with the AFP 
support as an organisational weaponry to subdue his political opponents in order 
to maintain political autonomy (Hernandez, 2006). The power symmetry of the 
military was at its peak during the Marcos administration which defined the civil-
military relations in the Philippines (Cruz, 2011). Marcos set an institutional 
arrangement with the military to secure his position while the military gained 
access to state power. After 1972, the military replaced politicians as chief 
executives of local government as well as the civilian positions making the AFP 
partners to the regime and as distributors of patronage with the prerogative of the 
President’s Office in implementing agrarian programs and community 
development (Kang, 2002). Put differently, the new group of patronages under 
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Marcos not only challenged the old political order, it also enhanced the President 
with absolute control to dictate the state’s budget to be redistributed to his own 
cronies.  
On the security realm, the strength of internal insurgencies also grew in 
strength whereby the combination of the two main groups, the CPP-NPA and the 
MNLF increased from 2,300 personnel to 15,978 by the end of 1985 were further 
conducive to the justification in maintaining the martial law (Office of the 
Minister of National Defence 1986; cited in Miranda and Ciron, 1987). The 
declaration of martial law convinced the MNLF that a peace settlement was no 
longer possible as they perceived that the Marcos program in creating a new 
society was a form of repression (Mercado, 1984). Whereas previously the 
bureaucracy was subordinated to the Senate, the lack of veto from the martial law 
provided the AFP the political autonomy to advance a particular policy agenda. 
This provided the military with the political prerogatives to formulate security 
policies with no civilian oversight to provide check and balance especially which 
saw the increase in defence spending (Hernandez, 1990; p. 125).  This resulted in 
the increase in military personnel from the integration of the Philippine 
Constabulary, which is now part of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to 
around 200,00 personnel in 1984 (Military Balance, 1985). It further expanded 
the military’s role as a coercive apparatus to quell on the elites with their private 
armies from interfering in Philippine politics.  
Coupled with domestic threats looming in the Philippines, the AFP saw its 
military spending to be some of the highest during the period of Marcos 
administration. The early part of the martial law also marked the regime’s attempt 
to improve the AFP defence capabilities to project and enhanced defence posture 
(Cruz de Castro, 2005). Based on the SIPRI military index data, the Philippines 
military expenditure grew exponentially between 1972 until 1986 when the 
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martial law was partially lifted although shown in figure 4.12. Indeed, Marcos 
compensated the military’s support by allowing his military cronies to graft state 
funds for their personal interest.  This was apparent which saw high ranking AFP 
officials bought multimillion pesos houses in Manila, as well as holding positions 
in state-owned enterprises despite their earning salaries of 5000 pesos or less 
(Aquino, 1987, p. 25). To maintain the support of the military and his cronies, the 
state’s foreign debt also increased from 1.6 billion pesos in 1972 to 6.2 billion 
pesos in 1976 (Wurfel, 1977).  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Source: SIPRI Military Index 2019 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. support would also further legitimise the 
martial law. In a memorandum of conversation between President Richard Nixon 
and Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo, with the President of the U.S. 
discussing on the situation in the Philippines quoting “I told the people here we 
are not going to lecture you. You can't have anarchy.” (FRUS, 1973). For the U.S. 
counterpart, the outbreak of Muslim secessionist rebellion in Mindanao and the 
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resurgence of Communist in the urban Manila could potentially disrupt its 
economic interest and the regional order (Celoza, 1997). Rather, the U.S. 
provided military aid and military finance sale which further strengthened the 
Marcos administration to increase the military budget. However, with no civilian 
oversight, the financial aid provided by the U.S. was syphoned by Marcos to 
support his military and business cronies as a form of regime maintenance 
(Chambers, 2014).With Marcos security guaranteeing to protect the U.S. interest 
in the land as well as the U.S. needing The Philippines for the Subic and Clark 
bases, the U.S. further funded the Philippines with military aid costing around 
US$180 million between 1970-1975, which was a substantial amount to the AFP 
(Goodno 1991, p. 68). Subsequently, the U.S. reduced its efforts to push for 
democratic land reforms that have benefitted both the local elites and the 
Americans (You, 2015, p. 79). With the power reside over Marcos and his 
cronies, this limits the access for other group of elites to extract state resources.  
In sum, the condition of Philippines domestic politics ignited a regime 
change to be an authoritarian state. With the elites increasingly polarised and the 
continued growth of domestic unrest, the Philippines political opposition was 
severely weakened and through his skilful manipulation of using state coercive 
power to initiate a regime change, which saw the breaking down of Philippines 
democracy (Anderson, 1988). Much like Indonesia, the military in the Philippines 
played an important role during the critical juncture that limit civilian oversight 
in containing the military influence in the politics. This would also give the 
political autonomy to influence its security policy. With the consolidation of 
power in the central, Marcos disrupted the network for power of the old oligarchy, 







To recapitulate, this chapter shows how that the different trajectories of 
security threats saw a similar yet different forms of regime changes in Southeast 
Asia. Consistent with the findings, we observe that in all case studies, at the apex 
of Cold War, power struggles between the domestic social forces saw an 
institutional change. Though, the magnitude of domestic problems varies and the 
differences in political rationalities in each state, on closer inspection, these 
security problems imposed upon societies in Southeast Asia were a product of its 
historical structures. In all of the case studies, the source of security threats was 
based on the breakdown of elite cohesion which reflected how conflicts between 
social forces inhabit states and how it besieges them. This period would also mark 
a critical juncture for Southeast Asia which saw the changes in power relations 
between the social forces in the states. One common denominator that would 
appear in Southeast Asia was the rise of authoritarian regimes that set a path 
dependence for a transformation of institutional arrangements that led to the 
consolidation of state power to certain elite groups. Through these insecurities, 
the regimes focused on building political stability within its territorial space to 
maintain legitimacy. This is where the similarities depart in all these cases. 
Though with differing conclusion, this chapter therefore find that the trajectory 
of authoritarian regimes led to different security priorities. Different forms of 
authoritarian rules were created that saw the different segment of society 
supporting the institutional arrangements.  
To maintain domestic order, dominant social forces used different state 
apparatus to stabilize and strengthen its political position by implementing their 
ideas, shaping specific institutional arrangements to gain regime legitimacy. This 
chapter reiterates that the changes in power dynamics between political forces 
allowed the dominant forces to shape the state’s overall contour of the security 
policy into specific policy outcomes. This gave access to the winning dominant 
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social forces the political capacity to formulate the policy agenda designed to 
protect its power from other domestic social forces. With the specific dominant 
political forces in power, a state’s national security concept conditioned itself 
with the particularities of certain institutional arrangements that are unique to the 
states, shaped by its historical legacies. The formulation of national security 
concept is dependent on how the power relations between political forces 
perceive to protect their own interest and the bargaining process to mobilise state 
resources to implement the policy outcomes.  
Though power relations between the civilian and military vary to a 
different degree in each state, a pattern emerges in the case of Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Specifically, under Suharto and Marcos, the military plays a huge 
role in maintaining internal security operations. On the other hand, in Singapore 
and Malaysia, the civilian elites continue to dominate the national security policy 
agenda with the military subordinated to the political regime. However, this is 
where the path diverges. In the case of Malaysia, with threats deriving from 
communal tension and elite division, the institutional arrangements revealed that 
the politics of security in Malaysia was established to improve the Malay 
condition.  
This would also lead to the rise in the elite driven regime to focus on its 
regime legitimacy. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic anxieties, 
fracture among the class line, and the poor economic condition left by the burdens 
of the British colonial policy saw the institutionalisation of a one-party state 
regime that was crucial to control the policy agenda. In both Malaysia and 
Singapore, the civilian government managed to consolidate power while military 
in both states were subordinated to the government, acting as a tool for the ruling 
elites. This gave precedence for the civilian elites to control the agenda setting to 
produce a security policy designed to protect specific social forces that was 
defined during the cleavages.  
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In Malaysia, the presence of domestic problems lies along the class which 
transcend into ethnic animosities due to the increasing class gap between ethnics. 
The 1969 riot saw for a change in regime which allowed the consolidation of the 
Malay dominated UMNO party to access state power, focusing on developing the 
security of the Malays socio-economic condition. Malaysia’s security policy was 
designed to enhance the regime legitimacy as well as to further institutionalise 
UMNO as a party state by providing security to protect the Malay position both 
politically and economically. The institutional depth provided the ruling elites to 
maintain its policy agenda in reducing domestic conflict along the racial and class 
lines. This would also increase the nation-building effort in Malaysia by creating 
specific linkages between the government’s economic policy to the security 
policy.  
In the case of Singapore, the PAP enjoyed political autonomy within the 
polity after its breakup with Malaysia allowed the ruling elites to formulate its 
security policy designed to strengthen the PAP ruling. With the PAP in power, it 
had unfettered access to link its security policy on nation-state building efforts to 
further consolidate the fragmented society. The PAP’s decision to militarising the 
civilians through the mandated NS conscript which further institutionalised the 
perception of a small city-state for survival. This allowed for the PAP to link its 
security policy to enhance national unity against foreign and domestic threats. As 
the state survival is dependent upon the regime survival, the ruling government 
focused on integrating the state ideology that is embedded in the society. 
In contrast, in the case of Indonesia, the rising conflict between the political 
elites and the military elites and the ideological clash initiated for the military to 
intervene and formally institutionalise its position in the politics. With the 
military historically as an autonomous institution, the GS30 movement provided 
the window of opportunity for the military to intervene which led to the shift in 
security objectives of maintaining domestic stability and to reduce the rise of 
social forces conflict along the class line. Whereas the civilian elites dominated 
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the politics in Malaysia and Singapore, the military was in the position of 
dominance. The policy decision-making was concentrated in the military which 
gave them control over security policy designed to protect its own political 
interest. The ideological function of the military for civilian oversight and for 
security inevitably increase its role in the nation-state building efforts, further 
justifying its role in the politics. 
Whereas Malaysia and Singapore saw the rise of party dominance 
controlling the formulation of security policies, in the case of Indonesia it gave 
rise to a personalistic regime which saw Suharto creating his own political cronies 
that saw the destruction of democratic regime. Moreover, in the height of the Cold 
War, the U.S. support for a more friendly regime gave the military the permission 
to respond the domestic challenges especially on quelling the communist threats 
with brutal crackdowns. Similarly, the Philippines on the other hand saw the 
growth of personalistic regime which gave rise to a strong president with the 
support of the military. This would also lead to the divergence in the state’s 
perception conceptualized in its security policies. The increasing political 
contestation between the elites and the society in the Philippines saw the 
breakdown of a democratic regime. However, this is where the Philippines 
departs from Indonesia.  In Indonesia, the regime change was driven by the rise 
in domestic unrest caused by the elite polarization along ethnic and class unrest. 
With a strong support from the military, the ruling elites declared a martial law 
and used coercive acts to suppress opposing parties. Indonesia formally diverted 
its attention on security in maintaining domestic order while limiting the 
involvement of the opposing oligarchs. In the Philippines on the other hand, the 
intense domestic unrest was caused by the lack of elite cohesion. Although the 
communist movement remained large in the archipelagic state, it was the 
vigorous electoral competition between the two main parties led to the rise of 
Marcos authoritarian regime.  
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Despite this, there are some similarities in the formation of 
authoritarianism in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In both states, the military 
became major players in the politics. With their roles expanded during Marcos 
regime, the military became an influential partner in supporting his regime as a 
coercive apparatus, which institutionalised the military in the policy decision-
making process. Sharing the same purview with Indonesia, the U.S. decision to 
allow its regional ally to declare a martial law and the use of military for 
crackdowns on communism strengthened Marcos’s regime legitimacy.  
On the external front, the formation of ASEAN also saw the 
institutionalisation of a regional order on the basis of non-interference, which 
provided the regional elites a protection pact which would allow the elites to 
consolidate its power in the domestic to maintain political order to boost its 
economic development while it provide regional stability. More so, the 
importance of regime legitimacy resides on the collaboration of a protection pact 


















The Transition of Political Regimes and the Impact on National Security 




The period of 1980’s and 1990’s was a period of transformative 
government in Southeast Asia. While the end of the Cold War saw a dramatic rise 
of a capitalist state, it also brought new challenges to the political legitimacy of 
these authoritarian regimes in various forms. For Southeast Asia, security policy 
expands beyond the protection from invasion, but also to protect from opposing 
groups on access to state power. As these early security policies were successful 
in maintaining political order, historical legacies pave the way for certain 
institutions (civilian or military) to sink deep roots. It would also become its 
source of insecurity as globalisation promoted waves of democratisation, 
challenging the legitimacy of the regimes in Southeast Asia. To differing extent, 
as states become the provider of security to its citizens, conflictual interest would 
also develop in the domestic, ethnic makeups and class divisions that were 
brought forth from their legacies on how they implement their policies would also 
become contested. 
In light of the context, it is helpful for us to recall and link together the 
points made in previous chapters. In the last two chapters, we analysed how 
Southeast Asia showcases a tremendous diversity on the social conflict and the 
development of political institutions. States came to emerge from the struggle for 
political autonomy contested by different social forces in the domestic for order. 
While the dust of elite conflicts settled, these enduring power struggles for 
legitimacy between social forces saw the formation of states informed by their 
historical antecedents. In the previous chapter, we also saw that the rise of 
 182 
dominant social forces that controls the policy agenda for national security. It 
would also give rise to highly distinctive forms of regime.  
To this end, this chapter aims to reiterate that the central theme of the thesis 
that security policy is constructed, pursued, and legitimated by powerful social 
forces. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how domestic institutions 
distribute power, and how actors exercise their power within the institutional 
context. This chapter will analyse and explore the differences in the role of 
civilian and military institutions and its impact towards national security policies. 
This chapter extends the arguments that state formation is crucial to explaining 
the set preferences and shape perceptions in policy decision-making that is path 
dependent to its institutional legacies. In every case, it illustrates how past 
institutional choices conferring power on some actors provide justification for 
different sets of institutional arrangements for winning group to promote their 
interest to the protection of nation-state. Debates, negotiations, conflict over 
power and resource allocations that are determined by the state reflect on the past 
model as a tool for legitimation to implement national security policies. 
This chapter poses to answer the main question of the thesis: how do 
domestic institutions influence political actors with regards to security policy 
behaviours? This question helps bring to the fore the inherent tensions on how 
states attempt to securitise certain issues vary and the processes involved 
becomes more complex. Supported by previous chapters, this chapter aims to 
pinpoint how the underlying sources of diverging trajectories of institutional set 
up during the critical junctures distributes power to political actors, and how it 
reinforces each other. It examines how security policy in Southeast Asia is 
subjected to the dominant social forces and how they impose their will to protect 
their source of power. This chapter puts to test on the institutional capacity to 
withstand the multi-faceted challenges in security. One of the main objectives of 
this chapter is to examine how domestic politics continues to play a major role in 
the development of its security policies which have been central for the creation 
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of a stable state. In all states, economic development has often been portrayed as 
a case for securitisation by dominant actors. 
 The first section will discuss how the historical context of Malaysia and 
Singapore paved the way for a dramatic transformation of the states and their 
formulation of security policies. This section pays close attention to the specific 
domestic makeups on how dominant political parties present in both states 
emerged to dominate their domestic power structures, both states began to 
institutionalise their political perceptions to protect their political legitimacy. The 
second section will discuss the case of Indonesia and the Philippines in a similar 
manner. It shows how the presence of different social forces for power highlights 
the state’s inability to provide security and public goods. In discussing these 
selected case studies, the chapter identifies how the existent of divergent domestic 
interest put forward by dominant social forces would create long-term 
repercussions of these institutional arrangements and how it affects the relations 
between the state and society.  
In what follows, this chapter will ultimately enhance the core of the thesis 
that state autonomy is defined by different historical legacies which influences 
how actors and state institutions shaped security policies. Political institutions 
determine the constraints and incentives of political actors to determine state’s 
security policies.  
 
5.2 Malaysia and Singapore: The Dominance of the Party State in Security 
Policy 
 
By the 1980’s, both Malaysia and Singapore enjoyed economic 
development while remaining autocratic, dominated by the seemingly strong 
ruling party. These strong regimes emerged from the historical conditions by 
broader processes of geopolitical and economic development inherited by the 
British colonies. Despite the similarity in state power and actors’ capacities, 
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different sets of actors’ exercise power in different ways. In the case of Malaysia, 
the abandonment of consociationalism in favour of an authoritarian regime after 
1969 riot saw the consolidation of political power of UMNO within the ruling 
coalition by co-opting most opposition parties, thereby transforming the Alliance 
into a dominant party state of BN (Crouch, 1996). Whereas in Singapore, the PAP 
managed to consolidate its power over the state by introducing the Total Defence 
Concept that was essential to the unity of the ethnically diverse society.  
 
5.2.1 Conversion: The Heavy Industry Policy as a Security Policy in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, the introduction of the NEP in 1971 by the BN government 
legitimises its political authority as a response to the social upheaval. The NEP 
was a restructuring of the society by ensuring that the Malay interest is 
represented, and that poverty is reduced across inter-ethnics. The implementation 
of this policy not only strengthened Malaysia’s nation-state building efforts along 
the ethnic lines, it also firmly institutionalised their policy agenda which solidify 
their mass-based support of the regime. The rise of Mahathir to power is critical 
to understanding Malaysia’s national security. Mahathir’s approach to the 
national security concept was deeply intertwined with social domestic issues of 
the Bumiputera. Continuing the policy legacy of his predecessors, Mahathir 
inherited an interventionist party-state that provided the institutional capacity to 
expand the national domestic project to further accelerate to dismantle class 
structure based on ethnic division of labour (Felker, 2015). With the 
reinforcement of the Bumiputera rights in the Constitution in the 1970’s, the 
ruling elites were able to generate effective policy agenda to provide their 
constituents a crucial presence for ethnic solidarity especially within the elite 
coalitions (Nathan, 2014).  
Despite its economic success, economic disparity gaps between ethnicities 
still persisted with the majority of the poorest ethnic groups still predominantly 
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with the Malays (Abdul Khalid, 2014). The economic needs for diversification 
drove Malaysia to reinforce its desire to modernise its industry to address the 
social cleavages. To deepen Malaysia’s economic growth and extend the 
economic infrastructure, Mahathir took this opportunity with Malaysia’s security 
policy to create linkages in coordination with his Heavy Industry Policy.  He 
carefully bind Malaysia’s industrialisation program with military modernisation 
as an offset to create a highly advanced manufacturing industry to forge a path 
for economic success and social stability (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 2009). 
Mahathir forged state-business corporatism to collaborate with multi-national 
companies in his domestic industrial policy (Jomo, 2002). To do so, Malaysia 
introduced its National Defence Policy in 1982 which saw the need to increase 
the privatisation of the defence industry as a policy process of self-reliance in 
small munitions and fire-arms but at the same time to diversify the economy  
(Balakrishnan, 2008). As these new security threats could potentially undermine 
the BN regime legitimacy, the BN government sought to modernise its military 
capabilities in facing these threats (Bitzinger, 2010). 
Although the National Security Council provided the security policy 
objectives, policy decision-making remained the premise of the ruling elites. As 
policy ideas are confined to the executive branch and their political allies, the 
parliament would be a rubber stamp for executive decision (Suffian, 2019). In 
this regard, Mahathir played a central role in providing the broad direction and 
formulating Malaysia’s security and economic policy. Policy decision-making 
with regards to security especially on military acquisition were often manipulated 
as a political incentive for both the state and personal purposes (Hellmann-
Rajanayagam, 2000). In order to carry out the security and economic policy 
agenda, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was created as the principal agency 
under the Prime Minister’s office to configure Malaysia’s national policies 
(Embong, 2012). 
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Despite the traditional role of the military is to protect national sovereignty, 
it is also a major sector for employment. With the majority of the military derived 
from Malay conscript, the RMAF remained an important institution for the ruling 
party as a political instrument to be recruited in the BN patronage network 
especially in the top position (Searle, 1999). To maintain the military’s morale 
and their loyalty, the ruling government took efforts to enlarge the military’s role 
on external defence. In order to further integrate the military with other domestic 
stakeholders, the government, businesses, and the society, the total defence 
concept approach called ‘HANRUH’ was introduced in 1986 (Keling, Mohamad 
and Abdul Batau, 2016).  
While top military leaders were often handpicked by the ruling elites, they 
also lent their support to the ruling elites’ policies in military acquisitions and 
other security matters. As these military leaders are patronages of the party-state, 
their main policy agenda was to support the ruling party, to further consolidate 
the ruling regime’s grip on power (Mak, 1997). Retired high-ranking military 
officials were often employed into Malaysia’s GLC related to defence owing to 
their connections in the BN regime (Balakrishnan, 2020). Due to their loyalty to 
the party-state, these military leaders hold the power to coerce the low-ranking to 
participate for voting during elections (Weiss, 2000).  
In principle, the military is linked to civilian sectors whereby the military 
power depends on the strength of the economy and vice versa. With these 
principal guidelines, the ruling elites created large state-owned enterprises as part 
of the beneficiaries of offset programs to develop the economy (Gomez, 2017). 
These state-owned enterprises were responsible for the production of defence 
items in an attempt to create linkages to redistribute wealth by providing rents to 
private Bumiputera companies such as licenses, contracts and employment to the 
Malays to produce non-defence products aimed to protect from competition while 
at the same time increase the Malay bourgeoisie (Matthews and Balakrishnan, 
2009). This cemented the political patronages between the ruling party and the 
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Malay capitalist class to gain support and maintain loyalty to the UMNO regime.  
with the government’s effort to increase defence offset in order to increase the 
technological transfer for its commercial initiatives (Balakrishnan, 2008). This 
can be supported with the data extracted SIPRI and World Bank in figure 5.1 and 
5.2.  A strong correlation has shown that the increase in military spending during 
the 1980’s was parallel with the manufacturing sector.  
 
 
Figure 5.1- Malaysia’ Military Spending as a Share of GDP Percentage 
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Figure 5.2 (Source: World Bank Data, 2019) 
 
However, Malaysia suffered some institutional setbacks as the world 
commodity shock hit the country in 1980s. Declining oil revenues which account 
for one third of its national economy would severely weaken the state to divert 
state resources, delaying the defence project during the mid 1980’s 
(Balakrishnan, 2008). Further, the decision to delay military modernisation was 
part of the government’s effort to maintain the defence expenditure on sustaining 
military personnel.  
The economic decline also saw the manifestation of elite fractions which 
affected the government’s capacity to dispense patronages to key elites (Wain, 
2009). In 1987, UMNO was split between two factions competing for UMNO 
presidency during the party poll with Mahathir claiming victory. With the elites 
fractionalised, they resorted to communal politics in the contest for power. Severe 
tensions among the ruling elites in the party erupted and would also fracture the 
coalition over education and language, affecting the state-society relation causing 
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relations as the deep factions throughout the 1980’s affected the power relations 
that weakened Mahathir’s capacity to implement his policy (Mauzy, 2002).  
Fear of the repeat on 1969 riot, in 1987 the ruling elites culminated in the 
launching of ‘Operation Lalang’. The government initiated a political crackdown 
with the full assistance of the police empowered by the ISA which led to the arrest 
of opposition members and the civil society, while some newspapers were 
temporarily banned (Weiss, 2006). These changes evoked elements of 
institutional layering with new institutions added to the existing institutions 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In doing so, his efforts were to marginalise a rival 
faction of the UMNO party with the support in branches at the state level 
bureaucracy that had expanded over the years to administer the NEP program 
(Felker, 2015).  
The net effect of these developments saw Mahathir consolidate the 
executive power through the amendment of the Constitution by removing the 
judiciary powers to the Parliament dominated by his political allies. This 
expanded the infrastructural power of the executive to facilitate the concentration 
of effective power (Slater, 2003). As the political condition continued to settle, 
the political elites would repledge back their loyalty to Mahathir, fearing loss of 
their patronage networks (Crouch, 1992: p.33). Such a political move by 
Mahathir saw the personalisation of power that was highly effective over policy 
decision-making and the cronyism that emerged from the weakened institutional 
apparatus for check and balance (Slater, 2003).  
 
5.2.2 Singapore: The PAP Dominance and The Hegemonic Ideology of 
National Defence 
 
Similar to Malaysia, Singapore’s conception of security has been the 
preserves to the ruling elites. As a single party state, Singapore also enjoyed strict 
civilian control over the military which closely resembles to Malaysia. However, 
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this is where the similarity departs with Malaysia. In contrast to Malaysia, 
Singapore has been extremely effective in mobilising its state capacity to focus 
on its defence (Khong,1995). The cornerstone of the PAP’s institutional power 
has been its dominant ideology constructed by the ruling party and its hegemonic 
position in the domestic politics which has successfully institutionalised its 
security perception of vulnerability. Further, to prevent such vulnerabilities from 
occurring, key security institutions such as SAF and NS were developed as a 
crucial component of Singapore’s security. With its impressive economic growth, 
the state has successfully shielded the society with its form of security in 
defeating communalism and communism. The thrust of institutionalising the 
militarisation of the civilians has been central to maintaining social order and the 
PAP’s legitimacy. 
By the 1980’s, Singapore was one of the fastest growing economies 
emerging as one of the newly industrialised countries in the region. It would also 
see a growing educated middle-income in Singapore. Moreover, the structural 
condition in Southeast Asia has been more stable than in the past, favouring 
Singapore to continue to grow economically while strengthening its relations with 
its neighbours and ASEAN members. During the process of nation-state building, 
the PAP also successfully institutionalised as a party-state, symbolising its 
leaders to be closely tied to national development and state security (Ortmann, 
2009). The PAP dominated the parliamentary seats between 1968 and 1980, 
while oppositions and trade unions were suppressed through the extensive use of 
legal repression and coercion, creating an unlevel playing field.  
However, the ruling elites were also growing anxious of the changes in 
civil society and the possible challenges it would present to its political 
autonomy. The growing educated middle-income purported the political 
implication that the societal changes might demand for more political freedom 
and social pluralism (Khong, 1995). Not to mention, the PAP leadership was 
progressively being replaced by the second-generation technocratic leaders, often 
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lacking in political skills or charisma present in the first generation (Rodan, 
2006). Political developments seemed to indicate the popular shift in demand. In 
1981 the PAP finally lost its monopoly in the Parliament seat to the Worker’s 
Party in the by-election, and PAP popularity fell from 77.75% to 64.8% in 1984, 
with two opposition parties returned to the Parliament (Nohlen, et al., 2001). 
Though the seats lost did not represent threats to the PAP dominance, 
nevertheless, in the words of Goh Chok Tong, “It was a loss of the perception of 
PAP’s invincibility” (Peh, 2018). It did raise concerns amongst the ruling elites 
that the political pressure that was beginning to emerge might propel the future 
policy processes (Khong, 1995).  
This presented a challenge to its fragile social contract as economic growth 
had been achieved at the price of political freedom. With the growing social and 
economic stability and the declining communist threats, the new generation of 
middle-income did not share the experience of the turbulent economic and 
security condition that the city-state had to endure in the 1950s and 1960s (Slater, 
2010a). As the locus of the PAP’s government power has been the promotion of 
their desired national image of survival and vulnerability, such changes would 
weaken the PAP’s power to control the society. Despite the growing resentment 
from the middle-class against the PAP preoccupation on defence with the 
restriction of political participation, the PAP-led regime institutional advantage 
over the opposition remains enormous (Barr and Skrbis, 2008).  
 
5.2.3 Singapore: The Total Defence 
 
In order to pre-empt any of these dynamics into genuine political pressure 
that could challenge its political hegemony, the PAP embarked on a series of 
institutional initiatives meant to steer Singapore’s path to political co-option 
(Rodan, 2006). With a strong administrative institution, in 1984, the PAP 
government introduced the concept of ‘Total Defence’ as part of the national 
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security doctrine. The total defence concept conceived a broader concept of 
security that extended beyond the military and the government to include GLCs, 
businesses, and the society as stakeholders to be a collective responsible to defend 
the nation (Matthews and Yan, 2007). The broader prospect of the total defence 
expands to several non-military instruments, such as psychological defence, 
economic defence, and social defence augmented military deterrence and 
defensive capabilities are part of the national security (Acharya, 2008). As the 
SAF and the NS have been successful in incorporating the state’s ideology, the 
PAP further extended its perceived interest by institutionalising their ideologies 
to other sectors.  
It must be understood that the Total Defence concept is an institutional 
exertion of the PAP to mobilise the society to expand their ordering power, rather 
than simply a security paradigm. As the attitude of the population gradually 
shifted to western values, the elites favoured a conversion of Singapore’s security 
policy for a more expansive defence approach. This was an innovative approach 
for the ruling elites to maintain their state power, and to make sure that the society 
remains compliant with mandatory contribution to the state’s security (Chong, 
2004). By incorporating the middle class into Singapore’s security, the ruling 
elites renewed its social contract to further expand Singapore’s macroeconomic 
goals to deliver high standard of living and a secure environment for the future 
generations. The depoliticisation of the middle class may have led to the 
elimination of choice in the political arena. As security policy decision-making 
is confined within the ruling elites, the Total Defence policy was designed for the 
regime to be more inclusive by consciously embedding their ideology to insulate 
with the society as civic identity and nationalism (Khong, 1995).  
  To further limit from Parliamentary seats losses, the PAP elites resorted to 
legal coercive tools to suppress opposing parties such as defamation and lawsuits. 
This creates an unlevel playing field as the power relations reside in the hands of 
the strong ruling elites to formulate security policy under the national ideology 
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of defending Singapore’s vulnerabilities (Ang, 2016). With the increase in 
civilian participation in defence, Singapore also expanded its defence by 
modernising the SAF to accommodate the Total Defence Concept. To 
accommodate the expansion of the security concept, the SAF began to modernise 
its military by upgrading and increasing its military capabilities, that was termed 
by Lee Hsien Loong as ‘porcupine’ (1984). This can be shown in figure 5.3 that 
Singapore’s military defence spending saw an increase after 1980 and continued 
to upgrade its military to date. The reason for this is the need for legitimacy to 
protect its vulnerability against any foreign intervention to ensure its economic 
growth by upgrading its military to be one of the most technologically advanced 
in the region.  
 
Figure 5.3 (Source: SIPRI, 2019) 
 
On the economic side, the PAP government restructured its economy by 
upgrading its manufacturing industry to expand beyond oil refinery into high-
technology manufacturing industry and increase FDI (Rigg, 1988). Singapore 
also used this as an opportunity to expand its indigenous defence industry, 
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business with its web of defence. Similar to Malaysia, the defence industry was 
used to support the SAF with capable technology base especially in the provision 
of training, maintenance and repairs as well as achieving the goals of self-
sufficiency in supply (Bitzinger 2017, p. 117-120). 
 
5.2.4 Singapore’s Security Policy: Source of Network for Elite Cohesion 
 
The PAP managed to retain tight control of the security policy through the 
Total Defence Concept. However, despite its impressive economic growth and 
its ability to provide security, the disparity between ethnics on socio-economic 
condition continued to be marginalised relative to the Chinese dominant 
communities (Rahim, 1998). This has generated new political challenges for the 
PAP’s dominance seeking to advance their interest in the domestic politics, as 
established institutions and ideology of political representation in Singapore is 
increasingly under political scrutiny by the opposing parties (Rodan, 2019). Even 
though it maintains that Singapore is the biggest defence spender in the region, 
its defence spending saw a steady slow decline in recent years. Between 2006 and 
2011, the PAP suffered a combined loss of 15 percent of its support concerning 
rising inequalities and high cost of living, declining social mobility, immigration 
and lack of public infrastructure (Tan and Lee, 2011).  
          Similar to Malaysia, access to state power in Singapore has been 
monopolised by party institutions rather than the military. Moreover, similar to 
Malaysia, Singapore’s Prime Minister always led by the PAP’s Secretary General 
and his cabinet always comprised leading figures from the SAF. For Singapore, 
the historical patterns of contentious politics have helped shape elite cohesion and 
a strong robust institution. They also lent support to build a stronger party-state 
institution, consolidating power to the PAP regime (Slater, 2010a). Specifically, 
we saw in Chapter 4 that the unmanageable threats from the Chinese speaking 
Singaporeans inspired the local-English speaking Chinese elites the construction 
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of a strong state before its merger with Malaysia. This initial nation-state building 
process was compounded and accelerated in the 1970’s to 1980’s that saw the 
regime expand its security sector.  
Through powerful coercive apparatuses as well as the capacity to extract 
state resources, the PAP formed a strong security institution by combining the 
administration of the civilians into the military through institutions such as the 
NS and the SAF to maintain resource for power control, increasing the PAP’s 
government capacity and legitimacy (Barr and Skrbis, 2008). The obligatory of 
the NS for male conscript provides a symbiotic relationship between the society 
and the appreciation of the defence establishment to gain appreciation of the 
security needs that it serves to defend. These institutional arrangements structure 
the permissible scope of participation and representation in deliberations and 
decisions over which the ruling elites makes the  policy decision-making (Rodan, 
2019). 
Concurrently, the SAF and NS are critical institutions to maintain social 
order as these institutions became the political ground for elites coalition (Walsh, 
2007). Although these institutions were initially created to provide social 
cohesion and nation-building purposes in the multicultural society, the 
institutional functions of the SAF and NS evolved over time. With popular 
politics being eliminated, Singapore is governed by the uncontested elites which 
span their interest beyond public and private (Hamilton-Hart, 2000). To further 
strengthen the PAP’s regime support, the PAP government needed to produce 
elites that can perpetuate itself on institutional means in preserving the regime’s 
interest, strengthening its elite collective actions. To recruit some of the brightest 
elites in the city-state, the PAP ruling elites created new interpretations of the 
security sector to advance their power and interest. The SAF became a recruiting 
ground for the regime through the provision of prestigious education scholarship 
to lure these elites as a prospective career path (Walsh, 2007).  
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According to Barr, the education system was designed to privileged the 
middle Chinese class and the upper class (Barr, 2014). By assimilating these 
social classes, it provided an unlevel playing field for the PAP to control defection 
that occurred in other case studies to maintain the policy agenda. These SAF 
scholars who became officers were often groomed to prominence in the military. 
Vasu and Loo (2016) elucidates that with their education credentials and their 
leadership skills, these military elites are then absorbed into the regime by 
recruiting them into the civilian sector to further their career path into politics, 
business or civil service after their military service. Over time, this institutional 
arrangement became a normalised path for the society to access to state power. 
The public-sector provides lucrative salaries that are competitive with the private 
sector. To give a perspective, the Prime Minister along with his Cabinet are 
currently some of the highest paid leaders in the world, comparable to CEO 
earnings. 
But beyond the meritocracy of academic performance and ability,  the 
security institution is also the epicentre for access to networks of power of small 
but influential elites for patronages to the party-state (Barr and Skrbis, 2008). 
According to Barr (2014) the defence is regarded as particularly important for the 
ruling elites to build their own base of political network that are highly personal 
designed to strengthen their position in the state institution. The SAF became 
fertile ground for political socialisation to forge informal links with young elites 
in supporting the PAP’s regime. This mechanism was institutionalised by Lee 
Kuan Yew as an informal practise that was preserved by successive leaders such 
as Goh Chock Tong and Lee Hsien Loong to reinforce the party’s ideology over 
the social forces to protect the PAP’s political power and interest. These 
institutional arrangements not only eliminates contest between party members for 
leadership in the PAP, but also provide reinforcement for the ruling elites to 
indoctrinate these newer generation of elites to the PAP’s hegemonic ideology 
(Abdullah, 2018). Walsh (2007) argued that the Singapore model resembles the 
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Western concept of aristocratic family supplying sons in both politics and the 
military.  This allows for the PAP regime to create a massive security network 
and institutional structure that centres around the party-state to maintain the 
national security framework to mitigate their preferred policy agenda.  
By the early 1990’s, new generations of leaders in the PAP replaced some 
of the older generations by intermeshing of educated elites from the bureaucracy, 
military and the GLC in the Cabinet. Most cabinet members derived from the 
prestigious scholars awarded by the military as part of the prospect to further their 
career in the civilian (Da Cunha, 1999). Currently, Cabinet Minister comprise of 
five members who had a military background, including the Prime Minister, Lee 
Hsien Loong. Aside from the Ministers, the Permanent Secretary and GLC’s 
often draw their leadership from the military. Though this does not represent a 
military takeover as presented in Indonesia and the Philippines, Singapore’s 
military is an integral form of administrative structure to operate within the 
framework of the dominant party perceptions (Tan, 2012). 
With a strong institutional design, Singapore’s security has been largely 
intact against assault by pressure from other opposing parties. Even with the 
growing competitiveness in Singapore’s politics, the PAP’s main opposition 
party The Workers’ Party (2011) conceded in their manifesto that Singapore 
needs a powerful and credible military to provide credible deterrence from 
external threats and to maintain sovereignty. This conformity of the PAP’s 
perception strengthened the legitimacy of their security policy that other parties 
could vindicate with their superior performance (Ortmann, 2015).  
 
5.3 Indonesia and the Philippines: Regime Breakdown and Institutional 
Changes 
 
In the last section, we saw the resilience of state institutions guided by its 
historical roots shaped state actors’ perceptions in security policies. We also saw 
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that not all security perceptions were created equal, for political institutions gave 
rise to different social forces and channel its security preferences. The changes in 
the relationship between state and society would also influence the institutional 
capacity that affected its security policies. With newer conflicts and development 
especially in the post-Cold War, it changed the context of security perception. 
Though contest for state power remains in the civilian, it also meant that the 
historical legacies gave rise to strong party-state institutions to control the state 
apparatus to expand its security policy to protect the population as opposed to the 
military as an institution.  
In contrast to Malaysia and Singapore, in both Indonesia and the 
Philippines, the control over state power and the implication for security policy 
are different. In both states, the balance of state power rest with the military as 
opposed to the civilian elites (Aspinall, 1995; Chambers, 2012). Though with the 
support of civilians initially, the military consolidated its power by creating a 
small network of military and bureaucratic elites that bind the regime stability. 
For Indonesia, the organisational and security logic surrounding the ruling elites 
reflect around its geographical structure and historical context. An important 
consequence of its specific history was the emergence of military domination in 
the late 1960’s saw that the ruling elites were preoccupied with internal security 
in the context of nation building and economic development. To a certain extent, 
the Philippines also show similar traits whereby the weakness of the political 
institution allowed the military to control policy decision-making.  
This section aims to analyse Indonesia and the Philippines by addressing 
the changes in relationship between the state-society and their political outcomes 
when a society is undergoing major socioeconomic changes. It briefly discusses 
how elite contestation evolved and how its security context unfolds on the basis 
of internal security prior to the end of the Cold War. The contestation for power 
between the elites would also lead to political violence that would cause further 
insecurity in Indonesia and the Philippines.  
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5.3.1 Indonesia: Contest for State Power and Internal Security 
 
In many respects, Indonesia’s concept of security is not particularly new. 
As noted in the previous chapter, since the birth of the New Order regime, the 
concept of national security was focused on internal threats. To maintain political 
order in the vastly diverse society, the New Order government introduced a single 
national interest embodied in the corporatist and populist ideals bounded by the 
national ideology of Pancasila (Elson, 2001). The national ideology would 
become a successful tool for the New Order government to effectively quash 
power struggles emphasising on nationalism while suppressing other alternative 
ideologies. With the military capturing the state power as opposed to the civilians, 
it created a path dependence for an authoritarian rule with the military to exercise 
full control of security apparatus and defence policies to maintain social cohesion 
under the guidance of the national ideology. The New Order also expanded the 
military’s role to maintain political stability as a pre-requisite to Indonesia’s 
economic development, that legitimises the military’s role in the position of 
power to be an active player in nation-state building.  
In the 1980’s, the appeal towards the New Order and the legitimacy of 
ABRI saw a gradual decline as competition for political power intensified 
between elites. As the Communist threats began to recede, the military’s 
legitimacy in power began to brittle as Suharto’s government derived solely 
based on the coalitional pact of these endemic threats (Anderson, 1978). 
Suharto’s campaign against the PKI played a central role to his regime legitimacy 
as he commanded wide support from the society as well as the military. However, 
institutional fragmentation began to emerge between state and society. The rise 
of new social forces, Muslim and other nationalist organisations were enraged 
over Suharto’s monopolisation of power which led to violent eruptions and 
student protests in the Malari Incident in 1974 (Vu, 2010).  
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Although the New Order began to erode with the regime losing its popular 
appeal in the population, Suharto managed to position itself at the apex of the 
regime with the support in the middle-class as well as the selected business elites 
between 1970’s and 1980’s (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Shaken by the crisis, 
Suharto began to use coercive forces to repress the social mobilisation. In turn, 
Indonesia during this period became a personalised regime which closely 
resembled Marcos in the Philippines. Yet, despite its similarity, urban movements 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s in the Philippines led to the downfall of Marcos where 
the powerful elites threw their weights to challenge the regime (Thompson, 
1995). Indonesia, on the other hand posed a different picture. The effectiveness 
of patronage distribution and firm control of repressive apparatus by the regime 
successfully quelled urban movements before these riots fully materialise. 
Suharto instead turned to a personalised regime by replacing the military to close 
knit elites as part of the extension of power, which provided the capacity for the 
President to prepare and control legislation (Winters, 2011). Suharto was also 
able to maintain elite cohesion, by creating a complex political system that was 
reliant on elite loyalists. Through the distribution of rent generated from the 
booming oil revenue as well as timber and mining through easy lines of credit, 
business contracts in petroleum industry as well as timber concession to cronies 
close to the regime with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of the 
President (Aspinall, 2014).  
Thus, to increase economic activities, efforts in extracting natural 
resources especially in the periphery territories began to intensify while resources 
were devoted to providing security to protect these facilities (Human Rights 
Watch, 2006). The involvement of the military is especially prevalent in the more 
isolated and lucrative areas such as Aceh, Papua and East Timor by classifying it 
as military operating provinces DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer) were closely 
guarded by the military as part of its role to maintain political unity and for its 
own enrichment (Kingsbury, 2003). The military’s role in the territorial structure 
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became the key institutional linkage through which wealth is distributed within 
the institution. Yet, the major potential for conflict outburst was located at the 
periphery territory of the nation-state. As the periphery territories were forced to 
subversion during the New Order, it did not share the same narratives of struggles 
in Central Java. It failed to resonate with the perception of nation building that 
felt that Indonesian presence was a form of foreign invasion (Ross, 2005). Local 
elites constructed the perception of grievances towards the central government 
that the local communities were excluded from the development projects 
(Aspinall, 2007). However, as these territories were essential to Indonesia’s 
development, the application of excessive security force were often applied to 
contain further secessionist movements, but at the cost of exacerbating political 
grievances and political alienation with the government’s policies (Aspinall and 
Berger, 2010).  
 
5.3.2 The Downfall of New Order and the Reorganisation of State Power 
 
By the end of the Cold War, Indonesia’s New Order under Suharto saw a 
dramatic rise to the state’s infrastructural power, unprecedented in previous 
regime. It led to the consolidation of power within all the institutions, creating a 
strong personalised regime.  The diversion from the initial institutional condition 
from the New Order also led to the increasing political marginalisation of the 
elites in the 1980’s and 1990’s. More pertinently, even though there was a 
positive trajectory on its economic growth and towards greater industrialisation 
under the New Order government, Suharto’s ruling was increasingly 
compromised. This was reflected by the growing political dissatisfaction between 
the state and society which would become an impending source of the regime’s 
insecurity. The legitimacy of New Order was facing multitude of challenges as it 
created opportunities for elites movement of keterbukaan (openness), 
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democratisation, human rights abuse and pressure from the civil society (Honna, 
2005).  
However, it was the severe intra-conflict within the military that became a 
source of political instability. With the military increasingly compromised by 
Suharto’s attempt to reconstruct the President-ABRI relationship, a dispute soon 
emerged. Suharto’s excessive patron-client networks to promote military 
personnel close to the Palace promoted a vigorous discontent within the 
professional military (Mietzner, 2008). In many ways, the practice of patronage 
politics was a consequence of historical legacy that helped shaped the regime.  
Even before the series of events that contributed to the regime’s downfall, the 
politicking and the creation of political centres of influence was often present but 
with met with force with the support of the military. However, the changes in 
power relations especially between the executive and the security force create 
opportunities for opposition forces to challenge the regime. It was the 
appointment of Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law to lead the Kopassus that led to 
schism in the military. The rise of new leaders such as General Wiranto, were 
disenchanted over Suharto’s decision to interfere with the military appointments 
through patronage rather than which created factions in the military.  
Moreover, the increasing personalised economic policy limited the 
opportunity for the military’s access in economic activities became a source of 
social tension. Disgruntled military elites formed an influential group called the 
Petition 50 that challenged the President during the keterbukaan movement. 
Social issues such as endemic corruption and the monopoly of Chinese businesses 
conglomerates that have close personal links to the President were targeted by the 
military faction, using the Parliament to undermine the legitimacy of the regime 
calling for political reform (Honna, 2005). The existence of intra-regime friction 
encouraged the mobilisation of the social forces seemingly guided by the military 
(Vatikiotis, 1998). Suharto sought to counter the military cleavage by increasing 
the defence budget to maintain steady stream of patronages to establish a loyal 
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military. Between 1993 to 1997 the defence expenditure increased as shown in 
figure 5.4.  
 
 
Figure 5.4    Source: World Bank 2019 
 
Analysts seemed to suggest that riots and violence were instigated by the 
elites to discredit both the regime and the rival military factions (Sidel, 1998; 
Aspinall, 2005). As mentioned in the last section, these riots often were met with 
excessive use of force to maintain political order. This would however lead to 
further insecurity in Indonesia as the use of force was often excessive, creating 
social grievances targeted towards the regime. The intrusions of modern 
economic policies in the guise of economic development especially in the 
periphery created social grievances over the state. Growing resentments gradually 
began to strengthen from the civil society towards forced land acquisitions to 
pave way for private businesses and government projects (Human Rights Watch, 
2006). The presence of industries and new bourgeoisie capitalist mostly from 
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were often expressed by the civil society of its economic insecurity and felt that 
it was an invasion of their land rights (Bertrand, 2004). 
However, the growing political uncertainty and trajectory of internal 
instability would lead to the regime breakdown. One of the main catalysts for the 
weakening regime’s legitimacy was the 97/98 financial crisis. Ethnic tension 
would also become prevalent as the economic disparity gap in Indonesia 
worsened due to Suharto’s economic policies creating deep resentment over the 
regime (Bertrand, 2004). Chinese conglomerates who benefitted from Suharto’s 
economic policies and cronies were subject of ethnic targets have turned to ABRI 
to seek physical protection from the riot, abandoning the regime (Pepinsky, 2009, 
p. 184). More importantly, it was the loss of protection pact from the elites to 
maintain the regime stability that led to the breakdown. As Robison and Hadiz 
(2004, p. 166) explained, Suharto became a liability to the social order that he 
helped build, consolidate, and protect.  
Whereas the elites in Malaysia still maintained a strong coalitional support 
from other ethnic elites to withstand endemic pressure in the 97/98 financial 
crisis, Suharto’s regime was abandoned by the oligarchs that he chose to side-line 
from state power. As a by-product of creating deep division in ABRI, the 
reformist military elites led by General Wiranto were willing to desert Suharto, 
weakening his position to coordinate an effective coercive apparatus to maintain 
internal stability (US State Department, 1998). The Trisakti event had huge 
political consequences. There were many factions of security forces that were 
present with different security interest to quell on the Trisakti protest, which 
resulted in open fire, killing four students (Department of Intelligence Agency 
U.S, 1998). Peaceful protests turned into violent riots in the city and across the 
archipelago to pressure Suharto for his resignation and to initiate political and 
economic reformation (Pepinsky, 2009). Such dynamic situations not only caused 
the elites to distance themselves from the New Order regime, but also 
increasingly provided the opportunity for disgruntled elites that were left out from 
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the regime to support democratic transition. However, it was General Wiranto 
who was appointed as ABRI leader that was crucial in managing and facilitating 
the resignation of Suharto that would best serve his interest (Honna, 2005). The 
New Order government fell after 32 years when Suharto finally resigned as 
President in 1998 ruling and transferred power to his Vice President B.J. Habibie 
(1998-1999).  
 
5.3.3 Indonesia:  Institutional Displacement and the Reorganisation of the 
Military Institution under the New Paradigm 
 
Similar to the Philippines in 1986, the sequence of Asian financial crisis 
and mass uprising laid foundation for institutional changes in Indonesia. The 
fragile social structure which overlapped with deep social cleavages and elite 
polarisation led to an institutional displacement saw Indonesia’s path to 
democratisation and the decentralisation of power from the President. Since the 
demise of Suharto, it created a power vacuum both in the centre and the periphery. 
As a young post-authoritarian state, Indonesian politics were ripe for internal 
conflict. With fall of the New Order, it gave empowerments to the legislature, 
reflecting the societal demands for broad-based politics. A host of new parties 
competed for presidency rather than the return to prominence of Golkar (Tomsa, 
2008). According to Robison and Hadiz (2004) the regime breakdown provided 
the opportunity for the oligarchs to reorganise their economic and political 
position in the face of new political order. In many respects, the post-Suharto 
order was reminiscent of the 1950’s clientelist democracy especially in the 
tendency to develop a coalition of political system. Whereas patronage politics 
during the New Order regime was centralised by the executive, in the post-
Suharto patronage system were institutionally shifted to the legislature which 
shares similarity to the Philippines (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011).  
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Between 1998 and 2019, Indonesia went through five presidential changes 
from B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Jokowi (2014-present) 
through parliamentary and electoral means without any necessary military coup 
or political repression present in the Philippines during its transition. However, 
the political economy of Indonesia is weighted against the full democratic 
transition that they are often in alliance with the military. Due to limited state 
resources, it forces the military to develop close ties between the political and 
economic elites to resist for equitable political reform. 
However, the new arrangements of political order would also affect the 
military’s access to state power. Public expressions over the regime and the 
military’s roles of dwifungsi were raised for scrutiny for its coercion and 
repressive measures on internal security, beset by a spate of corruption at the local 
level (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Military businesses raised special concerns 
because of its potential for conflict and abuse of power as human rights were 
often violated for its own economic interest which increased social tension. This 
was especially prevalent in the periphery as the military in these areas are 
autonomous and independent to conduct military repression (Mietzner, 2006). 
Under immense pressure from the civil society for its roles during the New 
Order on human rights abuse and the changes in domestic dynamics, many 
expected that ABRI would undergo for a transition to civilian control. Whereas 
the military initially strongly resisted for institutional reform in the Philippines, 
the TNI (subsequently changed from ABRI) succeeded in initiating institutional 
changes. In response, the military adapted itself by initiating its commitments for 
reform to reform-minded generals at the institutional level and the policy level. 
This was only possible after Wiranto purged officers who were loyal to Suharto, 
Prabowo and his factions known as de-Prabowo-isation. With the military faction 
close to the previous regime weakened, the institution achieved greater unity as 
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the military realised that the patronage for career promotion depended on their 
loyalty to Wiranto (Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, 2012).  
It was from within this novel that the military abandoned its dwifungsi role 
and adopted the ‘New Paradigm’ which stated its support for democratic 
transition (Crouch, 1999). Led by Wiranto, the adoption of this concept would 
subsequently allow the military as a guiding principle to forfeit its formal position 
in Indonesia’s politics. The military relinquished its role of dwifungsi, and its 
guaranteed seats in the Parliament. Many officers within Wiranto’s faction 
believed that the military had to make institutional adjustments in order to 
maintain its political presence in the new democratic regime (Wiranto, 2000, 
cited in Mietzner, 2006, p. 26).  
Perhaps the most significant institutional change is the degree of civilian 
control of decision-making in national security agenda.  Between 2000 and 2001, 
the military had defied President Wahid’s orders from excessive repression 
against secessionist movements, which caused inconsistencies against the 
government’s policies to launch crackdowns on the rebels and their sympathizers 
(Mietzner, 2006). On the other hand, there have been speculations that the 
military had orchestrated protests against  the government’s policy with Aceh for 
Peace accord in 2003 by actively challenging and launching a full-scale military 
operation (Editors, 2005). Similar accounts were also recorded in other parts of 
the territory where the military launched its own independent operations to 
defend its own economic interest which resulted in further social tension (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006).  
Since President Yudhoyono, the executive has managed to establish some 
degree of institutional authority over the national security agenda. Yudhoyono 
appointed Juwono Sudarsono as a second stint as the Minister of Defence, to 
strengthen the civilian oversight of the military by relinquishing its traditional 
roles of internal security during the New Order government, with the police 
separated from the military to assume the role as law enforcement under the 
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civilian control. It allowed the civilian institution to define boundaries of the 
military’s institutional autonomy to monitor and sanction military’s operations. 
With this arrangement, the civilian political elites with the new roles would 
disengage the military from Indonesian politics and the increase its 
professionalism with regards to external defence matters (Honna, 2005). 
Meanwhile, peace agreement was achieved after the natural disaster hit the region 
in 2004 between central Jakarta and Aceh, giving special autonomy to the local 
government.  
Given the constant pressure from the civil society, the TNI incrementally 
stepped up to further initiate further its security reform. Some of the military 
businesses were forced to liquidate or transfer to the state which institutionally 
weakened the military (Aspinall and Klinken, 2011). This was enforced by the 
Armed Forces Bill in 2004 under paragraph 76, under President Yudhoyono 
which legally bound the government to take over all the military business by 
2009. As a result, the TNI involvement in business enterprises were greatly 
reduced (Human Rights Watch, 2010).  
However, in practice the ability of the government for further institutional 
reform will hinge upon its ability to make-up the gap in funding as it has 
historically relied on these enterprises to generate the upkeep of the military. 
Despite this, it is worth acknowledging that the civilian authority has asserted 
some form of autonomy towards the TNI which managed to reinstitute some form 
of professionalism within the establishment. Through frequent pressure from the 
civil society and the strong leadership, the TNI were able to absorb the relevant 
policy ideas to strengthen their image as a protector of the country.  
 
 
5.3.4 Philippines: The People’s Revolt and The Return of Oligarch 
 
Prior to the fall of Marcos regime in 1986, the Philippines was mired with 
internal instability. The political regime was increasingly centralised, with the 
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military’s political involvement extended its institutional as junior partner in his 
ruling coalition. This would also expand the military’s roles beyond security 
policy. Communist threats from the CPP-NPA and the secessionist movement of 
the Bangsamoro caused by religious fragmentation in Mindanao persist, 
undermining the regime’s legitimacy. Marcos’s intolerance to political 
opposition over political protest by the civil society created severe political 
grievances as excessive use of force often practised by the security sector led to 
human rights abuse (Timberman, 1991) Perhaps, what is more endearing is that 
high levels of inequality and poverty continued to persist across the archipelago 
during the authoritarian rule despite his promises for economic development 
during the martial law.  
However, what added grist to the intense political tension was the 
competition for state power between the elite groups which became a crisis of 
regime legitimacy. Marcos increasingly personalised regime shared similarities 
with Suharto plundered the state resources and economic policies for the benefit 
of his cronies and new technocratic elites, while the old elites were excluded from 
the political machine (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). In contrast to Indonesia 
whereby Suharto held a significant power advantage over the opposing forces at 
the onset of the New Order, the oligarchs power base was more independent in 
the Philippines owing to the historical legacy of the state structure before the 
martial law. According to Winters (2011), “their challenges to Marcos were open 
and frontal, and the instruments of attack they employed included engaging their 
private material power resources to fund resistance, using their armed 
paramilitaries in the provinces to render Marcos’ control of certain regions highly 
contingent, organising and backing political parties to contest elections.”  
Hence, when the government spiralled into crisis, Marcos had to 
completely rely on the military to preserve the regime (Slater, 2010a). The state 
structure would also create factions in the military as the promotion of loyal but 
inept military that excluded many junior ranks from the political leadership. In 
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1986, the formation of a de-facto group called the Reform the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines Movement (RAM) led by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile 
and the Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos attempted a coup. However, the 
coup failed but catalysed the People Power Revolt led by Corazon Aquino with 
the support of the opposing elites and the US that brought down the regime and 
transition to democracy (Thompson, 1995).   
The fall of Marcos saw the restoration of democracy in 1986, with the 
Aquino administration replacing the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 
Constitution. This would provide safeguards for effective democratic control, 
including the establishment of Ombudsman and Commission of Human Rights, 
the separation of the military and the police, and the re-establishment of the 
Congressional oversight for check and balance, and the banning of private armed 
groups. To a certain extent, the institutionalisation of the Constitution formally 
reasserted the prerogatives of civilian authority over the military with the 
legislative as the political oversight of the military’s budget as well as 
confirmation of military promotions and appointments (Hernandez and Kraft, 
2010, p. 131).  
Despite the restoration of democracy, the People’s revolt has not been 
matched to significant changes on elite hegemony in the Philippines politics. In 
reality, the return of electoral democracy saw the return of clientele politics that 
was inherited from the previous structural-historical legacy experienced during 
Marcos. Further, the Philippines saw a remarkable continuity especially on the 
level of political contestation between the social forces in the archipelagic state 
(Regilme Jr, 2016). On closer examination, rather than a programmatic party 
system, the Philippines saw the return of clan politics which institutionalised the 
use of mobilised electoral support and implement central government policy, 
further fragmenting the already weak state (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; 
Kuhonta, 2011).  
 
 211 
The reorganisation of the state structure saw the attenuation of state power 
to the local and municipal levels that were dominated by the political clans in the 
pre-martial law. The 1987-88 Congress saw the empowerment of the political 
business elites to the state apparatus that were ousted from power in the 
authoritarian era, as well as former pro-Marcos elites who had managed to 
repackage themselves as advocates of democracy. The military meanwhile also 
asserted its claims for control over state power (Gutierrez, et al., 1992; Tusalem 
and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). Drawing from Hutchcroft (1998), Sidel (1999) and 
Franco (2001), they concluded that the post-authoritarian system in the 
Philippines instead saw the return of patron-clientele system with the political 
bosses to dominate the state, which entrenched political corruption and violence, 
to protect their wealth under the guise of national interest. It was ripe for open 
contestation from the social forces, pressure from the civil society, military coups, 
internal insurgencies and socio-economic problems (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 
2003). 
More pertinent, the Marcos regime left a legacy by institutionalising the 
politicisation of the military to challenge the regime legitimacy. The civilian 
institutions, it is to be remembered were significantly demolished, and the 
military were highly politicised and factionalised meant that the it became an 
institutionalised part the policy decision-making (Chambers, 2012). It is thus 
unsurprising that even when the AFP abandoned its formal powers to the civilian, 
some of the factions in the AFP sought to maintain its position as the return of 
clientelist politics would effectively reduce its formal influences in the domestic 
politics and access to state resources. Whereas Indonesia saw the success of 
internal military putsch to reposition itself to accommodate changes in the 
political order, in the Philippines, the factions that supported Marcos were 
resistant to rescind their power and roles in nation-building to the civilian 
authorities (Hernandez, 2006). Even so, a faction of the military from the RAM 
that took down Marcos initiated coup attempts during Cory Aquino’s regime and 
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was again involved in the Oakwood Mutiny in 2003 and 2006 were effectively 
absorbed into the political system (Lee, 2008).  
According to the fact-finding commission, the military discontent was 
motivated by the weakness of the state and the capacity in addressing socio-
economic problems, insurgencies, the endemic corruption and graft, and the low 
wages to support maintain the upkeep of the bloating army (Davide Commission, 
1990). Based on the analysis by Croissant et. al (2013), in order to uphold the 
civilian authority over the military, control over policy decision-making powers 
must retain with the civilians. Instead, to appease the military Aquino prompted 
further concession by including some of the top echelons in the administration 
while the military reform came to a halt. Simultaneously, Aquino practiced 
acquiescence in deploying the military to support their preferred policy of 
repression against insurgents in the affected areas (Quilop, 2005). 
This would also set a path dependence to ensure the survival of successive 
regimes, as military elites to be included in the administration to represent their 
interest (Hutchcroft, 2008). The fragile political legitimacy, weak civilian 
oversight institution and poor socio-economic condition provided the foundation 
for the military to increase its involvement in security policy (Arugay, 2012). 
This would also become the base for continuity in political struggles and security 
threats in the Philippines as the absence of political will to initiate further 
institutional reform to stem from corrupt practices beset Philippines’ socio-




This chapter highlights the transformation of Southeast Asia influence of 
outcomes have largely been established by its specific political institutional 
arrangements to respond to specific threats to the states. This chapter found that 
the levels of elite coalitions in the region varied markedly, contributing to the 
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levels of state capacity in nation-state building process. Differences in the way 
political leaders are organised and come to power lend themselves to create 
various sources of societal tensions among the different domestic actors 
competing for power for a particular agenda. To make sense of this discordance, 
this chapter found that it is useful to revisit the notion of distribution of power in 
Southeast Asia is profoundly shaped by its colonial legacies that are distinct and 
complementary.  
On the whole, Southeast Asia in the post-colonial era poses two different 
spectrums of power asymmetry and institutions. Ultimately, this chapter aimed 
to specify that the variation of types of regimes have different impact on the 
power relations that dictates the state’s security policy. This chapter also 
illuminates the importance of new critical junctures and learning mechanisms for 
states to change even when its security perception is heavily burdened by the 
logic of path dependence.  
Thus, the period of the 1980’s and 1990’s also saw the evolution of 
political regimes moving towards democratisation, which threatened the regimes 
in Southeast Asia. The increasing political contestation and the permissive 
conditions would create an opening for an institutional change. Whereas in 
Indonesia and the Philippines saw a democratic transition after an institutional 
failure that protects certain political and economic elites, Malaysia and Singapore 
increase their grip on state power where the political actors were able to organise 
state function to maintain security. What emerges in this chapter is that the 
political institutions that were entrenched by the colonies can either constrain or 
enhance political actors within the given context to provide security and welfare, 
which is the core of security threats. Within the specific system of states, the 
constellation of social power given to the actors by the institutional arrangements 
operate as practical constraints to the security policy.  
Conversely, strong states were able to grab hold of the state’s capacity to 
provide order and economic development. To a certain extent in Malaysia, but 
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more so in Singapore, that political institutions managed to maintain elite 
cohesion to provide security towards the regime. For Malaysia and Singapore, 
the ability of state actors to control over the coercive forces effectively allowed 
them to extract state resources and to formulate security policy to promote its 
economic as well as ideological for regime legitimacy. Singapore’s durability in 
commanding both the capacity of the state and the robustness of its elite cohesion 
has been the key to the PAP’s resilience in maintaining its highly expansive 
security policy. 
On the other hand, in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, although 
during the authoritarian regimes, they managed to capture some form of political 
integration, however, the institutional design was weak in comparison to the 
former cases where the elite cohesion in these states were fragile. Crucially, both 
of these states simply do not have the sufficient capacity to deal with the scale of 
security threats they face. The institutional arrangements in these states operate 
as a constraint on policy because social forces have the capacity to restrain the 
implementation of policy for their own interest. The lack of political legitimacy 
present in both states was reflected in the excessive use of force. Unlike in 
Malaysia and Singapore, the power relations presented an unlevel playing field 
in both Indonesia and the Philippines as other political institutions such as the 
military play a dominant role in politics.  
Although all state institutions provide patronages, however, the unequal 
distribution of wealth owing to the nature of its political institution create radical 
fractions between classes. These states failed to provide societal security that are 
present in Malaysia and Singapore. Starting from the Philippines and 
subsequently in Indonesia, both states saw the fall of regimes which opened up 
political contestation. The structural factors of internal threat environment have 
offered different state actors to retain control over the state apparatus. In both 
states, the military plays a larger role in dictating its security policy which 
resulted in weak civilian control. The strong military institutions acted as a 
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constraint to political order and an object of political conflict that exist in these 
two states. The potential use of excessive coercive force for state repression as a 
































The effects of globalisation after the end of the Cold War finds the region 
confronting newer emerging security issues. But even as the region deals with 
new challenges, existing security problems persist and becoming more complex. 
While the Cold War was central to the developmental success for states in 
Southeast Asia, the intensification of globalisation imposes intense political 
crises engulfing the countries with the challenges of nation-state building and 
sustaining economic development. For Southeast Asia, the potential source of 
security threats appears to be dominated in the long-running violent conflicts 
between social forces that are domestic in nature competing for state power and 
economic resources. As highlighted thus far, Chapter 5 shows that the temporality 
and downstream effects of the state’s diverging historical experiences influenced 
how states securitise certain issues as threats. It would also display how security 
practice in Southeast Asia is a product interest of specific social groups that are 
embedded as necessary to gain legitimacy.  
The contention in what follows in this chapter explores how the state’s 
security agenda is historically contingent. It aims to show why the 
conceptualisation of security policies in Southeast Asian states are constructed in 
different contexts, and how specific security policies coincide with the state 
power as a means to an end for dominant social forces to advance their particular 
perceptions of values and scope to claim legitimacy. It shows that security 
practices in Southeast Asian states are a product of historical structure and 
process that are shaped by the particular constellation of dominant social forces. 
With the help of the historical institutionalist explanatory factors, this chapter 
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shows why certain issues have been securitised using the logic of path 
dependence. What emerges in practice reflects how the political contestations 
between the social forces explored in the previous chapters continue to find its 
logic in the contemporary security policy in the name of national interest.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section gives 
consideration to how Southeast Asia identifies some of the contemporary security 
challenges in the region. It follows by discussing how the problems arises in the 
process of securitising these issues at both the domestic and regional levels. It 
looks into how external security helped frame some of the challenges that 
ASEAN member states face today. It also analyses how the perennial conundrum 
of internal instabilities facing the state forces its security policy behaviours to be 
constrained by a prevailing strategic concern, which focuses on maintaining 
regime legitimacy.  
The second section proceeds by examining the logic of continuity and 
change in state’s security culture. It aims to show that the particular constellations 
of power between social forces to define what constitute as a security problem. 
By using a comparative approach, this chapter critically analyse the differences 
in dominant forces shaped how states implement their security policy outcomes.  
As the most pressing security threats is internal in origins, Southeast Asia 
continues to securitise issues that have been framed over extended periods of time 
by certain dominant actors in the name of national interest. This section claims 
that security perception and governance is contextualised by its history.  
  
6.2 ASEAN and Regional Challenges  
 
A critical feature of Southeast Asia has been the existence of domestic 
coalition to construct ASEAN as a regional institution that showed remarkable 
durability. By the end of the Cold War, dominant elites would also effectively 
seize the opportunity to consolidate their own political position in the domestic 
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while weakening other social groups. For the original five ASEAN members, the 
achievement for avoiding conflict was predicated towards the success of 
maintaining sovereignty and the commitment to economic cooperation that was 
an essential precondition to achieve domestic stability and political legitimacy.  
Until the late 1990’s, ASEAN had successfully maintained peaceful 
relations, solidifying its intra-regional relations that are immensely diverse. Intra-
conflict between ASEAN would also be substantially reduced as a result of Paris 
Peace Agreement on the resolution of Cambodia conflict (Acharya, 2014). With 
the positive feedback from its role as a regional stabiliser, ASEAN was confident 
of its role and expanded its membership to include the Indo-China states to 
increase regional cooperation. The range of cooperation expanded significantly 
between members and extra-regional powers with engagements deeper with 
economic and political commitments to address newer security challenges.  
Conversely, with a strong commitment to a shared perception of creating a 
unitary state mentality ASEAN began expanding its institutional role through 
layering in response to demands to address post-Cold War security issues through 
layering to manage great power relations. Through the principles of ‘ASEAN 
values’ of non-interference, ASEAN successfully facilitated dialogues between 
members and great powers such as the U.S. and China through regional forums 
such as the ARF, which strengthened their diplomatic relations that enhanced the 
regional political stability (Mahbubani and Sng, 2017). This made ASEAN a 
pivotal actor in managing security issues and deepening political cooperation 
between external powers (Yates, 2017). Unlike traditional alliances that exist in 
the West, ASEAN-led institutions focus on promoting non-traditional security 
issues for regional stakeholders as a focal point to promote confidence building 
and actual defence cooperation that would better prepare ASEAN to address more 
complex security issues (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010). 
Yet, some things appear to be the same. More importantly, the continuing 
commitments that are dependent upon the traditional approach of non-
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interference is the result of contingent complex interaction in the flow of the 
domestic and international that ASEAN members find itself in. In the post-Cold 
War, the new hegemonic position that the US and its allies have acquired become 
strident in their promotion of liberal democracy and were more critical of the 
authoritarian regimes in the region. The changes in the international condition 
saw greater urgency to strengthen the regional identity, which members shared 
the mutual desire to protect sovereignty and the geo-political rivalries between 
great powers (Acharya, 2014).  
Lacking unconditional legitimacy for the states and its illiberal regimes, 
the ruling elites in ASEAN had a basic interest in safeguarding their political 
autonomy (Ba, 2014). With the rise of capitalist market paving the way for a 
dramatic transformation for ASEAN economies, states were vulnerable to 
domestic unrest facing new competition from different actors (Jones, 2012a). 
Most members found that the principle guidelines of the ‘ASEAN Way’ had two 
key consequences. First, the institutionalisation of state-centric approach on the 
principle of non-intervention reassured members that their sovereign rights would 
not be imperilled. Second, the regional diplomatic relations of every member by 
advocating to perform unity is predicated with security and economic problems 
that is critical to the regional security order. As states in the region were 
developing its economy often through state-led development, persistent 
patronage has produced illiberal ideology with lower orders to secure their 
interest (Rodan et. al, 2006).  
However, the principles of non-intervention were tested during the Asian 
financial crisis that exposed the fragility of the institution. Initially starting from 
Thailand, the crisis quickly spread and affected all states causing severe security 
instability to the region with currency collapsing, and national economies driven 
into recession. Thus, as the political order in Southeast Asia began to weaken, it 
would also exacerbate pre-existing social cleavages in member states that were 
brought in its wake to violent dissatisfaction towards the elitist regimes, erupting 
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social unrest cutting across different social forces (Sukma, 1999). These conflicts, 
in turn, would fracture domestic elite coalitions further intensifying the regimes 
instability across the region. This opens up the fundamental concept that security 
that is domestic in nature can also become a regional issue.  
ASEAN was criticised by analysts and Western policymakers for its 
inadequacy to provide economic and political security (Khoo, 2004). Thus, the 
changes in domestic politics and its impact between state-society relations would 
have a salient effect on ASEAN. After the financial crisis, there is also a growing 
trend on non-traditional security issues that are non-military in nature (Caballery-
Anthony, 2004). The financial crisis was a critical juncture to ASEAN security 
which revealed that the national security had a spill-over effect towards the 
destabilization of the authoritarian regimes that generated domestic instability 
across the region.  
Triggered by these events, the consequences saw several institutional 
changes occurred within ASEAN. In order to safeguard from regional instability, 
ASEAN has expanded its institutions such as the ASEAN Charter, EAS, APSC, 
and the ADMM to name a few, attempted to ensure its member states’ security 
interest, prevention of political marginalisation and maintain political autonomy 
from great powers (Koga, 2015). ASEAN sought to increase its institutional 
capacity through hosting meetings and consultations in order to increase 
confidence buildings in an effort to reduce frictions between members. In the 
process of greater unity, the emerging theme for the institutional framework 
within which ASEAN chose to label was of centrality which ASEAN would play 
a key role to the provision of Asia-Pacific’s security (Acharya, 2017). To be sure, 
these reforms were not simply designed by the member states to appease the 
emerging security challenges. As Jones (2012, p. 116) notes, “dominant social 
forces needed to adopt new forms of governance and ideology in order to retain 
or regain their hegemony”.   
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Not surprisingly, the institutionalisation of ASEAN principles would also 
become its source of political constraint to securitise at the regional level. Intra-
ASEAN consultation and consensus can be difficult to sustain as the member 
states are consumed with domestic political crises that are often economically 
related (Ba, 2014; Acharya, 2017). More importantly, these security challenges 
also re-affirmed the close nexus between security and economics. It reinforced 
the perception that political legitimacy can only be achieved if the region’s 
economy is stable (Ravenhill, 2013). To be sure, the current dynamics highlights 
the justification for the priority to be accorded to old security issues still 
persevering- maintaining regime legitimacy.  
Although the region has witnessed a relative decline towards inter-state 
war, ASEAN members continue to contest on how regional security is 
reinterpreted in order to serve their own national priorities. In Jones’ assessment, 
ASEAN’s behaviour has not been consistently compliant with the norms as 
member states have intervened in states domestic politics in the past to protect 
their own regime legitimacy (Jones, 2016). As Nesadurai (2008, p. 227) 
explained, ASEAN members sometimes choose to deviate from ASEAN 
sovereignty norms and practice if it could undermine their interest. Jessop (2008) 
argues, states are never neutral apparatus as it is consistently contested by the 
social groups in order to maintain power.  Yet, the important point is that the 
existence of ASEAN has not only provided security in the region, it also 
generated wealth, which benefitted the state leaders to provide gain popular 
support in the domestic politics (Stubbs and Mitrea, 2017). This has helped 
ASEAN to maintain a good deal of continuity as it has been a very important 





6.2.1 The South China Sea Dispute 
 
We have seen this on the impact of South China Sea that exacerbate 
internal tensions within ASEAN. An indicator of this is the more recent trend for 
regional challenges is the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness in 
Southeast Asia with regards to the South China Sea dispute and maritime borders 
further informed the complexity of the security practise in the region (Chinyong 
Liow and Emmers, 2006). While claimants of the South China Sea dispute may 
support multilateral efforts, the prospective losers will likely resist. For instance, 
tensions rose during Cambodia’s Chairmanship in 2012 generated by its 
increasingly close relationship with China.  The decision by Cambodia to block 
the statement was at the behest of China that include references that critique its 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. For Cambodia, as a non-claimant, the 
decision to challenge China would be both politically and economically 
devastating to the state as China is increasingly becoming an important source of 
its ambition to maintain regime legitimacy (Ravenhill, 2016).  
I make two claims here. First, despite its challenges to further 
institutionalise the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, these institutional 
frameworks have also enabled member states to deepen ties with great powers by 
profiting from economic deals rather than to challenge them (Emmerson, 2016). 
Through ASEAN framework, meetings and consultations have allowed for 
claimants to increase their social interactions to increase inter-state cooperation. 
While much has been written about China’s ambitions towards its aggressive 
posture over the South China Sea, there have been significant improvements in 
terms of economic deals between claimants.  
My second claim is that the politicisation of Chinese assertiveness varies 
in terms of strength and its perceptions in the domestic arena. For states in 
Southeast Asia, dominant ideologies over the ability to rule the state have been 
challenged in recent times. The politicisation of the South China Sea in claimant 
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states provoked certain institutional elements in the society which can either 
enhance or constrain its ability to find alternative solutions in managing the 
dispute. A more concrete sense of how these dynamics emerge in practice 
requires analysis on the domestic conflicts underpinning the key states. The key 
is to identify how these dominant social forces are at work and how they exercise 
their interest in practice. 
For instance, policymakers in Malaysia argue that aggressive responses 
towards China are ineffective as they see China as an economic opportunity to be 
exploited (Parameswaran, 2015). Rather than dealing with China forcefully as a 
security threat, constructive engagement with China enables Malaysia to 
construct a relationship to further expand its domestic political agenda. As part 
of China’s rapprochement with Malaysia, a defence contract was signed as a joint 
venture between the Boustead Naval Shipyard and China Shipbuilding & 
Offshore International Co Ltd. as part of the deal to commissioned four littoral 
mission ships from China with the first two naval ships to be built in China while 
the remaining two littoral ships will be built in Malaysia as part of the offset 
program  (Parameswaran, 2017). For Malaysia, the economic-security deal with 
China was viewed as a response to  strengthen the new economic development to 
bolster its regime legitimacy (Felker, 2015). On the regional level, Malaysia’s 
actions in engaging with China has also contributed to the development of 
cooperation between ASEAN members (Kuik, 2015).  
Similarly, in the Philippines, security priority to territorial defence took a 
slight shift from this trajectory when Duterte (2016-present) came into power. 
Instead of continuing Aquino’s legacies to maintain pressure against China, the 
Philippines saw a shift by deepening ties with China while they would become 
the most vocal critics on the US (Heydarian, 2018). There seems to be signs to 
suggest that the Duterte administration has recalibrated its security policy 
approach similar to Arroyo’s administration. Duterte’s strategy attempts to find 
alternatives for the Philippines strategic partnership by rekindling relations 
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towards China with the prospect of large infrastructural investments included in 
China’s Belt and Road Initiatives while gravitating away from the US 
dependence to appease China (Heydarian, 2017). Perhaps, similar to other cases, 
Duterte’s appear to be hedging towards China with the waning of US dominance 
in the region by avoiding the larger political tension that the two major 
superpower poses (Quintos, 2018). Under the current Duterte administration, he 
has put internal security and economic development as the centrepiece of his 
policy agenda, especially in the poverty ridden in the Southern of Philippines.  
 Indonesia is somewhat different to the other claimants. Although China is 
indirectly a threat Indonesia, in recent years, its small claim on the South China 
Sea has been a subject of territorial contestation with the emerging power. 
However, under the current Jokowi administration, the increasing polarising 
domestic audience in Indonesia has forced the state actors to take a more 
aggressive response on China. For Indonesia, illegal fishing conducted by 
Chinese trawlers could be potentially devastating to the Indonesian livelihood as 
it is an important source of revenue for the local market (Sulaiman, 2019).  Even 
as Jokowi displayed a strong show of force against China, Indonesia also 
desperately needed Chinese investments to support Jokowi’s development 
projects because of the economic slowdown that depressed Indonesia’s 
commodity exports (OECD, 2016) 
Despite this, the logic continuity of ASEAN derives from its institutional 
purpose of its ability to defend certain domestic actors to maintain power over 
the domestic. As a regional body, the institution may act as an institutional arena 
in which states struggle for influences or may actively intervene in the domestic 
interest. These procedures have been ritualised and act as  a symbol for the elites 
to justify their rulings especially in the domestic arena (Davies, 2018). Thus, it is 
sometimes difficult to gain policy coherences from ASEAN as different states are 
ruled by different social groups, naturally these dominant actors advanced their 
own interest in order to preserve their own autonomy.  
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While external security helped to frame some of the challenges that 
ASEAN member states face today, the perennial conundrum of internal 
instabilities continues to be plagued in their domestic that challenge the 
legitimacy of the state (Chalk, 2001). Yet, as we have seen, the sequence of 
historical conflict has the potential to profoundly shape institutional solutions, 
constrained by a prevailing strategic concern which forces its security policy 
behaviours to be. As such, in the highly globalised world, internal security 
challenges remained significant whereby the contemporary strategic context in 
the past still informs the present (Beeson, 2014). 
In sum, the core of security perception in Southeast Asia continue to reflect 
that the levels of economic development are necessary step to maintain political 
legitimacy. It is therefore relatively necessary for member states to securitize their 
economy (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). As previously noted, the answer lies in the 
diversity of ASEAN states. If we choose to accept that different states are being 
dominated by different dominant powers, it provides us the analytical tools to 
analyse how specific actors choose to respond to threat perceptions to advance 
their interest. Because state formation varies and states are captured by different 
social forces, they have often used regional institutions such as ASEAN to protect 
and ensure that dominant oligarchs interest can be realised in the regional context 
(Jayasuriya, 2004).  
 
6.3 The Continuing tension in Domestic and Regime Legitimacy: 
Political Crisis and its Significance towards Security Policy in Southeast Asia 
 
Since the post-Cold War, there have not been any major wars between 
states in Southeast Asia. Relations between Indochina and ASEAN members 
have begun to normalise devoid of contention that could escalate to full-scale 
war. On the surface, it appears that the defeat of communism in Southeast Asia 
paved the way for a dramatic transformation of ASEAN economies and politics.  
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Further, two of the case studies have transitioned from authoritarian to 
democratisation (Indonesia and the Philippines), while Malaysia and Singapore 
maintained authoritarian regimes.  
According to Hamilton-Hart (2013), cases of domestic insecurity in 
Southeast Asia from secession movements, communal tensions to terrorism, and 
other mass outbreak of violence have shown that economic motives appear to be 
the trigger for conflict that can create a spill-over effect to the regional security. 
One would also note that while economic security has long been securitised by 
the states, it was not until the 97/98 financial crisis that economic security gained 
more urgency in the region (Caballero-Anthony, 2008).  
For Southeast Asia, the significant source of legitimacy continues to favour 
economic development to achieve sovereignty. However, the rise of these 
capitalist states in the post-Cold War would also become the key to domestic 
contention as relations between social forces create unequal level access to state 
power and resources. As previous chapters have shown, the class relations and 
social cleavages can often be intertwined that can become a subject of political 
contestation. As the institutionalisation of certain norms, rules and organisation 
have created a path dependent effect, these institutions can become contested 
when certain sequences such as the financial crisis weakened their legitimacy. 
Thus, the trajectory of internal tension is a product of struggle between contesting 
social forces (Jayasuriya, 2004). This would provide us the context on why 
certain security policy continue to persist in the region.  
 
6.3.1 Malaysia: Increasingly Contentious 
 
 
In Malaysia, one could cite that its economy has been primarily the 
dominant security logic to guarantee regime legitimacy. Prior to the 97/98 crisis, 
Malaysia’s nation-state building program of the NEP was completed and 
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successful in building the Bumiputera capitalist. Malaysia also emerged as one 
of the fastest growing countries in the region, creating a large pool of Malay in 
the middle-income. Yet, the target for the wealth accumulation of the Malays set 
by the NEP was not met (Abdul Khalid, 2014). To this end, Mahathir introduced 
his development strategies which arose from his own complex visions to replace 
and restructure the NEP with  the Vision 2020 with a similar policy of pattern 
through layering and the recalibration of state interventionism (Felker, 2015). 
With the institutionalisation of the NEP as a guiding principle, the Vision 2020 
was a policy layering framed around the basic contours of the nation-state 
building project, to enhance Bumiputra’s economy (Case, 2001). This would also 
set the path for his successors as a policy structure designed to promote the ethnic 
redistribution programs.  
To reduce the state’s burden, government increased privatisation and 
government linked companies (GLC) to increase the distributional policy and 
expand the Bumiputera class. With Mahathir’s ideological and political ambitions 
moulded by an improving economic condition and the consolidation of power, 
Mahathir sought to further industrialise the economy with highly technological 
manufacturing industry through FDI with domestic linkages. However, Mahathir 
would also face a dilemma to meet the growing needs to provide security. Since 
the military was ill-equipped, Malaysia was compelled to modernise its military 
in order to overcome its insecurity (Singh, 2004). Hence, rather than simply 
promoting Malaysia’s security, Mahathir sought to create linkages between 
economic development and security. As a political maverick, Mahathir leverages 
the FDI as a new source of externally driven growth part of his political agenda 
to increase the push for domestic and economic restructuring that was married to 
his domestic national goals (Jomo, 2002). Mahathir launched a security policy of 
military procurement as leverage for weapon manufacturing states to accept 
offset programs to upgrade Malaysia’s economy to meet his redistributive 
national policies as part of the military deal. Mahathir explained that implicitly 
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military modernisation is often a subject of politicisation if further economic 
prospects can be achieved during the process of military procurement which can 
contribute to other civilian industry (Mahathir, 2016).   
The ruling elites used state-led initiative policies to maintain their intimate 
relations with business elites through distribution of patronages (Tan, 2015a). 
With the elites sharing the common perceptions informed by their history 
legacies, Brownlee (2017, p. 203) argued that the combination of ideological 
Malay agenda and the steady stream of patronages binds together the fractious 
elites in a durable coalition that would enable individual advancement amid 
collective security. The desire to increase the national capabilities and industrial 
skills in the national workforce allowed the ruling elites to pioneer the policy of 
military acquisitions to intertwine with the national development goals that is 
intrinsic to Bumiputera policy. High skilled industries such as the aerospace, 
naval, and the automotive industries were given top priority on military 
modernisation project as these are often sub-sectors of the defence industry.  
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This saw the increase in state-owned enterprises to facilitate growth of the 
Bumiputera capitalist often maintaining close ties with the regime as shown in 
figure 6.1. In an interview, according to Mahathir, the establishment of 
Malaysia’s own defence industry served the purpose of raising the employment 
level both in the military and civilian as well as government’s strategy to improve 
the standard of industrial development growth, and a fresh source of revenue for 
the government (Mahathir, 2016). Mahathir used Malaysia’s security policy to 
create new avenues for Malay capitalists to grow so as to relate his perception on 
domestic issues. Mahathir made use of extensive complex offset programs to 
nurture the Malay economy in order to increase the participation of the Malays in 
the technological sector. To achieve his vision, Mahathir used various institutions 
such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to create a local chain 
supply of these advanced technological industry through the collaboration of 
international companies to develop the Malay’s competency.  
In this telling, Malaysia initiated the use of military acquisition programs 
as an opportunity to use its security policy to strengthen ties with major powers 
who are also defence producing countries for external security as well as to meet 
their national redistributive policies. As military purchases are often sanctioned 
by the government of weapon producing states, Malaysia began to expand its 
foreign relations by purchasing military equipment with countries such as the 
U.S., Russia and the UK as part of its trade policies to strengthen bilateral ties 
while at the same time providing Malaysia with the military capabilities to 
enhance its security. The best example came from the acquisition for the upgrade 
of the Royal Malaysian Airforce. Malaysia bought 18 Mig-29 fighter jets worth 
US$600 million with a counter-trade deal with Russia. As part of the trade, 
US$95 million worth of Bumiputera produced palm oil and other palm oil 
products were bought by Russia (Abdul Ghani, 2011). 
However, policies associated with the securitisation of the economy causes 
tension between the state and society. Rather than providing security to the state, 
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military procurements are often subjected to patronages at the expense of 
Malaysia’s security (M.A.1, 2017; M.B.1, 2017). In the crucible of the 1997/98 
financial crisis Malaysia’s domestic politics began to fracture as the economic 
crisis followed by the fall of Malaysian currency saw a deep fragment between 
the state and society. The Asian financial crisis has devastated the Malaysian 
economy. Malaysia imposed a state led intervention to bail out well-connected 
business elites to prevent from the economic collapse (Gomez, 2004).  
Reflecting on the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, this emboldened Anwar and 
his supporters to the call for political reform to sweep Mahathir’s regime for 
chronic corruption, cronyism and nepotism (Felker, 1999). In the 1999 election, 
Anwar set a political platform for other alternative parties to contest in the general 
election. Although BN managed to maintain its institutional resilience, it severely 
weakened elite coalitions of the ruling party. The financial crisis would also set 
the path for more competition between merging forces to challenge the 
dominance of UMNO. As more educated Malay middle-class emerge, it is 
organic that they would demand for more political freedom, transparency and 
public goods (Gomez, 2016). Fearing that ethnic tension would erupt, it was a 
routine agenda for the political elites that resources allocated for military 
modernization in Malaysia to be subjected to diversion for distribution (Noor and 
Qistina, 2017). 
The most forceful attempt to challenge the BN government came during 
Najib Razak’s administration (2009-2018). The sequence of problems such as the 
rising cost of living, the implementation of the General Service Tax (GST), 
excessive corruption revolving around the 1MDB scandal, disgruntled Malay 
middle class and low oil prices eventually deepened elite fragmentation. Led by 
Mahathir, Muhyiddin and other political giants in UMNO defected from the party 
to join the opposition. This severely affected Malaysia’s military modernisation 
as the BN party diverted its resources to respond to the domestic unrest. The BN 
regime would again resort to patronages by heavily distributing rents that favours 
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ethnic Malay constituents in the rural and public sectors involving Malay rights. 
Though Malaysia’s defence posture in recent years have come to its shelf life and 
is in need to modernise the military, economic condition severely affected 
Malaysia’s military expenditure with the ruling government cutting the defence 
expenditure (Lockman, 2019). It forced its policy agenda to shift towards short 
term distribution policy to maintain the regime status quo at the expense of long-
term goals (Gomez, 2016; Case, 2017). 
The economic and political crisis also evoked the pre-existing cleavages 
which challenged BN’s legitimacy in a context where they perceived the 
institutional arrangement as a problem of institutional decay. Najib made an 
appeal to UMNO Supreme Council members and division chiefs as a foundation 
of UMNO’s power and the legitimation of protectors of the Malay rights to 
increase their loyalty to the party (Case, 2017). Recently, the new Pakatan 
Harapan regime led by Mahathir released Malaysia’s 2019 Defence White Paper 
as a guideline for the nation’s security concerns and its policy guidelines, 
replacing the 2010 Defence White Paper that was put forth by the previous 
regime. Despite the regime change, Malaysia’s national security priority saw little 
changes that shared similar path to the previous regime to focus on nation-
building involving the development of Malays (Noor, 2017).  
 
6.3.2 Indonesia: Persistent Domestic Security Threats and the Institutional 
Legacy of New Order 
 
What accounts for the striking continuity in Indonesia’s security concept 
spanning from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime? I make two 
arguments here. Though the institutional reforms in the wake of Asian financial 
crisis can be measured with relative success, the course of democratisation has 
not been a smooth consolidation of democratic regime (Jayasuriya and Rodan, 
2007). As the intense political contestation demonstrates, the path towards 
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military depoliticisation in Indonesia was resisted, owing to its past roles in 
maintaining political order. Secondly, the devolution of power from the centre 
would also create political instability in the periphery which challenges 
Indonesia’s regime legitimacy.  
In spite of Indonesia institutional changes after the fall of Suharto, on 
closer inspection, these reforms were thus only partially successful. Instead, the 
institutional reforms concerned a reassertion of control between political players 
over its internal affairs (Honna, 2005; Mietzner, 2006). Yet, it did not sufficiently 
guarantee that the military would be subservient to civilian authority. During the 
early period of the post-authoritarian transition, the successful military reform 
was initiated by the top military echelons from the winning military faction to get 
ahead of the curve rather than risking in political convulsion. The institutional 
drift creates opportunities for the military to pursue their goals that are favourable 
to the military while working within a set of complex situations (Greenlees, 
2011). The military had an incentive to negotiate with the civilian leaders to 
protect their political and economic interest without significantly affect its access 
to state power. Most significantly, the military continues to maintain its 
hegemonic position in the territorial command structure especially in the security 
decision-making (Croissant et al., 2013).  
Clearly, the fall of the New Order had an impact to the institutional changes 
that would also create political instability. The military institutional reform was 
halted after Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) was ousted from the Presidential 
position and was replaced by his more conservative nationalist vice-President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri. Part of the increasing security problems was the 
transition to a pluralist politics, which highlighted the deep fragmentation in the 
civilian politics that forced the governments to form a coalition of political parties 
with different interest (Bünte and Ufen, 2009).  
Indeed, the changes in the ordering power provided the space for 
competing groups between the centre and the periphery to mobilise and change 
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the status quo in the distribution of power and economic resources (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012). As the oligarchs was reorganising their power in the central 
Jakarta in the post-Suharto, there were conflicting views among civilian 
policymakers on whether to rely on the military to maintain political order. The 
intertwining of security policymaking with the struggle for domestic political 
struggles forced its security concept to a more domestic which began during the 
Megawati presidency (Aspinall, 2014).  
Perhaps, what strengthens the legitimacy of the military presence in 
Indonesia was the myriads of security issues, limiting the central government to 
implement its widespread reform within the military. The government routinely 
mobilised their extensive security apparatuses to suppress the periphery 
territories exacerbated the state-society relations. These insecurities are often 
interwoven with the political corruption and violence that were inflicted during 
Suharto which exacerbated political grievances amongst the local against the 
central government. Between 1999 to 2004, uneven economic development 
heightened tension in the periphery saw the rise in secessionist movement 
especially in resource rich areas in Aceh, Kalimantan, Papua, and Sulawesi 
(Robison and Hadiz, 2004). The fall of New Order also saw generated religious 
movements in Maluku (van Klinken, 2000),  the war on terrorism after the Bali 
bombing in 2002, Jakarta bombing in 2009, illegal fishing, and the increasing 
resentment from communal and ethnic violence in the post New Order (Sukma, 
2011). As Hadiz (2018) notes, the increase in religious and separatist movements 
was symptomatic of the capitalist disengagement between the state and the 
society, frustrated by the endemic oligarchic corruption.  
However, the impetus of Indonesia’s security policy was the mounting 
internal security challenges and the risk of possible national disintegration within 
the periphery. The independence of East Timor in 1999 under President Habibie 
was a catalyst for the policymakers, which created resentment among the 
conservative military that the civilian authority was weak in preventing the 
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territorial loss (US State Department, 1999). The military perceived that the 
civilian lack in the state capacity to keep the territorial integrity that they sought 
to build during the New Order. In fact, active duty officers were promoted to 
civilian Ministries, increasing the participation of the military (Laksmana, 2019). 
More importantly, the loss of East Timor also meant the loss of economic 
revenues for the military as it holds vast amount of businesses in the territory 
(Aditjondro, 1999). The political elites recognised that addressing the social 
grievances in the periphery remains a priority to its nation-state building.  
Civilian leaders soon realised that the police as a civilian security force was 
incapable of managing political violence. It is in this logic that the escalating 
internal security gave the military the opportunity to set a new political 
arrangement with the oligarchs to include the military in the policy decision-
making to maintain its sovereignty. Given the embedded nature of the military’s 
place in economy and the importance of the economic interest in financing the 
military’s upkeep, it is likely that the military will collaborate and continue to 
play a prominent role in security decision-making  (Beeson, 2006). The coalition 
pact mobilised a powerful discourse of ‘security-as-part-of-defence’, which 
embedded a nationalist claim of NKRI of national unity and political stability 
(Honna, 2009). Importantly, the discourse has effectively justified the military to 
maintain its strong presence in the conflict prone territories and in security 
decision-making for nation-state building and to defend the oligarchic economic 
interest.  
Furthermore, regaining its position in the internal security has been vital to 
support the national interest as well as the military’s economic interest. The TNI 
was concerned that the territorial command structure would be subject for reform 
which could weaken its capability to extract economic resources (Human Rights 
Watch, 2006). Despite the legal reform in 2004, the military still retains 
subsequent amount of businesses across the territorial region to support a slim 
budget to maintain the upkeep of the military (Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
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According to (Honna, 2017), regaining its role in internal security was crucial for 
maintaining the size of the military. Between 2001 and 2018, the Indonesian 
military grew in strength from 297,000 personnel to 395,000 personnel (Military 
Balance, 2001; 2018).  
According to Aspinall (2016), the military legitimises its position as an 
important player through mutual dependence on the basis of nationalist rhetoric 
that was shaped by its historical roots. To further institutionalise the military’s 
role in the post-Suharto era, the TNI released a Defence White Paper ‘The Role 
of TNI in the 21st Century’ which asserted its commitment of military 
professionalism to support the national ideology of Pancasila on territorial unity 
and to defend the national interest  (Pertahanan, 2003). Since then, the military 
has released two more White Papers, reiterating the military’s position in 
security. The TNI claimed that its roles have shifted from the traditional threats 
to include non-traditional threats such as terrorism, separatist movement, illegal 
fishing and armed rebellions.  
The issue on the South China Sea with illegal fishing has been an 
increasingly contentious issue that often overlaps with the foreign threats 
(Laksmana, 2018). It is the persistence of internal threats and a few external 
threats that enhanced the military prerogatives over the legitimacy of its roles to 
defend Indonesia’s economic interest that is often closely linked to the national 
security (Laksmana, 2018). In response, the TNI initiated calculated measures to 
increase its capacity to deter external threats while at the same time reassert its 
effectiveness in the counterterrorism and to safeguard from territorial 
disintegration. Under Yudhoyono and Jokowi, military expenditure saw a 
significant increase. This was further updated in the most recent Defence White 
Paper in 2015 which outlined the seamless role of the TNI in its commitment to 
preserve the military and non-military defence (Pertahanan, 2015). In this 
perspective, the integration of the military in the security decision-making would 
create a stronger nation-state to ensure the integrity of the state. Such a 
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phenomena suggests a trade-off whereby the military remained a key component 
to uphold the regime coalition in order to muster a coherent policy to deal with 
the political insecurity.   
Under the current Jokowi administration, there seems little to suggest that 
there is a major shift in the security perceptions as the internal security continue 
to be the most pressing agenda in Indonesia. For Jokowi, national integration and 
economic development as opposed to strengthening the civilian institution 
remains the key priority to his presidency (Diprose and Azca, 2019). The 
aforementioned analysis on the regime breakdown heightened the tension for 
distribution of power between centre and periphery have escalated in recent years. 
In 2015, the re-emergence of inter-religious and communal conflict as a result of 
economic disproportional growth during the New Order regime in Poso, Sulawesi 
highlighted the relevance of the military form maintaining political order 
(Nasrum, 2016). To ensure that the security policies remain within the purview 
of the military, retired military leaders have held important positions in the 
Cabinet with security portfolios. Specifically, the position of Coordinating 
Minister for Political, Security, Legal and Security Affairs that oversees security 
related ministries have been historically dominated by the military. High ranking 
military officials have especially vested interest in preservation of its roles in 
security policymaking as they could then continue their foothold in the military 
and economic interest in the archipelago (Honna, 2017).  
Consistent with the theme of the thesis as part of an overall assessment 
over Indonesia, the significance of the rising levels of armed violence in the 
periphery continue to demonstrate that internal security presents a significant 
challenge to the government. The institutional legacies of its authoritarian past 
seem to matter over the nature of state structure that shaped the nation’s security 
priorities. This section has shown that the recent trajectory of security crises in 
Indonesia derived from the development trajectory that span over several decades 
over the endemic internal conflict. One of the critical remarks that the endemic 
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internal security conflict was the breakdown of elite coalition in the penultimate 
of the New Order regime displayed political instability in the archipelago which 
raises serious security tensions.  
Although the New Order regime was effective in maintaining order, this 
was achieved by leveraging the military subservient to the executive as patronage 
politics was prevalent especially in the security policy. However, the practice of 
patronage politics would also create severe tension between elites over access to 
state resources. Whereas in the case of Malaysia and Singapore saw a strong 
party-state to requisite a degree of national identity and social cohesion to 
distribute patronage, in the case of Indonesia, the inability to successfully 
monopolise the use of coercion to achieve social cohesion showcases its lack of 
civilian institutional strength to legitimize political order. Instead, the civilian 
authorities continued reliance on coercion in ordering power suggest that the 
regime lacked a significant capacity of national unity led to further insecurity.  
 
6.3.3 Persistent Internal Insurgency in the Philippines 
 
Since the fall of Marcos, the Philippines has made an inroad path to 
democratisation, creating a legal mechanism that saw the institutionalisation of 
the civilian authority to oversight the military. The closure of US base seems to 
force the AFP that there would be a doctrinal shift from the internal to external 
defence. Perhaps, an important issue to shape the trajectory of the Philippine 
security policy is its continued path dependence on the preferences for alliance 
with the US. After the US military withdrawal in 1992, the Philippines realised 
that it needed to rely on the US patronage for external security in addition to 
maintaining domestic political order (Morada and Collier, 1998). As the AFP 
were predominantly preoccupied with the burden of internal insurgencies, the 
cost of military modernization to build a credible external defence force would 
overwhelm the government’s dire fiscal position that the AFP had to undertake.  
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The significance of the U.S. military presence cannot be understated as it was 
deemed a strategic deterrence against Chinese activism and any external threats. 
The U.S. military base was also an important economic source for the Philippines 
as the US pays US$180 million to the government yearly to fund its military 
(Press, 1988). Even before the War on Terror in 2001, the loss of access to US 
military equipment and technologies confronting the Philippines forced the 
revival of its alliance with the US under the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1997. 
This would facilitate the US to enter the Philippine territory for bilateral exercise 
under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (Cruz De Castro, 2014).  
The Philippines began an ambitious modernisation program to transform 
the military to a conventional role. According to Croissant et.al (2013), the law 
would further institutionalise the military to civilian authority, thus giving greater 
control in security policy decision-making. This would also provide Ramos the 
opportunity to create Huntington’s (1995) description of a professionalised 
military, diverting its role from internal security. Through the civilian 
constitution, Ramos pushed for military reform by shifting its roles to external 
security on territorial and maritime defence while subsequently reducing its roles 
in internal affairs, which gave the institutional power for the police in counter-
insurgency (Hall, 2007).  
Although Ramos’ advocacy for military reform appeared to be strong, 
however, the barrier to Philippines military modernisation program was 
hampered by delays in the Congress (Cruz De Castro, 2005). Given that the weak 
economic development has a direct impact on the stability of the state, it lacked 
the capacity to modernize the military and to provide credible deterrence to the 
encroaching Chinese presence. The fact that the modernisation program took so 
long to be implemented highlights the security priorities for the Philippines: the 
economic condition and the continued U.S. presence. The consequence of the 
oligarchic return to power limits the access for executive and the military to finite 
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state resources to develop a credible defence posture. More pertinent is that 
political elites in the Congress were also reluctant to fund the AFP because of the 
political violence under the Marcos regime coercing these powerful political 
elites (Roces, 2000). Due to the 1997/98 financial crisis, the oligarchs in the 
Senate used the power of the purse to micromanage and delay the modernization 
program citing more domestic structural concerns over the financial meltdown 
and economic downturn (Cruz De Castro, 2014). Even though the issue on the 
South China Sea were serious and involved in the stand-off, instead, the 
Philippines resorted to ASEAN for regional diplomacy by issuing its diplomatic 
support to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner (Zha and Valencia, 
2001).  
And yet, parallel to Indonesia, the Philippines security continues to 
demonstrate its focus on internal as persistent domestic security are detriment to 
affect its abilities to shift its security concept to territorial defence. This is 
because, the inherent nature of Philippine state institution set a path dependence 
that culminate its strategic culture to focus on its internal insecurities. For the 
Philippines, the most fundamental source of security challenges emanates from 
its internal crises. Although the regime transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy would have reduced political contestation, as with Indonesia, the 
Philippines continues to face serious social conflict towards the concept of its 
Filipino identity through the persistent of ideologically or religiously inspired 
armed rebellions especially concentrated in the resource-rich but impoverished 
South (Banlaoi, 2009). Though there have been various peace agreements and 
negotiations between the state, the Moro rebels, and the Communist rebels, 
however, it has yet to bring about sustainable peace to the region. Due to its 
failure to consolidate the different religion and culture in its nation-building 
efforts, the lingering effects of power struggles for political autonomy have 
profoundly influenced the path dependence on how the state develop its national 
security.  
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By the end of the Cold War, relations between the civilian and military 
have stabilised especially during the Ramos administration. After serving as 
Secretary of Defence under Cory Aquino’s administration, Ramos was in position 
to effectively reduce military defection through his association by relying on 
military support, appointing retired military to his cabinet to enhance his regime 
legitimacy (Chambers, 2014). Moreover, The Philippines managed to contain 
communist threats with the restoration of democracy with its membership 
declining. Due to internal rifts within the top echelons, it weakened their 
ideological influences throughout the archipelago (Quimpo, 2009). On the other 
hand, Moro insurgency also declined as a result of Ramos approach to appeal to 
the MNLF over a peace agreement signed in Indonesia in 1996. The peace 
agreement saw the development of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM), devolving power from the state which allowed the territory to be ruled 
by Moro people (Cagoco-Guiam, 2006). The establishment of the ARMM would 
also saw the appointment of Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF as its first 
governor. Perhaps, more significantly is that the peace agreement signalled a 
transformation of the MNLF from an insurgent group into a formal political 
organisation representing the Moro people.  
With a persistent internal instability, the political outcomes have led the 
Philippine government to focus on state resources to quash the internal threats 
often with excessive use of force. Crucially, despite achieving peace agreement 
with the MNLF in 1996 during Ramos administration, sporadic violence 
continued to be carried out by the breakaway secessionist group MILF and other 
MNLF factions. According to Quimpo (2016), the fragility of the ARMM peace 
agreement failed to address critical matters of land, governance and control over 
the Moro. At one level, the reason for the failure to reach an effective peace 
agreement can be traced by its failure to include other rebellion groups during the 
peace negotiations, creating deeper political grievances. Similar to the national 
politics, Mindanao constitutes different political clans and families to compete 
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over access to state resources in the economically deprived territory (Lara Jr & 
Champain, 2009).  At another level, the exacerbation of its insecurity remains on 
the uneven level of control of power resources and economic opportunities that 
are concentrated among the Christians as a consequence of its history (Gutierrez 
and Borras Jr, 2004). As such, the ARMM region continues to be the poorest 
region in the Philippines, neglected by the state from the benefits of national 
economic growth have prolong the regional conflict.  
However, a further concern towards the social disorder would also breed 
more aggressive groups of anti-establishment in the Philippines. The failure by 
the state to adequately resolve the political violence gave rise to extremism in 
Mindanao, which is seen as an expression of political discontent towards the state 
(Quilala, 2018). By the 2000s, it was engaged in the global War on terror with an 
extremist Moro separatist group, the Abu Sayyaf group that is linked to the Al-
Qaeda emerged terrorising the Philippines, adding to its host of internal security 
challenges (Kraft, 2011). Though by 2006, the military success in the operation 
to neutralise Abu Sayyaf was followed by the killing of its chieftain Khadaffy 
Janjalani, meaning that the group would turn into disarray. More recently, since 
assuming presidency, Duterte was faced with internal insurgency in 2017 in 
Marawi led by the alliance of Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf group that pledge 
its allegiance to ISIS. Prior to the Marawi siege, MILF leaders had warned that 
the rise of extremism would complicate the process for peaceful conflict (Unson, 
2015).  
Whereas in other case studies saw the effective repression against the 
Communist insurgencies, the Philippines CPP continues its armed struggles to 
overthrow the state in the post-Cold War. Although there was a decrease of its 
membership and scattered all over the archipelago, the CPP-NPA remains a 
deadly nuisance that harasses wealthy businesses through extortions and disrupts 
business productions that refuses to pay revolutionary taxes (Holden and 
Jacobson, 2007). Owing largely to the oligarchic stranglehold of the political 
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system and the state resources, the CPP insurgents have managed to gather 
enough support to continue waging war against the state (Quilop, 2005; Quimpo, 
2014).  
The communist insurgency would also remain a security problem as the 
local commanders of the NPA have the autonomy to conduct insurgencies over 
social discontent particularly on endemic poverty and inequality in land-owning 
peasants. For instance, the killing of mining activists has become more rampant 
since the enactment of Mining Act in 1995, which saw the displacement of 
indigenous communities and the destruction of the environment in place of 
economic development left bitter contestation between the locals and the state 
(Holden, 2013). In 2016, Duterte declared that he was willing to pardon the 
communist leaders to end the 50-year conflict. Yet, despite promising talks about 
resolution, the communist insurgents have been actively operating within these 
areas where the local governments and military leaders have great autonomy in 
the security policy.   
Taking from the cue above, the Philippines primary concerns have been 
the containment of social unrest of armed rebellions and ideological conflicts that 
dominate its national security agenda caused by its constrained economic 
development (Morada, 2011). Successive regimes since Marcos recognised that 
economic development and poverty as an inherent source of internal conflict. 
According to Duterte’s Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, the ongoing 
campaign has slowed down the efforts to modernise its military as the internal 
security operations has displaced the state’s capacity to effectively divert 
resources for territorial defence (Priam, 2018).  
Despite Duterte’s acerbic rhetoric and his combination of unorthodox 
methods with the U.S., the Philippines did not completely abandon its bilateral 
relations. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the disjuncture in the Philippines relations 
have typically involved a selective policy layering of new ones on top of the old 
ones. The U.S. presence has been successfully institutionalised to the Philippines 
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security as the AFP as the military elites have interlocking interest with the US 
(P.B2, 2019). The Visiting Force Agreement has been especially important for 
the AFP as it allows for U.S. forces to assist on counter-insurgency operations 
while it also advances the military’s corporate interest, allowing for the funding 
and doubling of its military’s salary. 
  In 2016, the U.S. helped inaugurate Duterte’s ‘War on Drug’ by providing 
sum of US$32 million to the police for training, equipment and rule of law 
(Anon., 2016). Thus, even though Chinese assertiveness triggered initial actions 
to prioritise the AFP to a more conventional role, the U.S. presence establishes 
its roles for Philippine policymakers that the responsibility for its external 
security falls over the former colony. The U.S. remains an extremely influential 
actor to its economic and security which is not limited to the intensification of 
Chinese growing presence, but also its preoccupation on domestic conditions to 
support military operations on intelligence and reports in Mindanao as well as 
providing fund to the AFP’s military modernisation program (Ba, 2017). As Ba 
(2017) notes, though there appears to be a downgrading of U.S.-Philippine, both 
states also expressed opportunities to expand different types of security ties that 
are less confrontational to China. 
Recently, despite the variance of security behaviour under Duterte, it 
presents a rationale for continuing trajectory that focuses on the pervasive poverty 
and inequality perpetrated against the Mindanao (Philippines National Security 
Council, 2017). Due to pre-existing divisions, the lack of autonomy in the Muslim 
dominated territory creates a contentious environment as they continue to 
challenge the ruling elites. This was evident especially in its National Security 
Policy whereby the 2011-2016 policy under the Aquino administration and the 
2017-2022 policy under Duterte administration highlighted that territorial 
disintegration, economic development and security are intertwined which 
hampered the nation-state (Philippine National Security Council, 2011; 2017). In 
this regard, the politics of policy-making institutions in the Philippines present an 
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unlevel playing field as the ruling elites often securitised the problem of territorial 
disintegration as routinised practiced through security actions to manage threats.  
Two key problems remain as hindrances towards a more equitable conflict 
resolution in the post-authoritarian Marcos regimes: weak state and a politicised 
military. The systemic persistence of armed conflicts are all reflective of the weak 
predatory state that is incapable of solving material inequalities in areas that were 
deprived of public goods due to the unlevel power in Manila and Christian 
dominated region in the country (Regilme Jr, 2016). Unlike more established 
states such as Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines remains unconsolidated in 
the post-authoritarian and is still engaged in nation-building especially in the 
Muslim South. The apparent lack of ideational roots in the return of electoral 
politics with a legal framework provided by the constitution, followed by a weak 
bureaucracy rendered to advance the narrow interest of the oligarchs (Quimpo, 
2009).  
If it is to be remembered, the legacies of institutional dysfunction in the 
return of electoral democracy saw the dominance of the oligarchic social forces 
to control the rules of the game who are more concerned in the accumulation of 
private wealth as opposed to national interest (Banlaoi, 2009). The oligarch 
operates as a constraint on the official policy for peaceful resolution because these 
groups have the capacity to restrain or overturn the implementation of national 
policies in defence of their own interest. Owing largely to the consequence of 
weak state institutions and elite polarisation, it lacked the capacity to provide the 
resources in managing its internal security threats (Putzel, 2018). For instance, 
during the 1996 peace agreement between MNLF and the state, Christian 
politicians and landlords stridently campaigned against the resolution fearing the 
loss over their land access, stirring up anti-Muslim sentiments which escalated 
into conflict (Gutierrez, 1999). Perhaps, similar case would present itself in 2008 
under Arroyo when the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD) between MILF and the state were denounced by some Christian 
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politicians in the Congress by whipping up some anti-Moro sentiments.  
Politicians claimed that the deal made by Arroyo was done without the 
consultation and transparency which would lead to an eventual territorial 
disintegration and declaration of MILF independence (Romero, 2008).  
Up until recently, the MILF signed a peace agreement with the government 
under the Aquino administration in 2014 which was mediated by Malaysia. The 
agreement was seen as a major legacy for Aquino’s administration as the MILF 
would renounce its main objective of separatism, and the Bangsamoro would be 
provided with greater autonomy under the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). Since 
then, the Duterte administration has followed similar steps set by his predecessor 
to improve the current conditions in the Southern territory. However, it remains 
to be seen whether the Duterte administration can uphold the ceasefire as some 
ex-combatant from the MILF faction continue to opposed the peace agreement 
(Maitem & Gallardo, 2019).  
On the other hand, similar to Indonesia, the problems of civilian control 
and the subordination of military in the Philippines especially in internal 
insurgency operations would also present two insightful analysis that shape the 
state’s insecurity. Even when the civilian authorities have initiated peace efforts 
to find a political solution with communist leaders and Muslim separatist, they 
struggle to control the military institutions and its instruments of violence that 
would lead to military intervention in its domestic politics (Espesor, 2019). This 
was illustrative in the Duterte administration when the CPP peace talk in 2017 
began to unravel as both sides accused each other of taking advantage of the 
ceasefire (Ocampo, 2019). Consequently, the oligarchic political behaviours have 
led to severe internal political tension and conflict in the society, engendering the 
military attempts at mutiny and coups, and civil society movement (Quimpo, 
2014). 
To maintain power relations between the civilian authorities and the 
military, succeeding regimes utilised the informal institutional arrangements by 
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appointing members of the high echelon in the military replacing some politicians 
in the local government units, national level and even holding positions in the 
executive branch. That served as a political patronage to the powerful political 
families with the prerogatives of the office of the president in implementing 
agrarian reform and national development (Hernandez, 2007). Military officers 
that were loyal to the administration were appointed to various positions in 
civilian governance, including in big revenue generating departments such as 
Department of Transportation and Communication and the Bureau of Customs. 
This trend continued under the Aquino administration (2010-2016) where retired 
generals under the AFP and the PNP are appointed into the cabinet ministers. 
Recently, under the Duterte Administration (2016-present) 59 retired generals in 
the security sector of the PNP and AFP were appointed as cabinet as well as other 
government owned corporations (Zamora and Tubeza, 2017).  
Not surprisingly, the detrimental effects of a politicised military inherited 
during the Marcos era to dominate security policy is an institutional problem that 
remained unresolved. This is due to the lack of professionalism especially in the 
abusive coercive apparatus that would aggravate internal security threats. For the 
AFP, the need to preserve its presence and in politics in conflict-prone areas to 
safeguard the nation is difficult for civilian authorities to overcome (Hall, 2017). 
The scale of political contestation and the inability by the state to provide order 
especially in the South often leads to excessive use of force for repression 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). In retrospect, the internal security challenges amid 
the return of democracy seem inevitable. While the security policy in the 
Philippines saw a trajectory shift to external defence, the persistence of internal 






6.3.4 Singapore’s Security Policy: Renewing Security Vulnerability in the Post-
Cold War 
 
Singapore is perhaps a significant exception. Foreign relations began to 
normalise among the ASEAN members as well as with other major powers. The 
US became a major security and economic partner for Singapore, while relations 
with China became the largest trading partner for Singapore. As war in the region 
appears to be more unlikely between neighbours largely due to the complex 
security web of various regional institutions, it makes it more costly to go to war 
with each other (Stubbs, 2014). Similar to all cases, the increase in 
democratisation and liberalisation in other parts of the world also influence the 
social transformation through individualism and the atomisation of family 
(Ortmann, 2009). The increase in middle class formed by the rapid economic 
development that is state driven was also dependent on the capability of state to 
provide economic growth and security in the society. The possibility of changes 
within the population’s views to be more democratic appears to be more 
appealing as democratisation is taking place on the other side of the world. With 
the regional order appearing to be more stable and Singapore achieving domestic 
stability, it was against this backdrop that the ruling elites adjusted its ideology 
to accommodate the situational shift.  
Whereas war between state seems to be unlikely during peacetime, non-
traditional security challenges such as secularism, terrorism and increasing 
opposition party have been the main challenges for the PAP regime. Yet, with a 
strong party-state institution by the end of the Cold War, the PAP shared similar 
institutional capacity in UMNO Malaysia to order power. In 1991, the 
government released a White Paper on “Shared Values” headed by Lee Hsien 
Loong (the current Prime Minister) to develop further Singapore’s identity based 
on ‘Asian values’ of “nation before community and society”, “family as the basic 
unit of society”, “community support” and “respect for individual, consensus, not 
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conflict” and “racial and religious harmony” (Singapore Government, 1991). 
Above all, the emphasis of the values resides on the nation implies that these 
values could be implicated through other purposes (Khong, 1995).  
The shared values further supplemented its security concept as it attempts 
to bridge the ruling elites with the population (Ortmann, 2009). Even though these 
values may then provide the ruling elites to implement narrow-based policies, 
nevertheless, it has empowered dominant actors to identify the policy that is 
seemingly for national interest through the emphasis of security through unity 
(Khong, 1995). These values were also used to justify the ruling elites’ policy 
agenda in the changes in regional or global context. Between 1990-2002 Goh 
Chok Tong and other ASEAN leaders advocated the termed as ‘Asian values’ in 
order to convince the domestic that development overrides Western style 
democracy (Thompson, 2001).  
Singapore’s national identity suffered setbacks in the 97/98 financial crisis. 
The Asian values were often associated with corruption which poses a challenge 
to its political legitimacy (Acharya, 2008). The crisis saw elite contestation in 
Malaysia and the downfall of Suharto’s regime, yet, in Singapore, the ruling elites 
cohesion remains strong despite the growing dissatisfaction in the middle class 
(Thompson, 2001). Unlike in Malaysia, which saw the government slash its 
military budget to accommodate its economic policy, Singapore was heavily 
dependent on its high defence spending that served as an important legacy to 
boost its legitimacy. More significantly, Singapore’s hegemonic ideology of 
extreme vulnerability surrounded by the Malay states encouraged the PAP to 
further entrench itself in defence. After decades of uninterrupted PAP dominance, 
fixed routines, loyalties and patterns of interactions transcend any political 
individuals from deviating about the proper political order (Slater, 2012).  
After the 97/98 crisis, there were no other alternative parties that resembles 
the PAP’s track record in providing security and economic development despite 
the crisis (Tan, 2015). With its expansive state capacity, the PAP government 
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published a Defence White Paper titled Defending Singapore in the 21st Century 
(Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2000), outlining that each year the government 
is committed to spending 6% of the GDP each year to maintain operational 
readiness of the SAF.  The ruling elites have justified that Singapore’s military 
expenditure to the public that it was committed to invest in the military to support 
the national security concept.  
Since 9/11, terrorism and the sporadic outburst relations between its 
neighbours demonstrates that internal and external threats have conflated through 
the elites’ perceptions of security to the city-state. Globalisation has been 
fundamental in reconfiguring the power and interest of the local elites that 
undermines the state capacity to underwrite policy frameworks upon which such 
constellation of power is dependent for the regime legitimacy (Beeson, 2003). 
The global terrorist threats have further strengthened the PAP’s rhetoric of 
vulnerability and the need to enforce its security policy designed to protect both 
domestic and abroad. Local Jemaah Islamiyah’s plot to attack critical sites in 
2002 has certainly affected the political legitimacy of the PAP government that 
threats were from within its multicultural fabrics (Vasu, 2008). Though these 
threats were swiftly countered through ISA, however, it highlighted that 
Singapore’s structural nature of its multiculturalism (Rodan, 2009). 
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Figure 6.2    Source: (World Bank, 2019)  
 
In recent years, the PAP is increasingly facing resistance from the domestic 
on its relatively high military spending. Similar to Malaysia, growing opposing 
parties such as Singapore’s Democratic Party have questioned the government’s 
military spending challenging the legitimacy of the party state. This forces 
Singapore to shift its policies to focus on welfare, while it retains high military 
expenditure as presented in figure 6.2. Despite this, there is an overwhelming 
acceptance that the PAP’s ideology of vulnerability was endorsed by the 
population. The ideological hegemony and its incorporation of other sectors that 
were institutionally exerted into defence has given the PAP to order power 
(Abdullah, 2018). As Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large 
(2015) explained the national narrative of the party-state, the 2015 election posit 
that the general population has given the overwhelming mandate to the 
government of its endorsement of the strategic perception of vulnerability.  
At various times, the ruling elites had referred to the possibilities that such 
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that Singapore’s uncertain strategic environment legitimises the state to increase 
to be more vigilant (Chong and Chang, 2016). With the combination of the PAP’s 
ideology, coercive institutional tools and elite cohesion, this gave the PAP the 
institutional strength to implement its security policy. With the media under its 
firm grip, the state was heavily promoting its national ideology in the state-
controlled media further mobilised for support of the policy agenda (Vasu and 
Loo, 2016). To further extend Singapore’s validity of existential security threats, 
military equipment is also used as part of Singapore’s national symbol to 
strengthen and reaffirm its needs to militarise the state. Often, advanced military 
weapons were deployed during Singapore’s national day as a display of power 
and national pride to create sense of awe, wonderment and admiration within the 
population with the government’s capabilities in providing security (Ortmann, 
2009). Though, highly technological weapons such as the F-16 and main battle 
tanks provide security to the state, these weapons also represent a national symbol 
to rally the population (Suchman and Eyre, 1992).  
Even though the identification of Singapore’s threats shifted in various 
times, nevertheless, Singapore’s national security remains firmly rooted in its 
historical legacies. In sum, in Singapore the infrastructural power to strengthen 
its security policy to further justify the PAP’s ideology that are politically 
contingent for ensuring continued commitment towards Singapore’s vulnerability 
and survivability. The state’s success was predicated on the state capacity to 
command compliance from middle-class, elites, bureaucrats and business elites 
to participate in contributing to Singapore’s defence. The main beneficiary has 









This chapter has revealed the variations on why Southeast Asian states 
behave differently. A careful analysis of security policies in Southeast Asian 
states shows that security is viewed as a means of power for the dominant actors 
to gain legitimacy. The above cases also bring attention that different state 
formation perceive different values as to what issues as are considered as security 
threats. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the continuing security 
problems are intractable because they are historically rooted in the nature of 
political contestations that are path dependent within the state. This helps us to 
understand why security practices in Southeast Asia present greater continuity 
rather than discontinuity in the region’s security practices. Regional elites often 
reflected on their own historical experiences and transformed discourse into 
negotiated reality.  
Thus, it is necessary for us to understand that states pursue certain security 
policies over spatial and time because it has built some biases to protect the 
dominant forces. State structure may also operate as an enabler or a constraint on 
security policy as political groups within the state may have the capacity to 
enhance or overturn policy to protect their own interest. In the case of Southeast 
Asia, security policies continue to be practised in a way to enhance regime 
security and state development. Because the state is usually captured by the 
dominant social groups, the state may privilege certain actors, ideologies and 
strategies over others. It has also given particular attention on contemporary 
security policies are best understood in the nature of domestic forces that shape 
state power and policy decision-making. The particular nature of the state 
structure formed in Southeast Asia has created dominant actors who are able to 
impose their will to organise or refrain other competing forces to suit their 
interest.  
 253 
As noted above, national security in Southeast Asia is best understood in 
the domestic, and the levels of conflict between social groups that shape policy. 
The above cases highlight that the logic of security forces us to bring attention to 
the domestic condition over state’s political resources and institutions. The 
particular nature of insecurity is the products of historical structures in which the 
dominant forces capture the state to implement policies that serve their own 
interest.  
This also highlights why ASEAN as an institution is confined to serve 
dominant actors in relevant states to maintain their power without interfering in 
their domestic politics. This in turn would reflect the dilemma in how states aim 
to securitise certain issues. This would also be the subject for contestation as these 
actors negotiate with each other over the shared interpretation of norms that may 
not present other’s interest. This chapter nevertheless reinforces this research that 
security is socially constructed. The institutional order laid by its historical 
specificities has a huge impact in the states on how the principal actor in 
securitising certain issues in Southeast Asia. As dominant social forces control 
state resources and capacity, it plays a role in securitising which issues that could 













Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analysed the development of national security in Southeast 
Asia during the colonisation period to the present day.  Drawing on the empirical 
data and insights from the preceding chapters, this thesis has shown how security 
policies in Southeast Asia is a politically contested issue. The various political, 
historical, cultural and social differences present in each case show that it is rather 
difficult to yield a straightforward generalisation in the region. Yet, a comparative 
approach nevertheless provided an important insight on the relative importance 
of history and political structures to determine how states undertake security 
implementation.  
This research has three key findings that highlight the key similarities and 
differences in Southeast Asia and the relation to national security policy. First, 
Southeast Asia’s security behaviour is socially inherited shaped by social 
conflicts during the formation of state after the post-World War. The origin of 
security in Southeast Asia was historically shaped by the levels of conflict during 
the eras of state formation with a powerful path dependent effect. By process 
tracing, this research found that the distinctive causal effects on the levels of 
conflict have a salient influence towards the fostering of national security 
concept. The formulation of national security concept is dependent on how the 
power relations between political forces perceive to protect their own interest and 
the bargaining processes to mobilise state resources to implement the policy 
outcomes. Despite the differences in all states, this research found that the there 
are some similarities in the causes of insecurity in Southeast Asia. Through 
process tracing, this research found that these social cleavages derive from class 
and ethnic cleavages, which continues to be the main determinant source of 
security concerns for Southeast Asian states.  
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As we saw in Chapter 3, the colonial powers primed the nuances for intense 
political conflicts in Southeast Asia. Though the levels of conflict vary in all 
states, the legacies of colonial policies put forth during this period helped 
intensify the social cleavages and how the ordering powers was rearranged during 
the decolonisation.  
In Chapter 4 we saw that the sequences occur preceding the critical 
juncture was endemic political conflict in Southeast Asia. As the social forces 
were on a level playing field during the period of decolonisation, contest for state 
power became more intense between the social forces. The intervention of former 
colonial powers during the negotiation for state autonomy played a critical role 
in dictating how certain dominant groups benefitted during in formulating their 
security policies. Moreover, the intense cleavages from the Communist Left in 
all cases further reinforced the state in securitising certain issues. Thus, in all case 
studies, economic development became the prime goal for these regimes. As Ba 
(2014) argue, in Southeast Asia, economic development was a necessary step in 
order to gain sovereignty. This research also found that the intensity of political 
contestation that overlapped between ethnic and class produced a greater bargain 
for more economic development. This was present in both Malaysia and 
Singapore where both party-state introduced powerful security policies to 
enhance ethnic harmony and wealth creation in order to gain sovereignty.  
  In Chapter 5, we saw how these security policies in Southeast Asia shifted 
which either constrained or strengthened the state power. The changes in the level 
of power dynamics before the end of the Cold War saw a policy shift in all cases. 
Whereas the threats from the Left have largely subsided in most cases aside from 
the Philippines, new threats emerge that would challenge the dominance of the 
ruling elites. The low commodity prices in the 1980’s challenged the legitimacy 
of these authoritarian states which led to the downfall of Marcos in the 
Philippines. Such events forced the dominant actors to strengthen their policies 
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in order to maintain power. Similarly, in Chapter 6, it is clear that from the 
published national security documents that there has been a broadening of the 
national security concept. Although security issues become more multifaceted 
and complex especially on the issue of South China Sea, what emerges in practice 
highlight that security policy in practice is a subject of political contest between 
different social groups. 
The second finding is that the institutional settings of state power is 
historically determinant during the critical juncture, which is consequential to 
how the political behaviours and identities are shaped. Once established, these 
political institutions can either constrain or facilitate future policy decision-
making which resulted in different trajectories on state capacity. The socio-
historical analysis of the institutions is especially important in temporal as it 
provides the context for the state to define its political priorities, identities, and 
values when formulating and implementing security policies. Treating security as 
historically contingent in itself allows us to understand which actors in the state 
have the authority to make the policy decision-making during the critical 
juncture. For this reason, institutional choices made during the initial conditions 
can have a diverging effect on the levels of political contestation, depending on 
the degree of political centralisation in the centre. The differences in 
institutionalisation in these case studies showcased the different trajectories of 
state capacity. This presents that security policies and practices are mediated as a 
product of struggles between social groups which can be dealt through state 
actions.  
Whereas in Malaysia and Singapore focused on the economy and the 
building of its military as a necessary step towards nation-state building and elite 
cohesion, in the Philippines and Indonesia, the lack in response towards nation-
state building saw the path to civilianisation.  This would also highlight how the 
different variations of regime types have different impacts on how states can 
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facilitate certain security policies. Evidence also shows that the democratic 
transition at least in the short run can increase insecurity. Both Indonesia and the 
Philippines saw the rise in predatory regimes which contribute to its insecurity. 
In both Indonesia and the Philippines, the historical conditions of a diverse multi-
ethnic, cultures, religions and the geographic proximity increase the complexity 
of security threats. In both states, they relied on the patronage politics to maintain 
elite cohesion.  
The differences in institutions would also lead to the differences in state 
formation that exist in the post-WWII. As we saw in Chapter 4, the different 
levels of political contestations during the colonial period gave rise to different 
political system in all four cases. It revealed that the levels of conflict during the 
Cold War gave different trajectories to the authoritarian regimes in Southeast 
Asia. To that extent, the levels of political conflict will determine how states 
organised themselves. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic 
anxieties, fracture among the class line, and the poor economic condition left by 
the burdens of the British colonial policy saw the institutionalisation of a one-
party state regime that was crucial to control the policy agenda. At the height of 
the Cold War, political contestations between the social forces shape choices 
about institutional development which have long-term effects. While the 
trajectory of state formation saw the path to authoritarian regimes in all four 
ASEAN states in the mid 1960’s, however, there would also be a diverging 
trajectory of authoritarianism. In the case of both Malaysia and Singapore, the 
effect of social cleavages led to a strong elite cohesion and the institutionalisation 
of strong party-states, which dominate the agenda settings. On the other hand, in 
both Indonesia and the Philippines, the intense social cleavages and the severe 
elite fractions saw the state trajectory to the path of militarisation. 
In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, while both are authoritarian 
regimes, the differences in the security priorities would also show. Both states 
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share similar historical legacies as both were part of the British colonies, therefore 
sharing similar political system. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the 
elites were severely fragmented which provided the military to play a bigger role 
in development of state. Whereas in Singapore and Malaysia focused on 
economic development and ethnic harmony to maintain regime legitimacy, in 
both the Philippines and Indonesia relied on excessive coercive use of force to 
maintain order especially in the periphery. 
Institutions would also become a subject of political conflict. In most case 
studies, institutionalising a security concept may only benefit certain social 
groups. Over time, the institutionalisation of the security concept as a result of 
the contingent outcome of struggle for power and control may either constrain or 
enable other actors to challenge the dominant actors for access to state power. For 
instance, as seen in Chapter 5, the policy conversion of the Total Defence Concept 
and the NEP in Malaysia played a critical role in enmeshing the ethnically diverse 
community to further promote nation-state building. On the other hand, in the 
Philippines and Indonesia, the rise of a personalistic regime became contentious 
especially between the elites as both Marcos and Suharto regime controlled the 
access to state resources and rents. In both states, there would also be a dramatic 
transformation on the institution which saw the democratization. As the political 
conflict becomes unbearable, it weakened the state which gave rise to other 
political actors while displacing the dominant actors.  
Perhaps, one common perception shared in these four cases was the 
institutionalisation of ASEAN during the Cold War. States have begun to 
organise themselves in order to promote the shared norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention. Growing economic and security concerns has compelled for 
ASEAN to expand its institutional role to deal with newer challenges. Despite 
this, because the domestic actors have their own strategic interest, it would also 
limit its institutional capacity as newer members might see this as pressure for 
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liberalisation. This in turn helps us to explain why it is often difficult for states to 
meet their obligations in certain institutional framework. For instance, the issue 
on South China Sea is increasingly acknowledge as a regional issue. However, 
the actual implementation of the policies adopted were filtered by the dominant 
interest. 
The third key finding is that there is a degree of continuity rather than 
discontinuity on security policies in Southeast Asia. Security concepts can have a 
path dependent effect that can be difficult to overcome leading to an institutional 
lock-in. The continuity of security concept is linked to its history and institution 
as certain dominant interest rely on this perspective. Despite the purpose of 
security policy is to provide safety, however, the process of institutionalising the 
security culture may involve other actors to reinforce the implementation. In the 
case of Malaysia, economic security continues to be its main priority because of 
the historical presence of ethnic cleavages. Due to the dominance of the party-
state, its ability to control the bureaucrats produces an interlocking path-
dependence. Whereas in Singapore, security policy is not only to enhance its 
nation-state building, but it also become its recruiting ground for elites. Despite 
being a small state, the legitimacy of the PAP historically has been to provide 
security and economic development that are intertwined. In the case of Indonesia 
and the Philippines, such continuity of security policies focused on achieving 
unity. Because it lacks the process of nation-state building that were present in 
Singapore and Malaysia, secessionist and terrorist activities continue to plague 
both Indonesia and the Philippines. Perhaps, at another level, the institutional 
arrangements would also become a source of political violence which increases 
the logic of continuity rather than discontinuity. Even though both Indonesia and 
the Philippines have successfully democratized, the military still possess 
institutional autonomy in formulation of security policy in both Indonesia and the 
Philippines can create a cycle of conflict.  
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What lessons can we draw from this study? This research finds that by 
using HI as an analytical framework, it provides a richer contextual account on 
the analysis of security in Southeast Asia. The analytical design also 
complements with the Constructivist approach which can widen the lens of 
analytical purposes. Whereas the mainstream has been susceptible to 
ahistoricism, in reality different states have its own historical specificities. Thus, 
by incorporating the study of history, it offers an immensely valuable perspective 
for understanding the politics of security in Southeast Asia and that it brings 
critical attention to the role of the state in understanding the variances in security 
policies in Southeast Asia.  
By exploring its history, timing and sequences, this research successfully 
unpacked the policy processes to provide an alternative context on why security 
behaviours vary in the region. It illuminates the importance of temporality and 
sequences in earlier choices matters. The comparative research presents that in 
order to better understand on security policies in the region, we also need to 
consider that the politics of security is not exclusively systemic bound. By 
analysing both the actors and the institution, HI provides a holistic explanation 
not only on Southeast Asia politics but also in the field of Security Studies. 
Utilising HI as an analytical approach allows us for an examination of the deeper 
political and normative implications as a security discourse which provides us 
with constitutive understanding of why particular security practices are 
implemented.  
 This research also finds that security analysis is much more multifaceted 
and complex that requires the analysis of history to trace its origin, evolution and 
consequences towards the state and society. If we choose to accept that states are 
not ahistorical, HI can provide a powerful tool to understand the study of security 
and International Relations. To complement the HI, by employing the small-N 
research, it provides thicker details on the states institutions and what influences 
the states actors, which the realist paradigm lacks. More importantly, this research 
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can encourage future studies to include the historical analysis in understanding 





























Table 1 Interviewees: Politicians/Bureaucrats/Academics 
Interviewee Positions 
Malaysia 
Mahathir Mohammed  








Dr. Faisol Keling 
Shahriman Lockman 




• the Former Prime Minister for Malaysia (2016) 
• ISEAS Singapore (2017) 
• Analyst from CSIS Malaysia (Chatham House Rules) (2017) 
• UKM Malaysia (2017) 
• Mid-Level Bureaucrat officer (Chatham House Rules) (2017) 
• Ex-CEO of Labuan Shipyard (2019) 
• Former Undersecretary of the Defence Industry Division at 
the Ministry of Defence Malaysia (2019) 
• University Utara Malaysia (2019) 
• CSIS Malaysia (2019) 
• New York University (2018) 
• High Ranking Military Officer (2019)  











• ISEAS Singapore (2016) 
• LSE (2018) 
• Former Cabinet Minister of the Philippines (Chatham House 
Rules) (2017) 
• Mid Ranking Army Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2016) 
• Mid Ranking Army Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2019) 




Collin Koh Swee Lean 
Ian Storey 
Richard Bitzinger 
Ang Cheng Guan 
Brunei Defence 





• RSIS Singapore (2016) 
• RSIS Singapore (2016) 
• ISEAS Singapore (2016) 
• RSIS Singapore (2016) 
• RSIS Singapore (2016) 
• MINDEF (2019) 
• Mid Ranking Military Officer (Chatham House Rules) (2019) 








Rizal Sukma      
Marcus Mietzner 
Brunei Defence Attache 
to Indonesia 
 
• CSIS, Indonesia (2019) 
• Former High-Ranking Military Officer, Interview in Brunei 
(Chatham House Rules) (2019) 
• Interview in Brunei (Chatham House Rules) (2019) 
•  Interview in Brunei (2019) 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brunei (2019) 
• Email Interview (2019) 
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